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Foreword By Kurt 
Carraway,UAS Department 
Head & Executive Director, 
Applied Aviation Research 
Center 
I am honored to introduce this fourth book, once again led by 
Professor Randall Nichols and his esteemed colleagues and subject-
matter experts on unmanned vehicles and cybersecurity. This 
compilation of work is thoughtfully broken down into sections 
including air and underwater domains in which unmanned vehicles 
operate as well as a section dedicated to unmanned vehicles as 
weapons and a section focused on geopolitical and legal advances. 
 
The first section, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” walks students 
through a series dedicated to the constantly evolving information 
advances on the topic, including a review on the state-of-the-art, 
serving as an exploration of current and emerging technologies 
and some fascinating implications it may have on the UAS industry. 
The entire section introduces some fascinating applications for 
UAS—both by the commercial sector as well as the federal 
government. 
 
Section 2 provides a fascinating glimpse into the maritime 
domain, with an emphasis on Unmanned Underwater Systems, or 
UUVs. The introduction focusses on navigational solutions for 
submarines and UUVs, including a discussion on the use of 
exteroceptive sensors to supplement map references, and when 
they do not exist, they may use these sensors for simultaneous 
xx  |  Foreword By Kurt Carraway,UAS
Department Head & Executive
localization and mapping, or SLAM. All of these methodologies are 
able to operate underwater without the use of global navigation 
systems—an area where one could argue that their unmanned air 
counterparts are overly reliant. The UUV section also goes into 
some depth (pun intentional) on the subject of underwater basing 
and military applications. Chapter 6 provides a reflection on the 
history of underwater vehicles, the advancement of sensors and 
UUV technology and commercial implications for the UUV market. 
This section is rounded off by chapter 7, a bit of a “deep dive” into 
UUV design considerations for naval architecture. 
 
Section 3 kicks off by adding historical context on regulatory 
development pertaining to technologies and an exploration on the 
subject of multi-domain traffic management systems. It goes on to 
introduce the counter UAS problem set and uses Iranian attacks on 
Saudi Arabian oil fields as a case study to illustrate challenges with 
cyber defense and vulnerabilities posed to Air Defense Systems, 
followed by an examination of path planning tactics. 
 
In section 4, one chapter stems from a graduate research project 
in which the author explored how FAA regulations pertaining to 
UAS operations are influenced by the Fourth Amendment, as well 
as privacy laws at multiple levels of government. This section also 
introduces how UVs may be vulnerable to misinformation and 
disinformation, and the consequences if unaddressed. 
 
Section 5 is fascinating. Carter’s chapter on Chinese Unmanned 
Proliferation Along New Silk Road Sea/Land routes offers some 
important strategic context on the People’s Republic of China. The 
chapter on crossing the machine-human barrier reviews the risks 
posed by social media and links its use to acceptance and trust—and 
then explores how it may be utilized in a nefarious manner. This 
offers a thought-provoking examination on the broader topic of 
artificial intelligence and autonomous technology. The final chapter 
explores the relationship between increased dependencies on the 
Foreword By Kurt Carraway,UAS Department Head & Executive Director,
Applied Aviation Research Center  |  xxi
Internet of Things and how its incorporation into maritime systems 
may be bringing the industry into the future, but not without 
broadscale risks from a cybersecurity perspective. 
 
Common threads across all of the sections includes an illustration 
of how technological advances promote the technical readiness 
level and implications of unmanned vehicles across all three 
domains, including military and commercial applications. This is 
underscored by a theme of considering various levels of autonomy 
and artificial intelligence across the range of systems—including the 
topics of dependability, trust, vulnerabilities, and human interaction 
associated with them. 
 
This body of work is derived from open source references and 
written by esteemed subject matter experts in their field is a 
compilation of thought provoking and up-to-date materials for 
consumption by students of all types. Professor Nichols and his 
colleagues have done it again! 
 
Kurt J. Carraway 
UAS Department Head and Executive Director, Applied Aviation 
Research Center 
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Preface 
This is our fourth textbook in a series previously covering the world 
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Counter Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (CUAS). Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber 
Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd edition and 
Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations
have seen considerable global recognition in the field.  (Nichols R. , 
et al., 2019) (Nichols R. , et al., 2020) 
The authors have expanded our purview beyond UAS / CUAS 
systems. Our title shows our concern for growth and unique 
operations for all unmanned vehicles in all theaters: Air, Sea and 
Land. Three different factors have spurred the authors into 
expanding our textbook offerings. First, unmanned technology has 
seen an economic explosion in production, sales, testing, 
specialized designs, and friendly / hostile usages of deployed UAS 
/ UAVs / Drones / UUVs / UDV / UGTs (hereafter referred to 
as a group as UVs). There is a huge global growing market and 
entrepreneurs know it. Small UV companies have been reproducing 
like rabbits. Many companies are exploring / creating new, unique, 
and profitable unmanned technologies for  all military branches, 
LEO, commercial, high-mountain and deep-sea rescue, and 
recreational purposes. Covid-19 has brought a new dimension to UV 
planning and designs for medical and rescue missions. 
Second, hostile use of UVs is on the forefront of DoD defense 
and offensive planners. They are especially concerned with SWARM 
behaviors in the air, over land and a new threat of underwater. 
 The influence of IoT, AI and Cyber technologies has complicated the 
defense planning mission. 
Third, UV technology has outpacing our first and second editions 
plus our textbook on CUAS. Everyday our writers group read / 
discussed new UAS / UV developments in navigation, weapons, 
surveillance, data transfer, fuel cells, stealth, weight distribution, 
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tactics, GPS / GNSS ( and replacement technologies) elements, 
SCADA protections, privacy invasions, legislation, big-data usage, 
terrorist uses, cryptographic protections, pressure protection for 
deep water exploration, maintenance, rescue or intelligence 
gathering; ASW, and defense; specialized software and security 
protocols and more. As authors we felt compelled to address at least 
the edge of some of these new UV developments. It was clear that 
we would be lucky if we could cover some of the more interesting 
and priority technology updates for the various UV AOs. 
Expanded purview means more experience was needed to write 
our newest work. We are privileged to add to original writing team 
of Nichols, Ryan, Mumm, Lonstein, Carter, and Hood new SMEs in 
the various UV technologies: Mai, Jackson, and Shay. Their extensive 
backgrounds are found in our tribute to the authors in a latter 
section. 
Here is an outline of topics in our latest work: 
SECTION 1: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
 
Chapter 1 Information Advances, Remote ID, & Extreme 
Persistence ISR [Ryan] 
Chapter 2 : Unmanned Aerial Vehicles & How They Can Augment 
Mesonet Weather Tower Data Collection [Mai] 
Chapter 3 Tour de Drones for the Discerning Palate [Nichols] 
 
SECTION 2: UNMANNED UNDERWATER SYSTEMS 
 
Chapter 4 Underwater Autonomous Navigation & other UUV 
Advances [Mumm] 
Chapter 5 Autonomous Maritime Asymmetric Systems [Hood] 
Chapter 6 UUV Integrated Autonomous Missions & Drone 
Management [Mumm] 
Chapter 7 Principles of Naval Architecture Applied to UUV’s 
[Jackson] 
 
xxiv  |  Preface
SECTION 3: UNMANNED VEHICLES FOR GROUND / LAND 
OPERATIONS & Penetration of ADS 
 
Chapter 8 : Unmanned Logistics Operating Safely & Efficiently 
Across Multiple Domains [Lonstein] 
Chapter 9 Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path 
Planning in Combat Environment [Nichols] 
 
SECTION 4: UNMANNED VEHICLES WEAPONS FOR C4ISR & 
POPULATION TRACKING  & CONTROL 
 
Chapter 10 UAS, the Fourth Amendment and Privacy [Shay] 
Chapter 11 UV & Disinformation / Misinformation Channels 
[Ryan] 
 
SECTION 5: UV GEOPOLITICAL & LEGAL ADVANCES 
Chapter 12  Chinese UAS Proliferation along New Silk Road Sea / 
Land Routes [Carter] 
 
Chapter 13 Automaton, AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the Machine – 
Human Barrier [Lonstein] 
Chapter 14 Maritime Cybersecurity [Nichols] 
 
 
We trust our newest look at Unmanned Vehicles in Air , Sea and 
Land  will enrich our students and readers understanding of the 
purview of this wonderful technology we call UV. 
 
Best 
Randall K Nichols 
Professor of Practice 
Director, Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) – 
Cybersecurity Certificate Program 
Managing Editor / Co-Author 
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Kansas State University Polytechnic Campus & 





Illi nunquam cedunt. 
“We Never Yield” 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 Abbreviations: Acronyms [Rev 80A] 09212020 
 
The following terms are common to the UAS industry, general 
literature, or conferences on UAS/UAV/Drone/UUV systems. 
A-STAR          Heuristic search algorithm discussed in chapter 9 
A2 / AD          Anti-access / Area Denial 
A /Aref            Amplitudes of source and reference points, see 
Eq-20-6,7 
AA                  Anti-aircraft / Adaptive Antennas 
AAA               Anti-aircraft artillery 
AAIB              Air Accidents Investigation Board 
AAM              Air-to-air missile 
AAV               Autonomous air vehicle 
ABI                 Aviation Block Infrastructure 
ABMS             Advanced battle management system 
A/C                 Aircraft 
ACAS             Airborne collision avoidance system / Assistant Chief 
of the Air Staff 
ACL                Agent communication language / Autonomous control 
levels 
ACOUSTIC    Detects drones by recognizing unique sounds 
produced by their motors 
ACRP             Airport Cooperative Research Project 
ACS                Airbome (defense) control station (system) 
ACTD             Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 
AD                 Air Defense / Ansar Dine terrorist group 
A/D               Attack / Defense Scenario Analysis 
ADAC            Automated Dynamic Airspace Controller 
ADAPs           Adaptive compute acceleration platforms 
ADC               Air data computer 
ADF               Automatic direction finder/finding 
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ADMS            Air defense missile (radar) system 
ADS                Air Defense System (USA) 
ADS-B            Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast 
systems 
ADT                Air Data Terminal 
AESA             Active electronically scanned array 
AEW              Airbome early warning 
AF                  Adaptive Filtering 
AFCS              Automatic flight control system 
AFRICOM      US Africa Command 
AGL                Above ground level 
AGM               Air- to- surface missile 
AGARD          Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and 
Development (NATO) 
AGM-65         Maverick (USA) is an air-to-surface missile (AGM) 
designed for close air support. It is the most widely produced 
precision-guided missile in the Western world, and is effective 
against a wide range of tactical targets, including armor, air 
defenses, ships, ground transportation and fuel storage facilities. 
AGV               Autonomous Guard Vehicle 
AHA               Autopilot Hardware Attack 
AHD               Analog high definition 
AHRS             Attitude and heading reference system 
AI                    Artificial intelligence: “1. a branch of computer science 
dealing with the simulation of intelligent behavior in computers and 
2: the capability of a machine to imitate intelligent human behavior.” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2020) 
AIAA              American Institute of Aeronautics and Aerospace 
AIC                 Aeronautical Information Circular 
AIP                 Aeronautical Information Publication 
AIS                 Automated Identification System for Collision 
Avoidance 
AJ                   Anti-Jam 
ALB                Air Land Battle 
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ALERT           Advanced Low-observable Embedded 
Reconnaissance Targeting system. 
AM                  Amplitude Modulation / al-Mourabitoun terrorist 
group 
AMB               Agile Multi-Beam 
AMRAAM      Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile 
ANSP              Air Navigation Service Provider 
ANO               Air Navigation Order (UK) 
AO                  Area of Operations 
AoA                Angle of Attack 
APEC              Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APG                Asia-Pacific Gateway 
APKWS          Advanced precision kill weapon system 
AQ                  Al-Qaeda Terrorist Group – “the Base” 
AOA               Aircraft operating authority 
AQIM             al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
Ar                   Receive antenna effective area, m2 
AR                   Aspect ratio 
AR drone       AR stands for “Augmented Reality” in AR drone. AR 
Drone can perform tasks like object recognition and following, 
gesture following. 
ARM               Anti-Radiation Munitions 
ARS                Airborne Remote Sensing 
ART                Autonomous Rail Transport 
ARW               Anti-radiation weapons 
AS                   Airborne Sensing Systems 
ASB                Advisory Service Bulletin  / Air Sea Battle 
ASBM             Anti-ship ballistic missile 
ASCM             Anti-ship cruise missile 
ASEA              Active electronically scanned arrays 
ASEAN           Association of Southeastern Asian Nations 
ASICs             Application specific integrated Circuits & circuit 
boards 
ASL                Airborne Systems Laboratory 
ASMS             Automated Separation Management System 
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ASR                Chinese Air Silk Road 
ASOS              Automated surface weather observation system 
ASTM             American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) 
ASTER           Agency for Science, Technology and Research 
ASuW             Anti-surface unit warfare 
ASW               Anti-submarine warfare 
AT                  Aerial target 
ATC               Air Traffic Control 
ATHENA       Lockheed Martin Advanced Test High Energy Asset 
ATM               Air Traffic Management 
ATN               Aids to Navigation  (aka ATON) 
ATR                Automatic Target Recognition 
ATS                Air Traffic Service 
AUDS             Anti-UAV Defense System 
AUV               Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
Avionics        Aviation electronics in manned or unmanned aircraft 
AUVSI            Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
International 
AV                  Air Vehicle 
AWOS            Automated weather observation system 
AWSAS          All Weather Sense and Avoid System 
B                     IF equivalent bandwidth, Hz 
Backhauling  Intermediate links between core network or internet 
backbone and small subnets at the edge of the network 
BAMS             Broad Area maritime surveillance 
BATS               Bermuda Atlantic Time-series Study 
Bandwidth     Defined as the Range within a band of wavelengths, 
frequencies, or energy. 
Think of it as a range of radio frequencies occupied by a 
modulated carrier wave, assigned to a service over which a device 
can operate. Bandwidth is also a capacity for data transfer of 
electrical communications system. 
BDA                Battle Damage assessment 
BER                Bit error rate 
BLOS              Beyond line-of-sight 
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BNF                Bind and Fly – with custom transmitter 
BPAUV           Battlespace preparation autonomous underwater 
vehicle 
BRI                  Chinese Belt and Road Initiative 
BR&T              Boeing Research and Technology 
BSR                 Bilinear Signal Representation 
BSs                  Base Stations 
BVR                Beyond visual range 
c                      Speed of light ~ (3 x 108 m/s) [186,000 miles per 
sec] in vacuum named after Celeritas the Latin word for speed or 
velocity 
c                      speed of sound (344 m/s) in air 
C                     Combined methods of CR 
C2 / C2W      Command and control / Command and Control 
Warfare 
C3I                  Command, control, communications, and 
Intelligence 
C4                   Command, control, communications, and 
computers 
C4I                  Command, control, communications and 
computers, intelligence 
C4ISR             Command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance &  reconnaissance 
C4ISTAR        Command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, target 
acquisition and reconnaissance 
CA                  Collision Avoidance / Clear Acquisition (GPS) / 
Cyber Assault (aka CyA) 
C/A                 Civilian acquisition code for GPS 
CAA                Control Acquisition cyber attack 
CAS                 Close Air Support / Common situational awareness 
CASA              Civil Aviation Safety Authority 
CASIC            China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation 
C of A             Certificate of Airworthiness 
CAP                Civil Air Publication 
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CAT                Collision Avoidance Threshold /Connectivity & 
automation in transport 
CC / CyC      Cyber Crime 
CCCI/II          Classical Cryptography Course Volume I/II (Nichols 
R. K., Classical Cryptography Course Volume I / II, 1996) 
CCE                Cyber Counter Espionage 
CCI                 Command control interface / Cyber 
Counterintelligence 
CCMCPS        Cooperative Cognitive Maritime Cyber Physical 
System 
CCS                Cyber Counter Sabotage 
CCT                Cyber Counter Terrorism 
CC-UAS         Counter-Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
CD                  Conflict Detection 
CDL                Common datalink 
CDMA            code division multiple access 
CDR                Collision detection and resolution systems 
(automated SAA in UAS) 
CEA                Cyber electromagnetic activities (Cyber, EW, 
Spectrum warfare) 
CETC              Chinese Electronics Technology Group 
CF                   Computer Forensics 
CFTA              Continental Free Trade Area 
CFT                Certificate of flight trials / Cross-functional teams 
CHIMERA     Counter-electronic HPM Extended range base air 
defense 
CI / CyI         Cyber Infiltration 
CIA                 Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability / Central 
Intelligence Agency 
CIAD              Cyber- Multi-layered Integrated Air Defense 
Systems 
CIED              Computer improvised explosive device 
CIN                 Common Information Network 
CIR                 Color Infrared – artificial standard where NIR bands 
shifted so that humans can see the infrared reflectance 
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CLE                Airport code for Cleveland 
C/N               Carrier to Noise ratio in HAPS, => C/ N0 
C/NA              Communication / Navigation Aid 
CM / CyM      Countermeasure / Cyber Manipulation 
CN3                 Communications / navigation network node 
CNI                 Critical National Infrastructure 
CNKI               China-North Korea-Iran technical weapons 
cooperation agreements 
CNO                Chief Naval Operations 
CNPC             Control and non-payload links 
COA                Certificate of Waiver or Authorization 
COB                Chief of the Boat 
COMINT        Communications intelligence 
COMJAM       Communications Jamming 
COMSEC       Communications Security 
CONOP(S)      Concepts of Operations 
CONUS          Continental United States 
COOP             Cooperative Observer Program 
COS                Continued Operational Safety 
COTS              Commercial off-the-shelf 
CPA                Closest Point of Approach 
CPA Spoof      CPA spoof involves faking a possible collision with a 
target ship 
CPL                 Commercial pilot’s license 
CPNI               Center for Protection of National Infrastructure 
(UK) 
CPRC              Communist Party of the Republic of China 
CPS                 Cyber-physical systems 
CR                   Conflict Resolution / Close range / Cyber Raid (aka 
CyR) 
CRH                Coaxial rotor helicopter 
CRX                 Received Signal Power, watts 
CS                   Control station 
CSDP              Common Security and Defense Policy missions (EU) 
CSR                Compact Surveillance Radar 
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CSfC               Commercial Solutions for Classified Program 
CSIRO            Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization 
CT                   Counter Terrorism / Counter Terrorism Mission 
CTOL             Conventional take-off and landing 
C-UAS            Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (defenses / 
countermeasures) 
CUAS             CSIRO Unmanned Aircraft Systems 
CV                  Collision Volume 
CW / CyW    Cyber Warfare 
D-STAR          Variation of A-STAR algorithm suitable for solving 
path planning problems in unknown environments 
D                     distance from transmitter in Range equation (Adamy 
D. -0., 2015) 
DA                  Danger area 
Danger Close 
Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/
2013/May-June/Myer.html Nov 14, 2013 – 1) danger close is 
included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire 
request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target. 
… Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate 
distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define 
danger close for aircraft delivery.  Pi = Probability of incapacitation. 
2) Definition of “danger close” (US DoD) In close air support, 
artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term 
included in the method of engagement segment of a call for fire 
which indicates that friendly forces are within close proximity of 
the target. 
DARO            Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 
DARPA          Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DAS                Detection by Acoustical Signature 
dB                   decibels 
DC                  Direct Current 
DCL                Drone Champions League 
DCPA             Distance between vessels approaching CPA 
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DDD               Dull, dangerous, and dirty 
DDOS             Distributed Denial of Service cyber attack 
DE                   Directed Energy 
DEF CON       DEF CON is the world’s longest running and largest 
underground hacking conference. 
DE / EP          Directed energy / Electromagnetic pulse 
DEM               Digital elevation model 
DEW               Directed energy weapons 
DF                   Direction finding 
DFCS              Digital Flight Control System 
DHS                Department of Homeland Security 
DIME              Diplomatic, information, military, and economy 
DIRCM           Directed Infrared Countermeasures 
DIY                 Do-it-yourself (amateur built drones or modified 
racing drones) 
D j                   Jammer location – to-target receiver location 
distance, in km, FM 34-40-7 
DJ                    Data Jamming / Drone Jammer 
DJI                  Popular and functional Chinese made drone series: 
Mavic, Phantom, Ryze, Matrix, Spark, Enterprise, Inspire, Tello 
{However, banned by USA Army} (Newman, 2017) 
DL                   Downlink in HAPS 
DLA                Date last accessed (usually a web reference) 
DLI                 Datalink interface 
DNA               Deoxyribonucleic acid 
DoD                Department of Defense 
DOF                Degrees of Freedom 
DVL                Doppler velocity log 
DOS                Denial of Service cyber attack 
DPM               Direct power management / Dynamic Power 
Management 
DPRK             Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
D-R-O-N-E   FAA Guidance: Direct, Report, Observe, Notice 
&Execute 
DROV            Remote operating vehicle 
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DSA                Detect, sense and avoid / Dynamic Sense-and-Act 
DSR                Chinese Digital Silk Road 
DSS                 Decision Support System 
DSSS               Direct sequence spread spectrum 
D t                   Enemy transmitter location -to- target receiver 
location, in km, FM 34-40-7 
DT                   Directional transmission / Department of 
Transport (UK) 
DTDMA          Distributed Time Division Multiple Access (DTDMA) 
network radio system 
DTED              Digital terrain evaluation data 
DTF                 Drug Task Force 
DTH                Direct-To-Home 
DTI                 Direct Track & Identify 
DTRA             Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
DUO               Designated UAS operator 
EA                   Electronic Attack 
EARSC           European Association of Remote Sensing Companies 
EAS                Equivalent airspeed 
EAU                East Africa union comprising of Israel and six East 
African states, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and 
South Sudan 
(Eb / No)        Thermal noise power spectral density ratio 
ECCM / EP    Electronic counter-countermeasures / Electronic 
Protection 
ECM               Electronic countermeasures 
ECR                Electronic combat reconnaissance 
EDC                Estimated Date of Completion 
EDEW            Effects of Directed Energy Weapons 
EEZP              Exclusive economic Zone protection 
EFF                 Electronic Frontier Foundation 
EHS                Enhanced surveillance 
EIRP               Effective isotopic radiated power 
Electrolaser  Electroshock weapon that is also a DEW. Uses lasers 
to form electrically conductive laser-induced plasma charge 
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ELINT            Electronic Intelligence 
ELT                Emergency locator transmitter 
ECM               Electromagnetic compatibility 
EM                  Electromagnetic 
EMC               Electromagnetic compatibility 
EME                Electromagnetic environment 
EMI                Electromagnetic interference 
EMO               Electromagnetic operations 
EMP               Electromagnetic pulse 
EMR               Electromagnetic Radiation 
EMS                Electromagnetic Spectrum 
EMSVIS          Electromagnetic Spectrum Visible Light 
EMW              Electromagnetic Waves 
EO                  Electro-optical (sensing) / Earth Observation 
EOTS              Electro-optical targeting system 
EPIRB            Emergency Positioning -Indicating Radio Beacon 
EQUAS          Explainable question answering system 
ERPJ               Effective radiated power of the jammer, in dBm 
ERPS               Effective radiated power of the desired signal 
transmitter, in dBm 
ESM / ES       Electronic support measures / Electronic warfare 
support / Earth station  &             ESM                         Electronic 
Signal Monitoring 
EU                   European Union 
EUNAVFOR   European Union Naval Force’s anti-piracy naval 
mission 
EUTM             Somalia Military training mission in Somalia 
EVTOL           Electric Vertical Take-off and Landing 
EW                  Electronic warfare, see 9-15 & footnotes 
F                      Field theory methods of CR 
F                      Fundamental frequency is defined as the lowest 
frequency of a periodic waveform 
f                       Frequency, cycles / second RRE) 
Fo                    Resonant frequency of string, Hz see Eq. 20-5 
F                      Frequency in MHz, FM 34-40-7 
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FAA                Federal Aviation Administration 
FACE              Future Airborne Capability Environment 
FAR                False Alarm Rates 
FBL                 Fly-by-Light, a type of flight-control system where 
input command signals are sent to the actuators through the 
medium of optical-fiber … 
FBW               Fly-by-wire 
FCC                Federal Communications Commission 
FCS                 Flight control systems / Flight Control Station 
FDF                 Frequency Domain Filtering 
FDM               frequency division multiplexing 
FHSS              Frequency hopping spread spectrum 
FIIP                 Floating Integrated Information Platforms 
FIR                  Far Infrared (25-40) to (200-350) um 
FIRES             definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon 
systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. 
FL                   Flight Level 
FLIR               Forward-looking infrared 
Fly-by-Wire  Predetermine flight mission path based on GPS 
coordinates 
Floats              Floating sensors (USN) 
FMS                Flexible manufacturing system 
Follow-Me      UAS autopilot automatically follows operator 
Fom                HAPS Figure of merit in upload /download link 
FoV                 Field of view 
FFOV              Forward Field of View 
FRAGO          Fragmentary Order – to send timely changes of 
existing orders to a subordinate 
FPV                 First Person View – live streaming video used in 
racing drones 
FPGA              Field programmable gate array 
FS                    Fixed service 
FSS                 Fixed satellite service 
FW                  Fixed wing 
FY                   Fiscal year 
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G                     Geometric methods of CR 
G5S                 G5 Sahel (G5S) Joint Force, has membership of five 
states: Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad 
GAO               General Accounting Office USA 
gAR                Receiving Antenna Gain as a Factor 
GBU               Guided Bomb Unit 
GCHQ            Government Communications Headquarters 
(Britain) 
GCS                Ground control station 
GDP                Gross Domestic Product (USA) 
GDPR             European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection 
Regulation 
GDT               Ground data terminal 
GEO                Geostationary Earth orbit satellite 
GEOINT         Geospatial-Intelligence 
GeoFence       A geo-fence is a virtual perimeter for a real-
world geographic area 
GIGO              Garbage in, garbage out 
GLOW            Gross lift-off weight for a missile / rocket 
GNSS              Global Navigation Satellite System 
GLONASS     Global Satellite Navigational System 
GPS                 Global Positioning System / Geo Fencing 
GPS/INS         Use of GPS satellite signals to correct or calibrate 
a solution from an inertial navigation system (INS). The method is 
applicable for any GNSS/INS system. 
GPSSPOOF    Hack of GPS system affecting UAS commands 
GPWS             Ground proximity warning system 
G R                 The receiving antenna gain in the direction of the 
desired signal transmitter, dBi 
G RJ                Receiving antenna gain in the direction of the 
jammer, in dBi 
GS                   Ground segment of HAPs 
GSE                Ground support equipment 
GSHM            Ground Station Handover Method 
GSM               Global System for Mobile Communications 
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GT                   Game Theory methods of CR 
G/T                ratio of the receive antenna gain to system noise 
temperature 
(G /Ts) dB      Represents the figure of merit of the HAPS receiver, 
in dB 
GT                   Gain of the transmit antenna, dB 
GTA                 Ground -to -Air Defense 
Hard damage DEW complete vaporization of a target 
Harmonic       Frequency, which is an integer multiple of the 
fundamental frequency 
H                     Elevation of the jammer location above sea level, 
feet, FM 34-40-7 
HAE                High altitude endurance 
HALE             High altitude – long endurance 
HAPS             High Altitude Platforms (generally for wireless 
communications enhancements) 
HAPS UAVs   UAVs dedicated to HAPS service (example to 
communicate via CNPC links) 
HCE               Highly contested environment 
HEAT             High-explosive anti-tank warhead 
HELWS          High energy laser weapon system 
HITL               Human in-the-loop 
HMI                Human machine interface 
HO                  Home Office (UK) 
HPA                High power amplifier 
HPL                High powered laser weapon 
HPM               High powered microwave defense 
H t                  Elevation of enemy transmitter location above sea 
level, in feet, FM 34-40-7 
HUD               Heads-up display 
Human           “a bipedal primate mammal (Homo sapiens), a 
person” (Merriam-Webster, 2020); Humanity       “the quality or state 
of being human.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020) 
Humanoids     “a humanoid being: a nonhuman creature or being 
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with characteristics (such as the ability to walk upright) resembling 
those of a human.” 
HUMINT        Human intelligence (spy’s) 
HVT                High value target (generally, for assassination) 
I                       Sound intensity, W x m-2 [Source strength S / 4πr2] 
(Uni-wuppertal, 2019) 
IA                    Information Assurance / Intentional cyber warfare 
attack 
I-actors         Intentional Cyber Actors 
IADS              Multi-layered integrated air defense systems 
IAI                  Israeli Aerospace Industries 
IAS                 Indicated airspeed 
ICAO              International Civil Aviation Organization 
I.C.B.C           International Center for Boundary Cooperation 
(China) 
ICBM             Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
ICGs               Information centers of gravity 
ICS                  Internet Connection Sharing / Industrial control 
systems 
ID                    Information Dominance / Inspection and 
Identification /Identification 
IEDs               Improvised Explosive Devices 
IEEE               Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IETM              Interactive Electronic Maintenance Manuals 
IEWS              Intelligence, electronic warfare, and sensors 
IFF                  Identification, friend, or foe 
IFR                  Instrument flight rules 
I&I                  Interchangeability and Interoperability 
IIT                   Intentional Insider Threats 
Imaging Sensors ARS sensors that build images 
IL                    Intensity level of sound measured, dB, Eq. 20-2 
IMINT            Imagery intelligence 
IMM                Interacting-multiple-models tracker 
IMU                Inertial Measurement Unit 
INS                 Inertial navigation system 
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IMU                Inertial Measurement Unit 
INFOSEC       Information Security 
IO                    Information Operations, see Figure 9-11 & footnotes 
IOB                 Internet of bodies 
IOC                 Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission 
IOR                 India Ocean Region 
IoT                  Internet of things 
IIoT                 Industrial Internet of things 
IPL                  Insitu Pacific Limited 
IR                    Infrared Sensors 
IRST               Infrared search and tracking 
IS                    Information Superiority 
ISCS               Integrated shipboard control systems 
ISIS                 Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) 
ISR                  Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance UAS 
Platform 
ISTAR             Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance 
IT                    Information Technology 
ITU                 International Telecommunications Union – 
Standards Organization 
ITU-R             International Telecommunications Union – Radio 
Sector 
IW                   Information Warfare 
JADC2            Joint all-domain command & control 
JADO              Joint all-domain operations (Thatcher, 2020) 
JAGM             Joint-Air-to-Ground Missile 
JAUS              Joint architecture for UAS 
JDAM             Joint direct attack munitions 
JFO                 Joint fires observer 
JP                    Joint Publication – followed by military identifier 
JDAM             Joint Direct Attack Munition 
JNIM              Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin 
JOAC              Joint Operational Access Concept 
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JOPES             Joint Operation and Planning System / Execution 
System 
JP                    Joint Publication 
J / S                = the ratio of the jammer power to the desired signal 
power at the input to the receiver being jammed in dB 
JST                  Japan Time zone 
JTAC               Joint Terminal Attack Controller. 
JTIDS              Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
(JTIDS) is an L band DTDMA 
K                     Boltzmann’s constant (Noise component, RRE) (1.38 
x 10 -23 J/K), Kelvin 
K                     2 for jamming frequency modulated receivers 
(jamming tuner accuracy), FM 34-40-7 
KAMIKAZI   Means “Divine Wind,” Tactic best known for Japanese 
suicide A/C attacks on Allied Capital Vessels in WWII. UAS TEAMS 
or SWARMS could be directed in the same way. 
KE                   Kinetic energy 
KEW               Kinetic energy weapons 
KM                  Katiba Macina Groups 
KSU                Kansas State University 
L                      λ / 2 in Eq. 20-5 
LAANC          Low Altitude Authorization and Notification 
Capability 
LASER           “A laser is a device that emits light through a process 
of optical amplification based on the stimulated 
emission of electromagnetic radiation. The term “laser” originated 
as an acronym for “light amplification by stimulated emission of 
radiation”. A laser differs from other sources of light in that it emits 
light coherently, spatially and temporally. Spatial coherence allows 
a laser to be focused to a tight spot, enabling applications such 
as laser cutting and lithography. Spatial coherence also allows a 
laser beam to stay narrow over great distances (collimation), 
enabling applications such as laser pointers. Lasers can also have 
high temporal coherence, which allows them to emit light with a 
very narrow spectrum, i.e., they can emit a single color of light. 
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Temporal coherence can be used to produce pulses of light as short 
as a femtosecond. Used: for military and law enforcement devices 
for marking targets and measuring range and speed.” (Wiki-L, 2018) 
Laser JDAM   Laser Joint Direct Attack Munition – dumb bombs, 
all weather precision –guided munitions. Guided by an integrated 
inertial guidance system. 
Laser rangefinder Scope to assist targeting of munitions. 
Countermeasure: laser-absorbing paint 
LGWs             Laser-guided weapons 
Latency         Processing difference between time interval signal is 
transmitted and signal is received 
LCDR             Lieutenant Commander 
L/D                Lift to drag ratio 
LDCM            Low Duty cycle methods 
LEO                Low Earth Orbit Satellite / Law Enforcement Officer 
LGB                Laser-guided bomb, a guided bomb that uses semi-
active laser guidance to strike a designated target with greater 
accuracy than an unguided one 
LGTF              Liptako-Gourma task force (LGTF) established by 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to secure their shared border region 
LIDAR           Light (Imaging) Detection and Ranging 
LFS                Free- Space Loss as a Factor 
LIPC               laser-induced plasma channel 
LJ                   Propagation loss from jammer to receiver, in dBi 
LMADIS        Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (family 
of C-UAS systems) 
LMM             Lightweight Multi-role Missile (by Thales) 
LORAN-C      Long Range Navigation, Revision C 
LOS                Line-of-sight / Loss of Signal / Loss of Separation 
LOSAS            Low cost Scout UAV Acoustic System 
LPA                 Log periodic array 
LPI                  Low Probability of Intercept 
LR                   Long range 
LRA                Long range artillery 
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LRAD             Long Range Acoustic Device (Weapon) (Yunmonk 
Son, 2015) 
LRCS              Low radar cross section 
LRE                Launch and recovery element 
LRF                 Laser rangefinder 
LS                   Losses existing in the system (lumped together), dB 
(RRE) 
LS                   The propagation loss from the desired signal 
transmitter, in dBm 
LSDB              Laser Small Diameter Bomb 
LST                 Laser spot trackers 
LTA                Lighter than Air (airship) /Low noise amplifier 
LTE /LTE+     Long Term Evolution – refers to mobile 
telecommunications coverage 
LUSV              Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
LWIR               Long wave Infrared (sensor or camera) 
M                     Mass in Eq. 20-5 
MA                  Multi-agent methods of CR 
MAD               Magnetic anomaly detection 
MADIS           Marine Air Defense Integrated System 
MAE               Medium-altitude endurance 
MAGTF          Marine air-ground task force 
MALDRONE  Malware injected into critical SAA for UAS 
MALE             Medium-altitude, long endurance UAS 
MALE-T         Medium altitude long endurance – tactical UAS 
MAME            Medium altitude, medium endurance 
MARIN           Maritime Research Institute Netherlands 
MASINT         Measurement and Signal Intelligence 
MATS             Mobile Aircraft Tracking System 
M-AUDS        Mobile Anti-UAV Defense System 
MAV               Micro-air vehicle 
Maverick        AGM -65 (USA) Missile 
Mesonet         network of  automated weather and environmental 
monitoring stations designed to observe mesoscale 
meteorological phenomena 
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MCE               Mission control element 
MCM              Mine countermeasures 
MCU               Master Control Unit 
MCVs             Mesoscale convective vortices 
MDR               Missed Detection Rates 
MEB               Marine expeditionary brigade (14,500 marines and 
sailors). 
MEMS            Micro-electromechanical systems 
MEO               Medium Earth Orbit satellite 
MFD               Multi Function display 
MGTOW         Maximum gross take-off weight 
MHT               Multiple-hypotheses-testing 
MIM                Man in the Middle cyber attack 
MINUSMA    Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali 
MIR                Mid Infrared 5 to (25-40) um 
MIT                 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
ML                  Machine learning techniques 
MLRS             Multi launch rocket systems 
MLU               Mid-life upgrade 
MMI                Man-machine interface 
MORS             Military Operations Research Society 
Modulation    Signal Modulation is the process of varying one or 
more properties of a periodic waveform, called the carrier signal, 
with a modulating signal that typically contains information to be 
transmitted 
MPA               Maritime patrol aircraft 
MPI                 Message-passing interface 
MPC                Model-based predictive control 
MPO               Mission payload operator 
MR                  Medium range / Maritime Reconnaissance 
MRE               Medium-range endurance 
MS                  Mobile service 
MSL / AGL    MSL altitudes are measured from a standard datum, 
which is roughly equal to the average altitude of the ocean. So, an 
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aircraft traveling 5,000 feet directly above a mountain that’s 3,000 
feet tall would have an altitude of 5,000 feet Above Ground Level 
(AGL) and 8,000 feet MSL. 
MSR                Maritime Silk Road (China) 
MSSM             Multi-step optimization method to achieve re-
planning for stealth UAV penetration of ADS 
MTCR             missile Technology Control Regime 
MTI                 Moving target indication 
MTOM            Maximum take-off mass 
MTOW            Maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft at which the 
pilot can attempt to take off, due to structural or other limits. 
MTS                Multi Spectral Targeting System /Maritime 
Transportation Systems / Sector 
MTTR             Multitarget tracking radar/Mean time to repair 
MUAV            Mini-UAV or maritime UAV 
MUJAO          Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
MUM              Manned-unmanned teaming 
MUSV            Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles 
MW                 Microwave 
MWIR             Midwave Infrared 
MW                 microwave towers 
N                     Available Noise power, watts for HAPS 
N                     Terrain and ground conductivity factor, FM 34-40-7 
5 = very rough terrain with poor ground conductivity 
4 = moderately rough terrain with fair to good ground 
conductivity 
3 = Farmland terrain with good ground conductivity 
2 = Level terrain with good ground conductivity[i] 
The elevation of the jammer location and the enemy transmitter 
location does not include the height of the antenna above the 
ground or the length of the antenna. It is the location deviation 
above sea level. 
NAC               Network Access Control 
NACA            National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics 
NAS               National Airspace (USA) 
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NASAMS II   National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System 
NATO             North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAV               Nano-air vehicle / NAV data message for GPS 
systems 
NBC                Nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare 
NCO               Network-centric operations 
NCW               Network Centric Warfare 
NDRC             National Development and Reform Commission 
(China) 
NEC                Network enabled capability 
NEMESIS       Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature 
against integrated Sensors (USN) 
NGA               National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
NGO               Non-Governmental Organization 
NIEM              National Information Exchange Model 
NIR                 near Infrared 
NLOS              Non-line-of-sight 
NM                  Nautical Miles 
NMAC            A NMAC is defined as an incident associated with the 
operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of collision occurs as 
a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a 
report is received from a pilot or a flight crewmember stating that a 
collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft. 
NMLA            the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad 
(Tuareg Rebellion) 
NO                  Numerical Optimization methods of CR 
NOAA            National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
NOLO             No onboard live operator (USN) 
NOTAM         Notice to airmen 
NPD                Near Peer Doctrine 
NPS                National Park Service 
NSA                National Security Agency (US) 
NSRL              New Silk Road Sea / Land routes (Chinese) 
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NTIA               National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration 
NTM/NTOM Notice to mariners 
NTSB              National Transportation Safety Board 
NTT                 Non-Threat Traffic 
NULLO          Not using live operator (USAF) 
O                     Other methods of CR 
OEM               Original Equipment Manufacturer 
OIO                 Offensive Information Operations 
OLOS             Out-of-the-line-of-sight 
OODA            Decision Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 
OoT                 Ocean of Things (USN) (DARPA) 
ONR               Office of Naval Research 
OPA                Optionally piloted aircraft 
OPAV             Optionally piloted air vehicle 
OPSEC           Operations Security 
OSI                 Open systems interconnection 
OT                   Operational technology 
OTH                Over- the- horizon 
P                      Isotropic source of an electromagnetic pulse of peak 
power, Mw 
PANCAS         Passive Acoustic Non-Cooperative Collision Alert 
System 
PB                   Particle Beams, Particle beams are large numbers of 
atomic or sub-atomic particles moving at relativistic velocities. 
PBL                 Planetary boundary layer 
PCAS              Persistent close air support 
PCS                 Personal Communication Services 
PEIRP             Transmitter effective isotropic radiated power, 
watts 
PFMS              Predictive Flight Management System 
PEMSIA         Partnership in Environmental Management of the 
Seas of East Asia 
PGB                Precision guided bomb 
PGM               Precision guided missile 
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PHOTINT       Photographic intelligence (usually sky – ground) 
PHX                Airport code for Phoenix 
PI                    Probability of Incapacitation 
PII                   Personal Identifiable Information 
PIM                 Position of intended movements/Previously 
intended movements 
PIT                  Proximity Intruder Traffic 
P j                    Minimum amount of jammer power output required, 
in watts, FM 34-40-7 
PL                   Power level, dB, Eq. 20-1 
PLA                Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
PLAN             People’s Liberation Army Navy (China) 
PLC                Programmable Logic Controllers 
PLOCAN        Research facility Oceanic Platform of the Canary 
Islands 
PMIAA            Permissions Management: Identification, 
Authentication and Authorization 
PNF                 Plug and Fly with custom transmitter, receiver, 
battery, and charger 
PNT                 Reliable communications; positioning, navigation, 
and timing 
PO                   Psychological Operations 
POS                 Position and Orientation System 
POV                Point of View 
PPP                 Precise Point Positioning 
PPS                 Precise positioning service (GPS) 
PRC                People’s Republic of China (China) 
Primum Non Nocere – First Do No Harm (Latin) 
PSD                 Power Spectral Density 
PREACT         Partnership for Regional East Africa 
Counterterrorism (PREACT) 
PRF                 Pulse repetition frequency codes 
PRM                Precision Runway Monitor 
PS                    Pressure sensor 
PSH                 Plan-symmetric helicopter 
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PSR                 Primary Surveillance Radar 
P t                    Power output of the enemy drone, in watts, FM 
34-40-7 
PW/PSYWAR Psychological Warfare 
PWO               Principal Warfare officer 
P(Y)                Precise Signal (GPS)for military positioning 
QOS                Quality of Service in HAPs 
QR                  QR code is a type of matrix barcode which is 
machine or phone readable 
QUAS             QUT UAS 
QUT               Queensland University of Technology 
R                     1 /Tb is the bit rate (b/s) in link equation 
R4                   Energy density received at detected target range, R, 
nm 
RA                   Resolution Advisory 
RAC                Range air controller 
RADAR          Radio Detection and Ranging 
RADINT         Radar intelligence 
RAM               Radar absorbing materials 
RAS                Radar absorbing structure 
RAST              Recovery, assist, and traverse 
RB                   Rule-based methods (Conflict Resolution) 
RBW               Red- breasted Woodpecker 
RCE                Remote Code Execution 
RCO                Remote-control operator 
RCS                Radar cross-section 
RCTA             Surf Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RED                Risk Estimate Distance 
Remote ID   Remote ID has two meanings in this textbook. It is 
used as an information / technology device to identify people from 
a UAV. This term is used in the UAS industry and the FAA as a 
mechanism for identifying an aircraft type and the registrant from 
the ground, essentially a digital license plate and registration. 
RES                 Radio electronic systems 
RF                   Radio Frequency 
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RGB                Red Green Blue for VIS camera 
RGT                Remote ground terminal 
RIAS               Research Institute for Autonomous Systems 
-University of North Dakota 
Rician PDF     Rician probability density function 
RIMPAC        Rim of the Pacific Exercise – Maritime 
RL                   Ramp launched 
RMS                Reconnaissance management system /Root-mean-
square 
RN                  Ryan-Nichols Qualitative Risk Assessment Equations 
17-2, 17-3 
RNRA             Ryan – Nichols Attack / Defense Scenario Risk 
Assessment for Cyber cases 
ROA               Remotely operated aircraft 
ROC                Republic of China (Taiwan) / Regional Operations 
Center (USA) 
ROV/ROUV   Remote operating vehicle / Remotely operated 
underwater vehicle 
RPA                Remotely piloted aircraft 
RPH                Remotely piloted helicopter 
RPV                Remotely piloted vehicle 
RR                  Radio regulations 
RRE                Radar Range Equation 
RSA                RSA (Rivest–Shamir–Adelman) -authors of early 
public –key cryptographic system 
RSTA              Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
RTA                Dubai Roads and Transport Authority 
RTF                 Off- the- shelf, Ready -to -Fly 
RTK                Real Time Kinematic 
RTS                 Remote tracking station/Request to send/Release 
to service 
RTU                Remote Terminal Unit 
RUAV              Relay UAV 
RWR               Radar warning receiver 
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SA                   Situational Awareness 
SAA                Sense and Avoid & 
SAA                Sense and Act Systems; replaces See and Avoid 
function of a human pilot 
SAASM          Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module 
SAE                Society of Automotive Engineers 
SAHRV          Semi-autonomous Hydrographic Reconnaissance 
vehicle 
SAM               Surface to Air Missile 
SAMPLE        Survivable autonomous mobile platform, long-
endurance 
SAP                Systems Applications and Products also the name of 
a company 
SAR                Synthetic aperture radar / Search and rescue- 
especially using helicopters 
SAS                 Safety Assurance System 
SATCOM       Satellite communications 
SCADA          Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems 
SCHEMA       Security Incident Identification 
SCIF               Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
SCS                 Shipboard control system (or station) / Stereo 
Camera System / South China Sea 
SE                   Synthetic environment 
SEA                Airport code for Seattle 
SEAD             Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SECDEF         Secretary of Defense 
Shadowing     Airframe shadowing – UAV- Ground signal 
degradation during maneuver 
SEZ                 Special economic zones 
SHM               Simple harmonic motion – represented by sign wave 
SHORAD       Short Range Air Defense systems 
SIGINT           Signals Intelligence 
Signature       UAS detection by acoustic, optical, thermal and 
radio /radar 
SINS               Ships inertial navigation systems 
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SJM                 Salafi-Jihad Movement 
SKASaC         Seeking airborne surveillance and control 
SKYNET        Fictional artificial intelligence system that becomes 
self-aware 
SLAM             Simultaneous localization and mapping 
SLAMRAAM Surface launched AMRAAM 
SM                  Separation Management 
SMC                Single moving camera 
SME                Subject matter expert 
SMR                Single main rotor 
S/N                  S / N = is one pulse received signal to noise ratio, 
dB: Signal to Noise ratio at HAPS receiver 
SOA                Static Obstacle – Avoidance system 
Soft damage  DEW disruption to a UAS computer 
SOLAS           Safety of Life at Sea (International Maritime 
Convention) 
SONAR          Sound Navigation and Ranging 
SPL                 Sound pressure level, dB = 20 Log p / po [ measured 
pressures to reference pressure]                            see Eq. 20-3,4; 6-7 
SPS                 Standard position service (GPS) 
Spoofing         A Cyber-weapon attack that generates false signals 
to replace valid ones 
Spot sensors  ARS sensors that measure single locations without 
image library 
SPURV           Special purpose underwater research vehicle 
SQL                SQL Injection – common malevolent code injection 
technique 
SR                   Short range 
SRBM             Short range ballistic missile, ex SCUD missile 
SRL                 Systems readiness level 
SSA                 Static Sense-and -Act 
SSBN              Ballistic missile submarine force 
SSP                 Smart Skies Project 
SSR                 Secondary Surveillance Radar 
SST                 Self – Separation Threshold 
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ST&T              Submarine Track and Trail 
STANAG 4856 Standard interfaces of UAV Control System for 
NATO UAV 
STK                 Satellite tool kit 
STOL              Short take-off and landing 
sUAS              Small Unmanned Aircraft System 
SubT              Subterranean Challenge Urban Circuit 
SUAVE           Small UAV engine 
SWARM         High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or 
unmanned boats 
SWAT             Special Weapons and Tactics (police / paramilitary) 
SWAP             Size, weight, and power 
SWIR              Shortwave infrared, 1400-3000 nm, 1.4 -3.0 um 
wavelength range 
SZ                   Safety Zone is defined as the horizontal and vertical 
separation criteria which form a cylindrical airspace volume around 
the UAS. In figure 3-2 that volume is defined by 1000 ft radius and 
200 ft height. It is assumed that initially the UAS is in the center with 
100 ft above and below the A/C. 
T                      In Range equation & environment, strength of a 
received signal, function of square or fourth power of distance, d, 
from transmitter (Adamy D. -0., 2015) 
T                      Time, sec (RRE) 
T                      Tension in Eq.20-5 
TA                   Traffic Advisory 
TAC                Target air controller 
TACAN           Tactical air navigation 
TAR                 Antenna noise temperature, Kelvin 
TAS                 True airspeed 
TBO                Time between overhauls 
TC                   Type certificate 
TCAS              Traffic alert and collision avoidance system 
TCPA              Time to reach Closest Point of Approach 
Te                    Effective input noise temperature, Kelvin, 
TEAM (UAS) High level, dangerous collaboration of UAS, UUV, or 
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unmanned boats; differs from SWARM in that it has a UAS Team 
Leader, (TL) where SWARM does not. TL directs the UAS team and 
is the primary counter UAS target to disrupt. 
TETRA            Terrestrial Trunked Radio for terrestrial terminals / 
services 
Thermobaric  Metal augmented charge 
THOR             Tactical high-power operational responder 
TIR                  Thermal infrared = 8000 – 15000 nm, 8 -15 um 
TL                   Team Leader 
TO                   take-off 
Tort                 A tort is an act or omission that gives rise to injury 
or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts 
impose liability. 
TP                    Trajectory Prediction 
TRANSCOM  U.S. Transportation Command networks 
TRL                 Technology readiness level: Technology readiness 
levels are a rating method developed by NASA to describe where a 
technology is in terms of its development.  The lowest levels (1 – 3) 
are technologies that are being researched, the middle levels (4 – 
6) are technologies that are being prototyped and tested, and the 
highest levels (7 – 9) are technologies that are being demonstrated 
and used.  (NASA, 2017) 
TS                    Measured noise temperature, Kelvin units above 
absolute zero 
TSTCP            Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. TSCTP 
partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. 
TT & C           Telemetry, tracking and command 
TUAV             Tactical UAV 
UA                  Unmanned Aircraft (non-cooperative and potential 
intruder) 
U-Actors       Unintentional Cyber Actors 
UAE                United Arab Emirates 
UAM               Urban Air Mobility (vehicle) 
UAPO             Unmanned Aircraft Program Office 
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UAS                Unmanned aircraft system 
UASCdr          Unmanned aircraft system commander 
UASIPP          UAS Integration Pilot Program 
UAS-p             UAS pilot 
UAV                 Unmanned aerial vehicle 
UAV-p            UAV pilot 
UBR                Uplink bit rate, Mb/s 
UCAR             Unmanned combat armed rotorcraft 
UCARS          UAV common automated recovery system 
UCAV            Unmanned combat air vehicle 
UCWA / UA Unintentional cyber warfare attack 
UG                  Underwater glider (USN) 
UGCS             Unmanned Ground Control Station 
UGS                Unmanned ground-based station 
UGT                Unmanned ground transportation 
UGV               Unmanned ground vehicle 
UHF                Ultra High Frequency, 300 MHz – 3 GHz 
UIT                 Unintentional Insider Threats 
UK                  United Kingdom 
UL                   Upload link 
ULC                Uniform Law Commission 
ULPCG           University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 
UMTS             Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
U.N.                United Nations 
UND               University of North Dakota 
UNESCO        United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization 
UNICEF         United Nations Children’s Fund 
US                   United States 
USCG             United States Coast Guard 
USCGA          United States Coast Guard Auxiliary 
USD                Unmanned surveillance drone 
USS                 Undersea Search and Survey 
USV                Unmanned surface vehicle 
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UTM               Unmanned Traffic Management / Safe Uniform 
Traffic Management 
UTV                Unmanned target vehicle 
UUV               Unmanned underwater / undersea vehicle 
UV                  Unmanned Vehicle 
UUNs / DUNSs Urgent / deliberate universal needs statements 
V                     Visible 
VFR                Visual flight rules 
VHS                Very High Frequency Radio 
VIKI               Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence 
VLA                Very light aircraft 
VLJ                 Very Light Jet 
VLAR             Vertical launch and recovery 
VLOS             Visual Line of Sight 
VMC               Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VNIR              Visible light and near infrared 400 – 1400 nm, 0.4 – 
1.4 um wavelength range 
Voloport        Landing site for Volcopter 
VTC                Vessel traffic control 
VTM               Vessel traffic management 
VTOL             Vertical take-off and landing 
VTUAV          Vertical take-off UAV 
WABN            wide available broadband networks 
WARM           identify war reserve mode emissions 
WEF                World Economic Forum 
WEZ               Weapon Engagement Zone 
WMD              Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WRC               World Radio Conference Standards Organization 
XLUUV          Extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle 
XO                  Executive Officer of Naval vessel 
ZIGBEE or KILLERBEE      Sniffing / penetration tools specific to 
UAS 
 
Greek / Mathematical Symbols 
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λ                      Wavelength in Hz, c / f where c= speed of light 344 
m/s and f = frequency, Hz. 
Σ                      Radar Cross Sectional Area, m2 
υ                      UAV velocity vector and UAV speed (ms -1) 
θ                      Horizontal angle in inertial axes (rad) 
Ψ                     Vertical angle in inertial axes (rad) 
x,y,z                 Inertial position coordinates (m) 
κ                      Curvature (m-1) 
τ                       Torsion, (m-1) 
r(q)                  Path, with path variable (q) 
h                      Path length (m) 
e                      Basis axes vector set 
P(x, y, z, θ, Ψ) UAV pose where: where x, y, z, is the UAV location 
or waypoint and (θ, Ψ) are the horizontal and vertical angles , 
respectively 
Ps                    Starting pose for UAV moving to 
Pf                    Finish pose 
Џ                     Path constraint in (9.4) 
a                      lateral acceleration proportional to curvature k 
∞                     vector operator in (9.6) 
f(n)                  Path cost function in (9.9) 
g(n)                  cost of path from start node n to the goal 
h(n)                 Heuristic function which estimates the distance 
from the next node n on the path to goal in (9.9) 
h(X)                 represents actual journey cost from goal X 
g(X,E)             represents the estimate journey cost from state X to 
the current position of the stealth UAV in (9.10) 
N                     Length of the prediction domain in (9.11) & N steps 
in (9.12) 
W                    length of the control domain in (9.11) 
qi                     Output prediction error 
qj                     Is the weighting coefficient of the control variable 
in (9.11) 
k                      Kth node for prediction of cost of predicted flight 
path in MPC (9.12) 
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Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the 
resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle, 
interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic 
weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics 
of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to 
use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality of their 
forces and equipment. (Thomas, 2010) Such strategies may not 
necessarily be militarized. (Steponova, 2016) 
 
This is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have 
comparable military power and resources and rely on tactics that 
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1. Chapter 1 Information 
Technology Advances, 
Remote ID,[1] & Extreme 
Persistence ISR [Ryan] 
Student learning objectives.  After reading this chapter, students 
should be able to do the following: 
• — Identify, describe, and explain the advances in technologies 
that affect unmanned system design and use 
• — Discuss the impacts of technology advances on the ability to 
remotely identify individuals 
• — Discuss how energy availability affects the range and 
duration of unmanned system operations 
The Emerging World of Unmanned Vehicle Uses 
As noted in the preface to this book, unmanned technology has 
undergone a growth explosion.  Innovations in production, sales, 
testing, specialized designs, and uses continue to push the adoption 
of unmanned systems into new markets while expanding its use in 
existing markets.  The improvement in the underlying technologies, 
such as cameras, have enabled many new uses.  Further, use in one 
area can inspire use in another area as knowledge about capabilities 
spreads.  The first types of jobs that are being tasked to unmanned 
vehicles are typically the ones that are dangerous or relatively 
expensive to use humans to execute.  The next types of jobs being 
assigned to unmanned vehicles are the repetitive but simple tasks 
that are less expensive to execute without humans.  Examples of 
some of the emerging uses of unmanned systems include the 
following: 
Chapter 1 Information Technology
Advances, Remote ID,[1] & Extreme
• Governmental uses, such as for military purposes and 
population control. The use of unmanned systems by military 
forces includes bomb disposal robots, surveillance drones, and 
battle damage assessment (Page, 2020).  Police forces use them 
for “mass surveillance, crime investigation, search and rescue 
operations, locating stolen goods, and surveying land and 
infrastructure.” (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2017) 
• Emergency services, including first responder support and 
humanitarian relief. These types of applications assist 
emergency personnel in finding victims, surveying disaster 
areas, and getting relief supplies to people who would 
otherwise be unreachable. (CB Insights, 2020) 
• Construction and infrastructure. Drones are being used to not 
only monitor the progress of construction (Burger, 2019) but 
also to move supplies around construction zones.  An 
emerging use of drones is to actually construct buildings: a 
proof of concept experiment in Switzerland used drones to “lift 
and stack thousands of polymer bricks… to create a geometric 
structure nearly 10 meters high” (CB Insights, 2020). 
• Crime. From transporting drugs and contraband into prisons 
and across borders to delivering bombs and spying on people, 
unmanned systems provide a cost effective and risk reducing 
capability to determined criminals. (Swales, 2019) 
Predictably, some of the uses are hostile to one or more parties.  Of 
course, hostility is in the eyes of the beholder: a criminal views law 
enforcement use of unmanned surveillance technology as hostile 
to their interests; a pro-democracy protestor views population 
surveillance as hostile and adversarial.  The point is, of course, that 
the technology itself is agnostic as to usage and that it is growing 
in leaps and bounds, with innovations in both the underlying 
technology base and in the use of the technology coming seemingly 
every day. 
In order to understand how the uses of unmanned systems can 
evolve and adapt, it is necessary to keep tabs on how the component 
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technologies – sensors, communications, controls, etc. – are 
evolving.  This chapter provides an overview of these advances from 
the perspective of unmanned systems.  Many advances in 
technologies and uses have occurred, with some of the most 
interesting being in the marrying of information technologies – 
imagers, signal sensors, etc. – with advances in aeronautics, energy 
sources, and engine technologies.  In this chapter, we will look some 




When talking with people about unmanned systems, it is 
sometimes surprising to realize that they do not fully appreciate 
the fact that few systems are fully autonomous.  When something 
is unmanned, it just means that the “manning” is outsourced.  But 
what is “manning” and what is “outsourcing”? 
“Manning” implies a lot of things, most specifically that a human 
is in the operational loop in the same location as the equipment 
being operated.  When a piece of equipment is “unmanned”, then 
one or more of those elements is different.  It may be that a human 
is still in the operational loop, but at a different location.  It may 
be that some aspect of human intelligence has been automated 
and integrated into the equipment.  Or it may be a combination 
of those.  Outsourcing is when one or more tasks that one person 
would do is given to another entity to perform.  Aspects of human 
labor are most easily outsourced to machines but could also be 
outsourced, when possible, to distant people.  Aspects of human 
intelligence can be outsourced to smart machines, to distributed 
groups of people, or to companies.  Therefore, when we say that 
“unmanned means that manning has been outsourced”, we are really 
saying that some aspects of human labor and cognition have been 
separated out and assigned to some mix of distant humans, distant 
machines, and on-premise technologies. 
The operations of any unmanned system is complex.  As noted in 
Nichols et al (2020): 
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A UAS can’t fly (very far) if it doesn’t have internal systems to parse 
received instructions, make decisions based on sensed data, and 
control its onboard systems.  The internal systems can be thought 
of as the internal nervous system of a UAS.  Sensed data is collected 
and may possibly undergo some preprocessing, prior to being 
transferred to a decision support system, a suite of AI support 
elements, or external communications for relay to other UASs and/
or command and control elements, such as an airborne control 
system or a ground control system.  The internal systems interpret 
and instruct navigational control, mission execution, and propulsion 
control.  When emergency situations occur, the internal systems 
execute preprogrammed options, which could include 
autonomously navigating to safe zones or self-destructing.  The 
internal systems also monitor the health and welfare of the UAS 
according to the instrumentation included onboard.  This may 
include fuel level monitoring, damage assessment, and interference 
detection.  According to design, the internal systems may relay 
information continuously, on schedule, or in emergencies. 
The separation of human labor, cognition, and equipment into 
disparate pieces means that a concomitant need for collaborative 
technologies becomes important.  The most obvious collaborative 
technologies are communications – exchanging data, commands, 
and responses.  Other types of collaborative technologies that need 
to be considered are those that prevent adverse interactions 
between system components, environmental sensing and reaction 
technologies, and control guidance technologies.  All of these 
enable the remote operation of an unmanned system. 
When considering the operation of anything that is unmanned, be 
it an earth-bound robot or a high-flying weather balloon, it is very 
useful to think about two things: where the intelligence associated 
with the operations is located, and how the intelligence is divided 
between elements.  The process of automation is fundamentally the 
process of taking elements of human intelligence and replicating 
those elements in machines.  Advances in automation follow the 
development of technologies that allow increasing distance 
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between humans and their tools, but also follow a fairly predictable 
cycle of development, use, integration, and innovation.  Successful 
innovation can both restart the cycle and spawn separate cycles. 
In order to explore advances in information technology as applied 
to unmanned systems, we will look at the several general categories 
of technologies and how they are poised to affect the future of 
unmanned systems.  When appropriate, examples of real-world 
implementations will be provided.  (The use of these examples does 
not constitute endorsement: they are simply examples of what is 
going on in the world.)  The general categories of technologies 
covered are: 
• Internet of Things (IoT) 
• Artificial Intelligence 
• Advanced Manufacturing 
In addition, a short look at energy advances is included, because 
without portable and sufficient energy, unmanned system 
operations are limited. 
Internet of Things (IoT) 
The term “Internet of Things” was coined to describe the network 
of everyday items (such as thermostats, toasters, and pet collars) 
that have been enhanced with information technology and enabled 
with communicative capabilities.  The simplicity of the term belies 
the extraordinary complexity of the reality.  Billions of devices 
sharing data over the internet means that tons of very granular 
data can be combined to create new knowledge.  Moreover, the 
direct connection to each device enables a level of control that 
transcends the individual component.  Within the last decade, major 
advancements in two fundamental technologies, sensors, and 
wireless communications, have led to an explosion of the IoT. 
According to SAS, there are “127 new IoT devices connected to the 
internet every second” and there will be “more than 150 billion 
devices connected across the globe by 2025”.  Further, “the global 
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datasphere will grow from 33 zettabytes in 2018 to 175 zettabytes by 
2025.” (SAS, 2019) 
The phenomenon of linking many small devices over very large 
networks is one aspect of the IoT.  There are also geographically 
smaller implementations of interconnected devices that create what 
can be effectively considered a swarm of minimally intelligent 
elements collaborating for a larger purpose.  One such 
implementation has been called an “internet of bodies” (IoB), where 
human bodies wearables and embeddables are connected to a 
network.  The initial purpose of IoB has been to augment health 
treatments, diagnoses, and monitoring, but once human health and 
behavioral data is being shared and accessed via the greater 
Internet, many possibilities emerge, including the merging of 
human and machine capabilities over great distances. 
 
Near Term IoT Technologies 
According to Strativerse, a collaborative research effort that 
“analyzed the capabilities of current technologies and their likely 
trajectory” (L’atelier BNP, 2020), there are several technologies that 
are at technology readiness levels  [2]  (TRL) 7 or higher that are 
worthy of consideration.  These include data marketplace, 
simultaneous localization, and mapping (SLAM), and digital 
twinning.  Those near-term technologies are already being used in 
some areas but could be more widely adopted in the coming years 
as the infrastructure support for them expands. 
Data marketplace is the term given to a service that allows people 
to buy and sell data.  Buying and selling data is nothing new but the 
adoption of marketplaces to connect buyers and sellers has made 
the practice more convenient and efficient.  As noted by Jeremiah 
Smith, data marketplaces provide the following advantages: 
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• Crowdsourcing:by making self-serve data selling a reality, they 
provide the solution to move away from inaccurate/expensive 
single-source data. 
• Aligned incentives: data owners/collectors directly benefit from 
keeping data in structured form and making it available to 
others. 
• Standardization: by design, a marketplace defines a common 
data model and interface for buyers and sellers to exchange data. 
• Fairness: instead of a having a central authority pricing data, 
providers can set their own prices while consumers can choose 
who they buy from. (Smith, 2018) 
How might this affect unmanned systems?  A big effect might be 
increased use of unmanned systems by individuals: smaller 
operations are incentivized because it makes collecting and selling 
data, even as a single person operation, possible.  This incentive 
makes it attractive to collect more data and to compete for buyers 
on both price and accuracy.  Over time, this could translate to 
aggregation of data providers, making the business case for 
operating large fleets of unmanned systems for the purpose of 
purely commercial data collection. 
Simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) is already in use 
by some unmanned systems and should be expected to expand 
to many more.  Imagine being taken into an unfamiliar building 
and being asked to draw a detailed and accurate map.  You don’t 
know where you are, you don’t know the dimensions of any of the 
rooms or even how many there are, and you don’t know if there are 
stairs or elevators.  When you start drawing the map, by measuring 
first what is around you and then moving outward, you are doing 
simultaneous localization and mapping.  Asking a human to do this 
is tricky but ultimately doable, because of the experiences that 
the human has accumulated over a lifespan with navigating and 
mapping.  Teaching a robot to do this more difficult because the 
problem is inherently paradoxical: in order to know where it is, the 
robot needs a map, but in order to make a map, the robot needs to 
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know where it is.  Furthermore, as it moves, it does not know where 
it is going.  (Martin, 2019) (Burgard, Stachniss, Arras, & Bennewitz, 
2020) 
The benefits of getting SLAM right are pretty obvious: drop an 
unmanned system into a danger zone and let it figure out how to 
navigate.  Send a robot to another planet and let it find its way 
around.  Launch an unmanned underwater vehicle to explore a deep 
canyon.  Send a drone into a cave system to explore.  As the 
technology matures, it will increasingly be used to assist unmanned 
systems in navigation, as well as provide important real time 
improvements in the quality of data about our physical 
environment. 
Digital twins are highly detailed computer models of actual 
systems, which are different from other models in that they are 
continually updated with data from the actual system so the model 
reflects the current operational status accurately.  The key to 
successful implementations of digital twins is the data feed between 
the system and the twin: the digital thread. The distinction between 
the twin and the thread is time:  “the digital twin is the current 
representation of a product or system, mimicking a company’s 
machines, controls, workflows, and systems. The digital thread 
meanwhile is a record of a product or systems lifetime, from its 
creation to its removal.” (Miskinis, 2018) 
The benefits to unmanned systems lie in the ability to exploit 
the real time aspects of the twin in order to detect and react to 
challenges faster.  The thread provides a way of analyzing the 
longitudinal aspects of the system.  For example, if “a vehicle has 
an accident due to the fault of the system such as unplanned 
acceleration, the digital thread through having traceability across 
the lifecycle of a vehicle, will be able to identify the issue.” (Miskinis, 
2018) 
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Longer Term IoT Technologies 
Atomic scale storage is an experimental approach to encoding 
information in atoms.  It is currently at TLR 4 and can only be 
done in a laboratory.  The promise of this technology is intriguing: 
“the storage density of this memory is 500 times larger than that 
of state-of-the-art hard disk drives.  If perfected, this technology 
could enable the manufacturing of memory cards with capacity of 
62 terabytes.” (L’atelier BNP, 2020) 
A synthetic doppelganger is a “realistic robot powered by 
advanced artificial intelligence with the ability to emulate one’s 
personality and subsequently substitute for them.” (L’atelier BNP, 
2020)  The idea here is that a “human brain would be scanned 
and digitized, with the resulting content being fed into an artificial 
neural network.” (L’atelier BNP, 2020)  The application to unmanned 
systems would be in using the synthetic copy to operate in places 
where human bodies are not well suited, such as space or 
underwater, with the full learning, deciding, and personality cues 
of the original human.  This technology is at TLR 3 and faces many 
challenges before being realized. (L’atelier BNP, 2020) 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
The growth and promulgation of both weak and strong AI is 
already evident in many aspects of our lives.  The integration of 
AI into unmanned systems holds a lot of promise.  As noted in 
Nichols (2020): 
… the increasing miniaturization of electronic components, the 
incorporation of alternatives to electronics, such as optics, and the 
development of special purpose processors have and continue to 
revolutionize the ability to squeeze capabilities into a small size 
form factor.  Size reduction has a lot of advantages: it can mean 
lower power requirements, faster execution of computational 
cycles, and less heat generation.  It can also have some inherent 
disadvantages, including less robust physical components. 
Protecting advanced microelectronics from directed energy 
Chapter 1 Information Technology Advances, Remote ID,[1] & Extreme
Persistence ISR [Ryan]  |  11
attacks, for example, can require significantly increased shielding, 
which can in turn affect overall energy requirements for flight 
operations.  In mission situations where energy efficiency and UAS 
maneuverability are important, trade offs need to be considered in 
overall system design.  However, great strides have been made in 
both the development of specialized processors that execute AI-
like capabilities and the integration of those processors on common 
chip sets.  Integration of multiple special chips in a system can 
provide a marked improvement in on-board intelligence (Morgan, 
2019). 
The integration of advanced automation, including AI, into UAS 
architectures can be thought of as having several faces.  First, 
decision support systems with pre-programmed rules of 
engagement can be embedded onboard the individual systems. 
Next, specialized AI processors can be included as well.  Naturally, 
more complex AI and decision support solutions can be 
implemented that rely on backend (either terrestrial or airborne) 
processing for the heavy computational lifting.  Finally, all of these 
can be integrated together. (Nichols, et al., 2020) 
There is an enormous amount of progress being made in realizing 
applications of AI.  Three of the emerging technologies are already 
being incorporated into unmanned systems: facial recognition, gait 
recognition, and gesture tracking. 
Facial recognition has gained a bit of notoriety because of some 
governmental applications.  The use of facial recognition 
capabilities in unmanned systems is useful for threat recognition 
as well as for commercial purposes, such as urban planning. 
Understanding who goes where in a city and when can be extremely 
important information for city management purposes. 
Abuses of human rights, however, have made it a controversial 
capability.  By 2019, 64 countries were using facial recognition for 
surveillance purposes. (Feldstein, 2019)  China in particular has 
made extensive use of facial recognition in many sectors, including 
“from catching criminals in huge crowds to detecting and shaming 
jaywalkers to deciding whether someone can get an extra square of 
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toilet paper in a public bathroom.” (Samuel, 2018) This technology 
has been used in unmanned systems, with a new level of secrecy 
and disguise has been reached through the development of robotic 
birds for population surveillance. (Chen, 2018)  “The drones have 
wings that flap so realistically they’re difficult to distinguish from 
actual birds. In fact, animals on the ground often can’t make the 
distinction, and even real birds in the sky sometimes fly alongside 
the drones.” (Samuel, 2018) 
Gait recognition is less widely proliferated but of great interest to 
augment facial recognition and other identification methods.  Gait 
recognition is based on analyzing how people walk.  Even those who 
have very similar faces move differently.  “One promising extension 
of gait recognition is to use inputs from multiple or moving cameras 
… (e.g., cameras installed on drones) [to] actively detect people 
behaving suspiciously by capturing pedestrians from different 
viewpoints.” (Shigeki, Okura, Mitsugami, Hayashi, & Yagi, 2018) 
Gesture tracking, which is a technology that captures how people 
move, enables a new type of interface for computer system control. 
While the early implementations of gesture-based controls relied 
on instrumented gloves and other wearables, the use of computer 
vision and other sensing systems has freed the human from having 
to don equipment.  “Gesture-based technology is already in place 
and commonly used (e.g., public buildings, public restrooms) 
without special instruction required for effective use. A common 
example of a well-designed gestural command is the use of hands 
to “wave” to activate (e.g., public bathroom faucet).” (Elliott, Hill, & 
Barnes, 2016) The use of gestures to control unmanned systems 
can enable a more intuitive and rich interface with the systems. 
“Navigating and controlling a mobile robot in an indoor or outdoor 
environment by using … hand gestures offer some unique 
capabilities for human–robot interaction inherent to nonverbal 
communication with features and application scenarios not possible 
with the currently predominant vision-based systems.” (Stancic, 
Music, & Grujic, 2017) 
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Advanced Manufacturing 
From creating new materials to creating new ways to use 
materials, manufacturing is being affected in ways that change 
many aspects of system use.  Two technologies in particular are 
having impacts on the use of unmanned systems: 3-D printing and 
auxetic material. 
3-D printing can be done in many different ways, such as adding 
material incrementally to create something or incrementally 
removing material to create something.  Swarm 3-D printing occurs 
when many small printers are connected together in a swarm. 
Each part of the swarm is assigned a small task.  The collaboration 
makes 3-D printing of very large projects possible. (L’atelier BNP, 
2020)  The combination of the swarm approach to 3-D printing 
with unmanned systems opens up a wide variety of potential 
applications, including creating structures in remote or inhospitable 
areas. 
Auxetic materials are those that can “react to changes in their 
physical environment” and which can act as sensors by virtue of 
harnessing that change. (L’atelier BNP, 2020) Auxetic materials act 
differently than normal materials: they get “wider when stretched 
and narrower when squashed.” (Mir, Ali, Sami, & Ansari, 2014)  They 
also “possess attractive acoustic properties, and it is found that at 
frequencies up to 1600 Hz auxetic forms of polymeric and metallic 
foams possess enhanced acoustic absorption.” (Mir, Ali, Sami, & 
Ansari, 2014)  Current applications include smart bandages, which 
act both as sensor for detecting when medicine is needed and as 
protection for wounds.  The integration of auxetic materials into 
unmanned systems for enhanced resiliency and acoustic absorption 
is intriguing.  There is also an application of these types of materials 
to create a new type of prosthetic, such as a gripper, that is “smaller, 
more energy efficient and more puncture resistant.” (Chin, 2019) 
 
Energy Sources 
One never-ending challenge for automated systems of all types 
is energy access and availability.  Approaches to managing this 
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challenge include reducing energy usage, improving energy 
efficiency, and creating power sources that have a higher energy 
density.  Lighter weight materials in unmanned systems contribute 
to energy management, as do the incorporation of renewable 
energy sources in systems (such as solar panels).  Advances in 
energy storage technologies, such as batteries, are being made as 
well. 
Nuclear energy is contributing to small and portable energy 
applications.  A research team looking to “develop an energy source 
that is both small and light, and produces more power for a longer 
time” (MaterialsToday, 2009) created a battery that uses radioactive 
material.  The use of advanced materials for sealing and shielding 
the battery enables it to be used in a variety of 
applications. (MaterialsToday, 2009)  This work has continued in 
many different labs, with an expectation that commercial use of 
nuclear batteries could be achieved by the mid-2020s. “The space 
industry would also greatly benefit from compact nuclear batteries. 
In particular, there is a demand for autonomous wireless external 
sensors and memory chips with integrated power supply systems 
for spacecraft. Diamond is one of the most radiation-proof 
semiconductors. Since it also has a large bandgap, it can operate in a 
wide range of temperatures, making it the ideal material for nuclear 




The advances made in science and engineering are important 
for the future of unmanned systems.  The advances in information 
technologies enable more complicated operations but require more 
energy.  The advances in energy technology, both in energy density 
and in portability, open the door for more integration of advanced 
information technologies in unmanned systems.  The advances in 
manufacturing technologies and approaches create a rich future for 
unmanned systems. 
While reading the rest of this textbook, keep these advances in 
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mind and imagine how what you are reading will be changed, 
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[1] Remote ID has two meanings in this textbook. It is used as an 
information / technology device to identify people from a UAV. 
This term is used in the UAS industry and the FAA as a mechanism 
for identifying an aircraft type and the registrant from the ground, 
essentially a digital license plate and registration. 
[2] Technology readiness levels are a rating method developed by 
NASA to describe where a technology is in terms of its 
development.  The lowest levels (1 – 3) are technologies that are 
being researched, the middle levels (4 – 6) are technologies that 
are being prototyped and tested, and the highest levels (7 – 9) are 
technologies that are being demonstrated and used.  (NASA, 2017) 
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2. Chapter 2: Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles & How They 
Can Augment Mesonet 
Weather Tower Data 
Collection [Mai] 
Student Learning Objectives 
The student will gain conceptual knowledge of a Mesonet, how 
a Mesonet can aid in weather prediction, and how a sUAV (small 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – usually tethered up to 400 feet) can fill 
in holes and create a 3D Mesonet. 
The student will be able to: 
 
1. Understand the Highlights of Mesonet Data collection selected 
weather instrument(s) 
 
2. Gain an overview of sUAV’s currently interaction with 
Mesonet(s) 
 
3. Explore future uses of sUAV’s for assisting Weather prediction. 
 
What is a Mesonet? (Wikipedia, 2020) 
Mesonet, is a network of  automated weather and environmental 
monitoring stations designed to observe mesoscale 
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meteorological phenomena. (Service, 2020) (Glickman, 2000) Dry 
lines, squall lines, and sea breezes are examples of phenomena that 
can be observed by mesonets. Due to the space and time scales 
associated with mesoscale phenomena, weather stations 
comprising a mesonet will be spaced closer together and report 
more frequently than synoptic scale observing networks, such 
as ASOS. The term mesonet refers to the collective group of these 
weather stations and are typically owned and operated by a 
common entity. Mesonets usually record in situ surface weather 
observations but some involve other observation platforms, 
particularly vertical profiles of the planetary boundary 
layer (PBL). (Marshall, (11 Jan 2016)) 
 
The distinguishing features that classify a network of weather 
stations as a mesonet are station density and temporal resolution. 
Depending upon the phenomena meant to be observed, mesonet 
stations use a spatial spacing of 1 to 40 kilometers (0.62 to 
24.85 mi) (Fujita T. , 1962) and report conditions every 1 to 15 
minutes. Micronets (see microscale and storm scale), such as in 
metropolitan areas such as Oklahoma City, (Basara, et al., 2011) may 
be even denser in spatial resolution. (Muller, Chapman, Grimmond, 
Young, & Cai, 2013) 
 
Thunderstorms, squall lines, drylines, (Pietrycha & Rasmussen, 
2004) sea and land breezes, mountain breeze and valley 
breezes, mountain waves, mesolows and mesohighs, wake 
lows, mesoscale convective vortices (MCVs), tropical 
cyclone and extratropical cyclone rainbands, macrobursts, gust 
fronts and outflow boundaries, heat bursts, urban heat islands, and 
other mesoscale phenomena can cause weather conditions in a 
localized area to be significantly different from that dictated by the 
ambient large-scale conditions. (Fujita T. , 1981) (Ray, 1986) As such, 
meteorologists need to understand these phenomena in order to 
improve forecast skill. Observations are critical to understanding 
the processes by which these phenomena form, evolve, and 
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dissipate.[ This is where the sUAV comes into play – enhancing the 
data collection and reduction of chaos.] 
 
The long-term observing networks (ASOS, AWOS, Coop),1, 2 
however, are too sparse and report too infrequently for mesoscale 
research. ASOS and AWOS stations are typically spaced 50 to 100 
kilometers (31 to 62 mi) apart and report only hourly at many sites. 
The Cooperative Observer Program (COOP) database consists of 
only daily reports. “Mesoscale” weather phenomena occur on spatial 
scales of tens to hundreds of kilometers and temporal (time) scales 
of minutes to hours. Thus, an observing network with finer 
temporal and spatial scales is needed for mesoscale research. This 
need led to the development of the mesonet. 
 
Mesonet data is directly used by humans for decision making, 
but also boosts the skill of numerical weather prediction and is 
especially beneficial for short-range mesoscale models. Mesonets, 
along with remote sensing solutions (data assimilation of weather 
radar, weather satellites, wind profilers), allow for much greater 
temporal and spatial resolution in a forecast model. As 
the atmosphere is a chaotic nonlinear dynamical system
(i.e. Butterfly effect), this increase in data increases understanding 
of initial conditions and boosts model performance. In addition to 
meteorology and climatology users, transportation departments, 
energy producers and distributors, other utility interests, and 
agricultural entities also have a need for fine scale weather 
information. These organizations operate dozens of mesonets 
within the US and globally. Environmental, emergency 
management and public safety, and insurance interests also are 
heavy users of mesonet information. 
 
In many cases, mesonet stations may (by necessity) be located in 
positions where accurate measurements may be compromised; for 
instance, this is especially true of the stations built for WeatherBug’s 
network, many of which were located on school buildings. The 
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potential bias that these locations may cause must be accounted 
for when entering the data into a model, lest the phenomenon of 
“GIGO”3 may  occur. 
 
Mesonets were born out of the need to conduct mesoscale 
research. The nature of this research is such that mesonets, like the 
phenomena they are meant to observe, are short-lived. Long term 
research projects and non-research groups, however, have been 
able to maintain a mesonet for many years. For example, the U.S. 
Army Dugway Proving Ground in Utah has maintained a mesonet 
for many decades. The research-based origin of mesonets has led 
to the characteristic that mesonet stations tend to be modular and 
portable, able to be moved from one field program to another. 
 
Whether the mesonet is temporary or semi-permanent, each 
weather station is typically independent, drawing power from 
a battery and solar panels. An on-board computer takes readings 
from several instruments 
measuring temperature, humidity, wind speed & direction, 
and atmospheric pressure, as well as soil 
temperature and moisture, and other environmental variable 
deemed important to the mission of the mesonet, solar 
irradiance being a common non-meteorological parameter. The 
computer periodically saves these data to memory and transmits 
the observations to a base station via radio, telephone (wireless or 
landline), or satellite transmission. Advancements in computer 
technology and wireless communications in recent decades made 
possible the collection of mesonet data in real-time. The availability 
of mesonet data in real-time can be extremely valuable to 
operational forecasters as they can monitor weather conditions 
from many points in their forecast area. 
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Figure 2.1 A weather map consisting of a station model plot 
of Oklahoma Mesonet data overlaid with WSR-88D weather radar 
data depicting possible horizontal convective rolls as a potential 
contributing factor in the incipient 3 May 1999 tornado outbreak 
Source: (Wikipedia, 2020) 
 
Introduction 
How does weather prediction work?  Weather is extremely 
difficult to predict.  Atmospheric conditions must be compiled 
around the world for a number of days monitoring such things 
as changes in pressure, temperature, wind speed, and rainfall. 
Weather balloons are sent up to take weather readings.  Ships and 
aircraft also monitor weather data.  Cloud patterns are monitored 
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by satellite imagery.  Historical data is also used to assist prediction 
by using variables of heat, air, and moisture in numerical modeling 
to see how they flow over the earth’s surface. 
 
An examination a Mesonet Data Collection weather 
instrument(s). 
A Mesonet is a network of environmental monitoring stations 
designed to measure the environment at the size and duration of 
mesoscale weather events.  The phrase “Mesonet” is a portmanteau 
of the word’s mesoscale and network.  One can think of Mesonet 
as the average occurring weather, not large scale, or microclimate 
without being used in combination of the before mentioned inputs 
to weather prediction.  In this case we will concentrate on a 
network made up of 10-meter towers with a set of research grade 
weather and ground sensing instruments. 
 
In Figure 2.2 a 30ft. weather tower is depicted.  The instruments 
spaced at 10m are: 1 – RM Young anemometer, 1 – HMP60 
temperature/relative Humidity sensor w/ radiation shield. 
Instruments at 2m are: 1 – RM Young anemometer, 1 – HMP60 
temperature/relative Humidity sensor w/ radiation shield, 1 – 
CS301 Pyranometer.  Midway up the tower is a 7dbi antenna. Inside 
the NEMA enclosure: 1 CR1000X data logger, 1 – RV50 Modem, 1 – 
CS106 Barometer, 1 – Charge controller. 
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Figure 2.2: 30’ Weather Tower 
 Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
Businesses such as airlines and farming rely heavily upon accurate 
weather forecasting.   Forecasting accurately is extremely 
important in keeping track of deadly weather events.  That demand 
for accuracy places an emphasis on making proper predictions and 
also using high quality instrumentation that is proven to be reliable 
and repeatable with known calibration intervals that can be traced 
to know standards.  We will now make an examination of the 
standard instrumentation used in Figure 2.2 top to bottom. 
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Figure 2.3: 05103 Wind Monitor 
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
 
Wind monitors, also known as Anemometers, are kinetic and 
require a robustness that can tolerate all weather conditions.  The 
wind monitor show in Figure 2.3 is a lightweight, sturdy instrument 
for measuring wind speed and direction in your harsh 
environments. Its simplicity and corrosion-resistant construction 
make it ideal for a wide range of wind measuring applications. 
Manufactured by R. M. Young.  The 05103 Wind Monitor is made 
out of rigid UV-stabilized thermoplastic with stainless steel and 
anodized aluminum fittings.  The thermoplastic material resists 
corrosion from sea air environments and atmospheric pollutants. It 
uses stainless-steel precision-grade ball bearings for the propeller 
shaft and vertical shaft bearings.  The 05103 measures wind speed 
with a helicoid-shaped, four-blade propeller. Rotation of the 
propeller produces an AC sine wave that has a frequency directly 
proportional to wind speed. The AC signal is induced in a transducer 
coil by a six-pole magnet mounted on the propeller shaft. The coil 
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resides on the non-rotating central portion of the main mounting 
assembly, eliminating the need for slip rings and brushes.  Wind 
direction is sensed by the orientation of the fuselage-shaped sensor 
body, which is connected to an internal potentiometer. The data 
logger applies a known precision excitation voltage to the 
potentiometer element. The output is an analog voltage signal 
directly proportional to the azimuth angle. (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
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Figure 2.4: HMP60 temp/relative Humidity 
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
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Figure 2.5: HMP60 temp/relative Humidity w/ radiation shield 
Source:(Campbell Sci, 2020) 
 
The HMP60, manufactured by Vaisala, probe measures air 
temperature for the range of -40° to +60°C, and relative humidity 
for the range of 0 to 100% RH. It uses the INTERCAP® capacitive RH 
chip. This field-replaceable chip eliminates the downtime typically 
required for the recalibration process.[4] (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
Figure  2.6: CS301 Pyranometer 
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
 
The CS301 uses a silicon photovoltaic detector mounted in 
a cosine-corrected head to provide solar radiation measurements. 
Its dome-shaped head prevents water from accumulating on 
the sensor head. To eliminate internal condensation, the sensor 
head is potted solid and the cable is shielded with a rugged 
Santoprene casing. The CS301 is calibrated against a Kipp & 
Zonen CM21 thermopile Pyranometer to accurately measure sun 
plus sky radiation. (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
30  |  Chapter 2: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles & How They Can Augment
Mesonet Weather Tower Data Collection [Mai]
Figure  2.7: CR1000X Datalogger 
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
 
The CR1000X is a low-powered device designed to measure 
sensors, drive direct communication and telecommunications, 
analyze data, control external devices, and store data and programs 
in on-board, non-volatile storage. The electronics are RF-shielded 
and glitch-protected by a unique sealed, stainless-steel canister. A 
battery-backed clock assures accurate timekeeping. The on-board, 
BASIC-like programming language—common to all Campbell 
Scientific data loggers—supports data processing and analysis 
routines.  The CR1000X wiring panel includes two switchable 12 V 
terminals, analog grounds dispersed among 16 analog terminals, and 
non pluggable terminal blocks for quick deployment. (Campbell Sci, 
2020) 
Chapter 2: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles & How They Can Augment Mesonet
Weather Tower Data Collection [Mai]  |  31
Figure  2.8: CS106 Barometer 
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
  
The CS106 uses Vaisala BAROCAP silicon capacitive sensor to 
measure barometric pressure. It is encased in a plastic shell (ABS/
PC blend) fitted with an intake valve for pressure equilibration. 
The CS106 outputs a linear signal of 0 to 2.5 Vdc, which allows 
the barometer to be directly connected to a Campbell Scientific 
data logger. An internal switching circuit allows the data logger to 
power the CS106 only during measurement, which reduces power 
consumption. (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
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Figure  2.9: NEMA Enclosure 
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
 
Note: The Datalogger, Barometer, Charge Controller, and Modem 
are housed within the NEMA. 
The ENC16/18 is a weather-resistant enclosure that is 16 inches 
wide and 18 inches tall. It can house a data logger, a power supply, 
and at least one peripheral. This enclosure is recommended for 
applications that need to have multiple communication or 
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measurement and control peripherals housed in the same 
enclosure. (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
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Figure  2.10 TE525 Rain Gauge 
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
 
The TE525 funnels precipitation into a bucket mechanism that 
tips when filled to its calibrated level. A magnet attached to the 
tipping mechanism actuates a switch as the bucket tips. The 
momentary switch closure is counted by the pulse-counting 
circuitry of our data loggers. (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
 
Figure  2.11: CS655 TDR Soil Moisture and Temperature 
Source: (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
The CS655 consists of two 12-cm-long stainless-steel rods 
connected to a printed circuit board. The circuit board is 
encapsulated in epoxy and a shielded cable is attached to the circuit 
board for data logger connection. 
The CS655 measures propagation time, signal attenuation, and 
temperature. Dielectric permittivity, volumetric water content, and 
bulk electrical conductivity are then derived from these raw values. 
Measured signal attenuation is used to correct for the loss effect 
on reflection detection and thus propagation time measurement. 
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This loss-effect correction allows accurate water content 
measurements in soils with bulk EC ≤8 dS m-1 without performing a 
soil-specific calibration. 
Soil bulk electrical conductivity is also calculated from the 
attenuation measurement. A thermistor in thermal contact with a 
probe rod near the epoxy surface measures temperature. Horizontal 
installation of the sensor provides accurate soil temperature 
measurement at the same depth as the water content. Temperature 
measurement in other orientations will be that of the region near 
the rod entrance into the epoxy body. (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
Figure  2.12: 107 Temperature probe 
Source: (Campbell Sci. , 2020) 
The 107 is a rugged, accurate probe that measures temperature 
of air, soil, or water from -35° to +50°C. It easily interfaces with 
most Campbell Scientific data loggers and can be used in a variety 
of applications.  The 107 consists of a thermistor encapsulated in 
an epoxy-filled aluminum housing. The housing protects the 
36  |  Chapter 2: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles & How They Can Augment
Mesonet Weather Tower Data Collection [Mai]
thermistor, allowing you to bury the probe in soil or submerge it in 
water. (Campbell Sci, 2020) 
 
Additional Components in the Weather Ground Station part of 
the sUAV ecosystem 
 
Additional components needed are: A rugged modem such as a 
Raven RV50 w/ 4g antenna, Solar panel(s) based on power demand, 
deep cycle 12Vdc battery for power storage, and a charge controller 
for power management. 
The above components are by no means the limit to the type 
and style of sensors and hardware that can be added to a Mesonet 
tower.  However, they will acquire the basic data, moisture, wind 
speed and direction, temperature, relative humidity, barometric 
pressure, solar radiation, used in recording data. 
A tower by itself would not be good enough to do any type of 
weather prediction.  Even combined with multiple towers they are 
only good enough to record the weather at each point at any given 
time.  As a Mesonet increases its number of towers they become more 
valuable.  As stated before, the data collected on its own is only a 
record.  If used in conjunction with the other forms and types of 
weather data collection, only then can weather prediction become 
possible.  Even then, many holes could be filled by more towers 
creating more data collection points.  The only way to be 100% 
accurate in weather prediction is to be omniscient or collect data 
on every square inch of the earth.  Which we all understand that is 
economically unfeasible and a temporal impossibility. 
Billions of dollars are spent each year in the recording and 
prediction of the weather to save lives, assist businesses and help 
the public with their individual daily activities.  The collection of 
more data can only assist in that goal.  But just more data is not the 
only requirement.  Understanding that data and making inferences 
to establish a prediction is most important.  So how do we interrupt 
the weather? 
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If a butterfly flaps its wings in Brazil, could it really cause a 
hurricane in Texas? 
That’s more or less a spoof on the mathematics of Chaos 
Theory.[5]  (Roulstone, 2013) To be more specific that is how we 
determine weather patterns.  The mathematics of the known laws 
of motion are not good enough to predict weather.  The movement 
of weather is so complicated it requires the use of a computer 
to develop models of probability.  Even if you change the initial 
conditions only slightly the end conditions are wildly different 
resulting in Chaos.  This is where Chaos theory becomes involved. 
By using contributing factors of weather, we do have models on 
how these variables behave.  If a perfect weather prediction is 
impossible, then better computer computations and as many 
possible data points sampled would be the best we as humans can 
expect to strive towards.  This is the point sUAV’s could help in 
increasing sampling points and predictive of severe weather 
events. 
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Figure 2.13 120m Tethered UAV on windy weather, cable feeder, 
400VDC 
Source: (Campbell Sci. , 2020) 
 
To work with a Mesonet, a Tethered sUAV could be added and 
create a 3D Mesonet.  Power and data could flow thru the wiring 
acting as a tether.  This would also provide stability and retrieval. 
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Figure 2.14: Automatic Winch to Control Tether Retrieval 
Source: (Campbell Sci. , 2020) 
Figure 2.15: Tether Power Pak 
Source: (Campbell Sci. , 2020) 
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Oklahoma Mesonet 
The following abstract focuses on the efforts of the Oklahoma 
Mesonet and their efforts to design and build a 3D Mesonet with 
the aid of UAV’s.  At the time of this writing the author is aware 
of only the Oklahoma Mesonet making significant funded efforts to 
use sUAV’s in their operations. 
Fixed monitoring sites, such as those in the US National Weather 
Service Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) and the 
Oklahoma Mesonet provide valuable, high temporal resolution 
information about the atmosphere to forecasters and the general 
public. The Oklahoma Mesonet is comprised of a network of 120 
surface sites providing a wide array of atmospheric measurements 
up to a height of 10 m with an update time of five minutes. 
 
The deployment of small, unmanned aircraft to collect in-situ 
vertical measurements of the atmospheric state in conjunction with 
surface conditions has potential to significantly expand weather 
observation capabilities. This concept can enhance the safety of 
individuals and support commerce through improved observations 
and short-term forecasts of the weather and other environmental 
variables in the lower atmosphere. 
 
We report on a concept of adding the capability of collecting 
vertical atmospheric measurements (profiles) through the use of 
unmanned aerial systems (UAS) at remote Oklahoma sites deemed 
suitable for this application. While there are a number of other 
technologies currently available that can provide measurements of 
one or a few variables, the proposed UAS concept will be expandable 
and modular to accommodate several different sensor packages 
and provide accurate in-situ measurements in virtually all-weather 
conditions. Such a system would facilitate off-site maintenance and 
calibration and would provide the ability to add new sensors as they 
are developed, or as new requirements are identified. The small 
UAS must be capable of accommodating the weight of all sensor 
packages and have lighting, communication, and aircraft avoidance 
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systems necessary to meet existing or future FAA regulations. The 
system must be able to operate unattended, which necessitates 
the inclusion of risk mitigation measures such as detect and avoid 
radar and the ability to transmit and receive transponder signals. 
Moreover, the system should be able to assess local weather 
conditions (visibility, surface winds, and cloud height) and the 
integrity of the vehicle (system diagnostics, fuel level) before 
takeoff. We provide a notional concept of operations for a 3D 
Mesonet being considered, describe the technical configuration for 
one station in the network, and discuss plans for future 
development. 
 
Future uses of sUAV and Weather stations 
As the use of UAV’s in a 3D Mesonet configuration are perfected, 
these same applications can be moved into situations were 
atmospheric gases can be sampled and quantified.  For example, 
controlled burns in the central US could be monitored by mobile 
and tethered UAV’s carrying smoke canisters.  The particulates from 
the smoke canisters can be quantified then statistically equated 
to the imagery of the satellites.  This would allow for a close 
approximation to the amount of biomass consumed and the amount 
of CO and CO2 released into the atmosphere.  This technology 
could be used on forest fires, oil field fires, and volcanic eruptions to 
quantify the number of particulates and greenhouse gases released. 
It would allow operators to stay at a safe distance while gathering 
data.  A sonic anemometer could be used during the study to verify 
background CO2 flux and other trace gases.  Done correctly, this 
could lead into xo-atmospheric research. 
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Figure 2.16: Smoke study 
Source: (Randall, Mai, author courtesy of KSU/WDL) 
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 Figure 2.17: Sonic Anemometer 




Civilization has come a long way since first trying to predict the 
weather.  For example: Red sky at night sailors take delight and red 
sky in the morning sailors take warning.  This revels clouds position 
of clouds at sunrise and sunset.  We now have very sophisticated 
instruments that can take very exact readings.  But those readings 
cannot act alone in a vacuum.  And they are forever changing and 
changing immediately.  So, the only way humans can improve 
weather prediction is to increase the number of readings and the 
profile of those readings.  And then the never-ending task of making 
inference as to what all that data means.  As we push into AI and 
things such as Quantum Computers we can solve more quickly the 
interruption of massive amounts of data.  However, physically we 
will have to push the envelope on how to sample the never-ending 
pool of data the weather presents.  Tethered and even mobile UAV 
can assist by carrying atmospheric sensors to improve the profile 
that we call weather and eventually climate. 
Student Think Questions 
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1. Where might we find a valuable place to deploy Tethered 
UAV’s? 
2. How can we assure powering a UAV in its role as a Tethered 
UAV package? 
3. How would you design a request for funding for a Tethered 
UAV? 
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[1] ASOS = Automated Surface Weather System 
[2] AWOS= Automated Weather Observing System 
[3] GIGO = refers to computer data garbage in, garbage out 
[4] https://s.campbellsci.com/documents/us/product-brochures/
b_hmp60.pdf 
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[5] A useful source is Roulstone, I. & Norury, J. (2013)  Invisible 
in the Storm: The Role of Mathematics in Understanding Weather.
Princeton University Press 
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3. Chapter 3 Tour de Drones 
for the Discerning Palate 
 [Nichols] 
Student Objectives 
To enjoy the range of UAS and UUV technologies by shared 
stories. At Olive Garden© they call it a “Tour de Italy” This chapter 
is a “Tour de Drone for the Discerning Palate.” Through stories and 
vignettes, UAS and UUV world are further discovered. 
Introduction 
In our three previous textbooks, the authors covered the whole 
spectrum of UAS / CUAS technologies. (Nichols R. K., et al., 
2020)(Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber 
Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 
2019)(Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) Every day since our publication 
have come to market, news about UAS and CUAS technologies have 
emerged in as many publications and media. In this textbook (4th 
textbook in the series) the authors have added the unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUVs) as technologies based on many of the 
same autonomous principles working in a different medium. This 
chapter highlights some of the interesting finds since February 
2020 publication of ground-breaking textbook on CUAS. (Nichols, 




On 3 August 2020, an interesting poster was received from the 
Chief of Security at KSU regarding identification of suspicious 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). It was CISA’s Office of Bombing 
Protection. (Bombing, 2020) 
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Figure 3.1 is aimed at the protection of national critical 
infrastructure but has elements common to civilian facilities and 
personnel protections from a wide variety of threats. 
 Figure 3.1 Recognize Suspicious UAS 
Source: (Bombing, 2020) 
The poster shows several interesting items: 
Indicators of Suspicious UAS Activity 
• Repeated unauthorize flights 
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• Suspected reconnaissance, such as repeated flyovers or 
prolonged hovering at low altitudes, 
• Testing facility security protocols by flying in sensitive areas to 
observe the reaction of security personnel (Bombing, 2020) 
Easy Acronym – DRONE 
Detect all available elements of the situation; attempt to locate 
and identify the individuals operating the drone ( look at windows, 
balconies, roof tops) 
Report the incident to local LEO and FAA Regional Operations 
Center. 
Observe the UAS and maintain visibility of the device, look for 
damage or injured individuals. 
Notice Features: Identify the type of device ( fixed wing/ multi-
rotor), size, shape, color, payload, and activity 
Execute appropriate security actions. (Bombing, 2020) 
 
Grounded UAS 
Treat a suspicious grounded UAS as a potential explosive threat! 
(Treat as an IED) (Bombing, 2020) 
 
Figure 3.1 is aimed at / designed for personnel protecting our 
national critical infrastructure. However, it is just as useful for 
determining UAS privacy invasions, drug flow and delivery, 
fraudulent delivery from retailers, residential property casing, 
stalking, child exploitation, and robberies to name a few 
possibilities.  Treating every downed UAS as an IED is a bit over the 
top (perhaps) however, better to be cautious because one mistake 
could cost lives.  One the key features of the poster is the 
“navigation lights taped over or removed” observation. This disabled 
safety feature can be seen – especially at night – for quite a distance 
or approximately 500 feet elevation. This is a serious indicator that 
the UAS is suspicious. (Bombing, 2020) 
 
Cops, Drones and Nudes 
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From Minnesota comes a strange story. On 31 July 2020 cops in 
Minnesota flew a drone over a public beach to see if they could 
spot some exposed females – and then sent seven officers down 
to ticket topless sunbathers. (Cole, 2020). In response to dozens 
of complaints regarding nudism, alcohol and drug use, the Golden 
Valley Police Department used a drone  to find people in the nude 
at Twin Lake, a public beach that’s secluded but popular with locals 
who want to let it “hang out a little.” The city defended the police 
citing Covid-19 concerns. The drone was used to “avoid unnecessary 
face-to-face interactions and the data was used for documentation, 
evidence collection, and prosecution if need and deleted as soon as 
possible.” (Cole, 2020) 
An ordinance from the Minnesota Park and Recreation Board 
states that “no person 10 years of age or older shall intentionally 
expose his or her own genitals, pubic area, buttocks or female 
breast below the top of the areola, with less than a fully opaque 
covering in or upon any park or parkway.” (Cole, 2020) (PRBC, 2020) 
[1] The ordinance has been attacked by a coalition LGBT civil rights 
activists as discriminating. The author of the article chided the 
Golden Valley Police Department in her conclusions: “ The fact 
that the police department—especially around Minnesota, one of 
the cities at the center of protests against police brutality this 
year—would break out the most over-the-top means of surveillance 
and enforcement they could, shouldn’t be surprising.” (Cole, 2020) 
All this over a drone! 
 
28,300 feet 
Inspired by the 1924 expedition of George Leigh Mallory and 
Andrew ‘Sandy’ Irvine, National Geographic is working on a 
documentary titled ‘Lost on Everest.’ Mallory’s remains were found 
in 1999, but Irvine’s body is still missing. It remains a mystery as 
to whether the team actually reached the summit before their 
unfortunate deaths. If they did, it would have been long before 
Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay reach the top of Mount Everest 
in 1953. A team from National Geographic surveyed Mount Everest 
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with a drone at 28,300 feet putting the unmanned aircraft in 
uncharted territory. They flew the drone as high as 28,300 feet or 
8,625 meters, just shy of the summit of Mount Everest, which is 
at 29,000 feet or 8,840 meters, flying the Mavic 2 into ‘uncharted 
territory.’ Mark Sinnott and Renan Ozturk from National Geographic 
renewed the search for Irvine’s body and brought with them a DJI 
Mavic 2 to survey the terrain. With the drone, the team was able to 
capture sweeping landscape views and close-up photos of key areas 
of Mount Everest (Figures 3.2, 3.3) (Kesteloo, 2020) [2] 
Figure 3.2  National Geographic Climbing Team with Mavic 2 
Drone 
Source: (Kesteloo, 2020) 
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Figure 3.3 Key Search area of Mt Everest 
Source: (Kesteloo, 2020) 
 
 Turtles 
From Mt Everest , we fly 8,313 km (5,165.5 miles)  to the Great 
Barrier Reef. Researchers at Raine Island, the world’s largest green 
turtle rookery, have used a drone to conduct accurate population 
surveys, with stunning results. Drone vision captured in December 
2019 as part of the Raine Island Recovery Project showed up to 
64,000 green turtles around the island waiting to come ashore and 
lay clutches of eggs. (See Figure 3.4.) Dr Andrew Dunstan from the 
Department of Environment and Science (DES) and lead author of 
the paper said researchers had been investigating different ways 
of conducting turtle population surveys. “New scientific research 
published on Monday 8 June in PLOS ONE found that drones, or 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), were found to be the most 
efficient survey method,” Dr Dunstan said. “Previous population 
survey methods involved painting a white stripe down the green 
turtles’ shell when they were nesting on the beach. The paint is non-
toxic and washes off in a couple of days. “From a small boat, we then 
counted painted and non-painted turtles, but eyes are attracted 
much more to a turtle with a bright white stripe than an unpainted 
turtle, resulting in biased counts and reduced accuracy. “Trying to 
accurately count thousands of painted and unpainted turtles from 
a small boat in rough weather was difficult. Using a drone is easier, 
safer, much more accurate, and the data can be immediately and 
permanently stored.” The drone vision was analyzed, frame by frame 
in the laboratory, reducing observer error and allowing accurate 
counts on painted and unpainted turtles. “The ratio of unpainted 
and painted turtles allowed us to estimate the total population for 
last December to be 64,000 green turtles waiting to nest on the 
island,” Dr Dunstan said. 
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“By using drones, we have adjusted historical data. What 
previously took a number of researchers a long time can now be 
by one drone operator in under an hour.” “This research is of prime 
importance to the understanding and management of the 
vulnerable green turtle population, according to Dr. Dunstan.” (USA 




From counting sea turtles’ eggs, we turn our heads to getting air 
sick as a passenger (not the pilot) in the first manned aerobatic 
drone flown by the Drone Champions League (DCL). The Drone 
Champions League (DCL) has been captivating audiences since 2016 
with the world’s best pilots of quadcopter racing in head-to-head 
battles flying drones that can reach speeds of over 160 km/h. It 
is recognized as the World Championship of professional drone 
racing. Pilots are chosen by being the best players of the “DCL -The 
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Game” video game. The game can be played by anybody at home, 
giving everyone the chance to qualify for real-life drone racing 
events by playing in the DCL Draft Selection. 
 
Now, Drone Champions AG, the creators of the Drone Champions 
League and DCL – The Game, have revealed their latest innovation: 
the world’s first manned drone capable of aerobatic maneuvers such 
as loops and rolls. It was invented by Herbert Weirather, the Drone 
Champions founder and CEO of DCL. (Steffen, 2020) See Figures 3.5 
-3.7. 
 
Dubbed the “Big Drone,” the aircraft is a full-sized, carbon fiber 
airframe that has six arms protruding from an aerodynamically 
faired chassis. Each arm has a pair of coaxial rotors mounted at the 
end. There is a middle seat to carry a passenger, not a pilot. The Big 
Drone was designed to be flown from the ground by professional 
drone racing pilots over a remote control. (Steffen, 2020) 
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Figure 3.5 “Big Drone” by DCL 
Source: (Steffen, 2020) 
 Figure 3.6 “Big Drone” by DCL (2) 
Source: (Steffen, 2020) 
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Figure 3.7 “Big Drone” by DCL (3) 
Source: (Steffen, 2020) 
A very cool flying machine! 
 
Swarm Farming 
In our textbook on CUAS we consider drone SWARMS a 
dangerous threat. (Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Technologies and Operations, 2020)  However, what if we 
could use it for improving our agricultural outputs. Swarm farming 
is the concept of using multiple smaller robotic platforms to 
autonomously conduct farming operations as a substitute to large 
manned agricultural equipment. (See Figures 3.8 & 3.9) Now, rural 
agricultural communities have large sections of farmlands and large 
equipment, which can rapidly cover acres for planting, nutrition, 
pesticide, and harvesting operations (sometimes involving multiple 
operations for nutrition and pest control). During a growing season, 
limited days suitable to work are available to timely complete the 
specific operation without penalty on yield and profitability. 
(Precision AG , 2020) 
 
Key drivers for the motivation in swarm farming include 
decreasing number of people engaged in agriculture, sustainable 
crop production methods for environmental sustainability, potential 
negative effects from soil compaction when using larger ag 
equipment, increasing size of farming operations, and rising average 
age of U.S. farmers. (Precision AG , 2020) 
 
When it comes to substituting current large equipment with 
swarm farming, one of the key qualifiers is going to be comparative 
system productivity and accuracy. There are probably dozens of 
different types of robotic platforms which have been designed in 
Europe and the U.S. Some examples include Robotti by Agrointelli, 
Tertil by Franklin robotics, OZ, and DINO by Naio technologies, 
TerraSentia by Earthsense, AVO and ARA robots by Ecorobotix, DOT 
by Raven Autonomy, SwarmFarm Robotics, and BoniRob by 
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Deepfield Robotics. Platform sizes vary from small robots to do 
scout activities, medium sized for operations like weeding, and 
some large enough to conduct multi-row operations like spraying 
and seeding. (Precision AG , 2020) 
 
Most of the robotics platforms currently in sight are standalone 
with a future vision to operate as swarms. The majority of these 
robotic platforms are light enough to just conduct non-soil 
engaging activities, whereas only a few can do soil engaging 
activities. These platforms are currently shown to operate on crops 
with low canopy heights (vegetable and fruits), with few exceptions 
like vineyards. (Precision AG , 2020) 
 
However, there are very few options for row crop operations 
requiring operation on substantially large acreage, greater draft, 
and weight transfer. Another interesting facet is that not all of these 
robotic platforms have been designed with full considerations on 
implementations or application systems to be utilized in the real-
world. Today’s producers use a lot of technology, automation, 
automatic machine data, and not to mention, the human 
intelligence sitting inside the machine. One question we need to ask 
ourselves as stakeholders in the industry is, are farmers ready to 
provide a practical switch?    (Precision AG , 2020) 
Currently, there are a handful of swarm farming concepts which 
are being explored. Robotic platforms, like ones from Swarmfarms, 
DOT, Naio, Guss and others, are examples of how swarm robots 
could become reality. Personally, I feel the biggest hurdle we need 
to cross is the ability of such robotic platforms to operate as a 
fleet or implement swarm farming on large acres in a representative 
manner. (Precision AG , 2020) 
Swarm farming definitely has some foreseeable advantage, if this 
swarm fleet becomes fully autonomous in operation over larger 
fields. Personally, I see two biggest advantages. One, a fully 
integrated system can reduce operational time spent by farm 
owners on and off the machines and continuous optimization using 
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machine learning, Two, the  automatic decision-based applications 
using artificial intelligence, data assimilation, and aggregated data 
availability for analytics are strong assets. Swarm has the ability 
to operate on its own, detect and communicate faults, automatic 
reloading of operational boundaries if one platform is down, and 
many more. (Precision AG , 2020) 
The big dream is that platforms within swarm farming will have 
capability to operate nearly 24/7, but the question is, how far are we 
from that reality? (Precision AG , 2020) 
Figure 3.8 Swarm Farming -Spray Operations 
Source: https://www.silicon-saxony-day.de/ 
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It is an understatement that Covid-19 pandemic has affected 
millions of lives globally. However, a company called SkySkopes is 
doing something positive in the midst of chaos. 
Unmanned aerial systems (UAS)  are being studied as tools to 
fight the novel coronavirus. (See Figure 3.10 sprayer for disinfectant) 
The UAS will be used to disinfect large public areas and to deliver 
supplies. In Grand Forks, N. Dakota, SkySkopes, a UAS flight 
operator that serves a wide variety of industries; the Center for 
Innovation at the University of North Dakota (UND); and a number 
of other companies are engaged in a study to determine how drones 
can be used to accomplish these tasks. (Zimmer, 2020) 
SkySkopes is also testing the use of thermal sensors that are 
positioned in stationary locations above research participants. The 
sensors detect elevated temperatures and help ensure that an 
individual is healthy enough to return to work. Like Syracuse-based 
drone startup EagleHawk, SkySkopes is determining what methods 
can be used to disperse disinfectant effectively and on a large scale. 
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Since mid-March, the company has been making test runs, spraying 
public playgrounds using nozzles and tanks. The only substance 
SkySkopes has sprayed outdoors is water. When its UAS have been 
used indoors, they have sprayed a solution of 3 percent hydrogen 
peroxide and 97 percent water. (Zimmer, 2020) [4] 
SkySkopes is also developing procedures for drone pilots and 
visual observers to travel to and from a site, and to clean 
instruments before, during and after use, and take measures to 
inform and protect the public. SkySkopes CEO Matt Dunlevy said 
that reconsidering the use of drones during the pandemic requires 
identifying new precautions and protocols. (Zimmer, 2020) 
Figure 3.10 SkySkopes Covid-19 Disinfectant sprayer drone 
Source: (Zimmer, 2020) 
 
“One of our biggest questions is what we will need to do to 
discourage crowds who want to observe our work from forming. We 
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do not want to exacerbate community spread as we disinfect public 
spaces,” said Dunlevy. (Zimmer, 2020) 
Dunlevy added that while playgrounds are not the only target 
site being considered,  they are good locations to conduct research. 
“We’re using them to learn how to disinfect many other objects and 
areas, including vehicles, the outsides of different types of buildings, 
park equipment, and indoor spaces such as movie theaters and 
gymnasiums,” said Dunlevy. (Zimmer, 2020) 
 
Fortunately, playgrounds are ideal for study because they contain 
a number of complex elements that can indicate how to tackle 
similar areas in other outdoor workplaces. For instance, SkySkopes 
has a number of clients in the energy industry, where ladders and 
platforms are present, and crowds are unavoidable for project 
executions. (Zimmer, 2020) (See Figure 3.11 SkySkopes Playground 
Test Area) 
Figure 3.11 SkySkopes Playground Test Area 
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Source: (Zimmer, 2020) 
 
Dunlevy explained that smaller areas could be disinfected with a 
single payload of liquid carried on the drone and released by “one 
fell swoop” of a drone pilot. Larger areas could be disinfected with 
liquid drawn from a tank on the ground by an assistant, carried 
to the drone by a tube, and sprayed out of a nozzle attached to 
the tube. A tank-and-hose combination could also be effective at 
disinfecting the underside of elements like monkey bars. The drone 
could fly under the play structure and turn the nozzle to spray 
disinfect upwards. 
Currently, SkySkopes is running thermal sensor tests with 
Infrared Cameras Inc.’s Optical Gas Imaging camera, which is made 
with components by FLIR Systems, Inc., on DJI’s Zenmuse XT. 
SkySkopes expects real-life use of the sensors could involve 
mounting the device on the wall of a hospital or care facility, with 
an employee standing under the device to take a reading. (Zimmer, 
2020) 
“Right now, we’re just testing out use of that on the ground. 
We are only testing it on SkySkopes employees and research 
participants. As for nozzles for drone spraying, we are testing out a 
combination of different spray nozzles and tanks. We’re borrowing 
heavily from already-proven techniques in agriculture,” said 
Dunlevy. (Zimmer, 2020) 
Mark Askelson, a professor of atmospheric sciences and executive 
director of the Research Institute for Autonomous Systems (RIAS) at 
the University of North Dakota, is assisting with the study. Askelson 
said the studies indicate that a spray of very small drops of 
disinfecting liquid would likely limit the fluid’s ability to kill the virus. 
“The smaller the droplet, the faster it evaporates. That is the reason 
SkySkopes is out there under different conditions to determine how 
drop size, wind speed, and direction affect coverage,” said Askelson. 
Askelson noted that determining the “residence time” of droplets of 
cleaning fluid is important to determine whether the drops stay on 
the surface of an object long enough to kill the virus. (Zimmer, 2020) 
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HAPS UAV – Stratospheric Test Flights 
In our CUAS textbook, we covered the failed promises of HAPS 
technology using UAVS. (Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Technologies and Operations, 2020) However, there is 
progress. 
HAPSMobile has successfully completed the fourth test flight of 
its Sunglider solar-powered high-altitude pseudo-satellite (HAPS) 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The test flight took place at 
Spaceport America in New Mexico, and its completion marks the 
conclusion of all basic aircraft tests for the aircraft. HAPSMobile will 
now begin preparations for stratospheric test flights. (UST Weekly 
eBrief, 2020) (See Figure 3.12) 
 
During this round of testing, Sunglider reached altitudes higher 
than those of previous flights and maintained high altitudes for a 
long duration. Other test milestones included flight speed changes, 
steep turns, automated flight control in the event of interrupted 
communications with the Ground Control System, and in-flight 
balance control. (UST Weekly eBrief, 2020) 
 
HAPSMobile has constructed a new specialized test site at 
Spaceport America, providing an additional facility to the existing 
test site on the Hawaiian island of Lanai. Spaceport America offers 
flexibility in coordinating test flight schedules, providing 
opportunities to conduct test flights with greater frequency and 
more freedom to conduct various types of tests. HAPSMobile also 
plans to conduct stratospheric test flights at Spaceport America. 
(UST Weekly eBrief, 2020) 
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 Figure 3.12 HAPS Sunglider 
Source: (UST Weekly eBrief, 2020) 
 
Drones to Deliver Organ Transplants 
Drones are slated to be the ideal technology to deliver organs 
to transplant patients—and a test program could soon make this 
premise a reality. Dr. Joseph Scalea, transplant surgeon at the 
University of Maryland Medical Center, is working with a group 
of researchers to explore if drones are a suitable method for 
transporting organs . The team recently concluded a series of 14 test 
flights that demonstrate the potential for drones to work as organ 
couriers. (Greenwood, 2019) 
The team used a DJI M600 Pro drone for the experiment. See 
Figure 3.13.  Its six motors lie directly below their respective 
rotors—and further away from its cargo, a smart cooler that contains 
an organ, reducing the organ’s exposure to heat from the robot’s 
motors. The team also designed a wireless biosensor that measures 
the organ’s temperature, barometric pressure, altitude, vibration, 
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and GPS location while it is being transported. Finally, the team 
used a kidney that was not a viable transplant to test its drone. 
(Greenwood, 2019) 
Figure 3.13 DJI M600 Pro for Organ Transplant 
Source: (Greenwood, 2019) 
 
The results, published by the IEEE, show the test was a success. 
[5]  Biopsies of the kidney before and after the flight showed it 
remained undamaged. The temperature of the kidney remained at 
a stable 2.5°C, the air pressure matched the altitude, and the drone 
flew up to 67.6 kph. The kidney was even subjected to marginally 
fewer vibrations than it would have been exposed to on a fixed wing 
plane. (Greenwood, 2019) 
Organs do not last very long outside the body, which means they 
must get to their intended recipients as soon as possible—often on 
short notice, making every second critical. But the current organ 
transport system relies on couriers, commercial airline schedules 
and expensive charter flights. Any delay or mistake during this 
process could mean the organ loses its effectiveness—or 
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deteriorates so much that it cannot be used at all. (Greenwood, 
2019) 
 
These costs and mistakes could be reduced by using drones. “It 
will be faster and cheaper and more predictable,” said Scalea. There 
are regulatory obstacles to overcome. The FAA strictly enforces 
limits on drone use, but the agency is planning to make changes 
based on data from 10 pilot programs—two of which plan to 
transport medical supplies. Those changes would make it possible 
for drones to make the organ transportation system—which supplies 
organs for more than 30,000 transplants a year—faster and more 
efficient. “Drones really work for this purpose,” said Scalea. 
(Greenwood, 2019) See Figure 3.14. 
Figure 3.14 Organ Transplant coming in for landing at Hospital 
Source: (Greenwood, 2019) https://spectrum.ieee.org/image/
MzE3NTIwOA.gif 
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Robot Trucks? 
The author is all for expanding the uses of drones in the 
transportation theater. But Robot trucks? Respectfully, this is a 
horrible idea. Living near a major trucking thoroughfare in 
Pennsylvania with 50+ huge trans-shipment / storage complexes 
off I-81 /, where real semi-trucks going North and South at a rate 
100,000 + per hour along with triple that number in regular cars 
moving about 70 mph pile up the accidents (many fatal) every single 
day. This is with drivers that understand human nature, road rage, 
tailgating and impaired drivers have an advantage. Add to this mess 
robotic, autonomous, computer algorithm-based vehicles with lots 
of momentum and weight, portends a huge risk to public 
transportation. [6] 
 
However, TuSimple, a self-driving startup with operations in the 
U.S. and China,[7] is opening what it calls the world’s first 
“Autonomous Freight Network,” a highway corridor stretching over 
1,100 miles from Phoenix to Houston for its robot trucks to haul 
loads in a technology partnership with UPS, U.S. Xpress, Penske 
Truck Leasing and Berkshire Hathaway. The project involves the San 
Diego-based company’s fleet of 40 self-driving semis (with human 
safety drivers in the cab), new proprietary software for TuSimple 
and its customers to monitor their on-road performance and 
location data, high-definition digital route maps and freight 
terminals at strategic locations. 
TuSimple will haul revenue-generating loads for UPS and 
foodservice McLane as well as new customer U.S. Xpress on routes 
throughout the network–with Penske helping to maintain the 
trucks–and the partner firms can learn how to integrate robotic 
trucks into their operations. (Ohnsman, 2020) 
If all goes as planned, TuSimple will expand the network from Los 
Angeles to Jacksonville, Florida, along U.S. Interstate-10 by 2022 and 
then start operating Level-4 self-driving truck services across the 
U.S. by 2023. “The network is the first of its kind to address how 
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you can bring autonomy to the market at scale,” TuSimple President 
Cheng Lu tells Forbes. (Ohnsman, 2020) 
Figure 3.15 TuSimple Autonomous Truck 
Source: (Ohnsman, 2020) 
 
Can you be sued for flying a Drone over Private Property – The 
New Tort Law 
The draft of the proposed tort law relating to drones, due to be 
discussed by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) soon, is out – and 
drone operators should be paying very close attention. What is Tort 
Law, and Who is the ULC? Why is this new Tort law important to 
drone owners? 
The definition of “Tort,” according to the Cornell Legal 
Information Institute, is “an act or omission that gives rise to injury 
or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts 
impose liability,” and the point of a tort law is “to provide relief 
to injured parties for harms caused by others, to impose liability 
on parties responsible for the harm, and to deter others from 
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committing harmful acts.”  That relief, says the Institute, is typically, 
“damages in the form of monetary compensation.” (McNabb, 2019) 
The ULC, by their own definition, “provides states with non-
partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings 
clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.”  ULC 
is proposing a tort law relating to drones, which would give 
homeowners the right to sue drone operators for flying over their 
private property under certain conditions. (McNabb, 2019) See 
figure 3.16. 
Figure 3.16 Drone footage over a private house and barn 
Source: (McNabb, 2019) 
 
Background on the Tort Law Relating to Drones – Draft One 
 
The first draft of the tort law drew nearly universal condemnation 
from the drone industry. According to one expert “If the draft Act 
became law, the mere presence of a drone in the airspace up to 
200 feet over private property would be, by definition, injuring the 
landowner and committing aerial trespass. Essentially, the draft Act 
does not recognize a distinction between a drone which harasses 
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the property owners by hovering feet from a window and a drone, 
operated by a certificated professional, hovering one foot inside a 
neighbor’s property line to snap a photo of an adjacent property.” 
That draft received many comments from drone industry 




The New Draft 
The new draft does attempt to address some of the issues found 
in the first draft: for example, it creates a more narrow definition 
of aerial trespass that includes the terms “substantial interference 
with the use and enjoyment of the property,” and defines 
“substantial interference.” The new draft also includes clauses about 
the accidental or unavoidable landing of a drone on private property 
and specifies that landowners must return a drone that lands on 
their property to the operator. This proposal has such potential to 
materially impact legitimate drone operation that it behooves drone 
operators to take the time to educate themselves.  (McNabb, 2019) 
 
See additional quoted verbiage below from the new proposed ULC 
draft Tort law relating to drones. (McNabb, 2019) 
 
Definition of “Airspace Intrusions” from the draft: 
 
SECTION 5: AIRSPACE INTRUSIONS. 
 
(a) An aerial trespass occurs when a person intentionally and 
without consent of the landowner operates an unmanned aircraft in 
the airspace over the landowner’s property and by so doing causes 
substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of the property. 
 
(b) The determination of whether an unmanned aircraft’s 
operation over property has caused substantial interference with 
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the use and enjoyment of property shall be based upon a review of 
the totality of the circumstances, including: 
 
(1) The amount of time the unmanned aircraft was operated over 
the landowner’s property. 
 
(2) The altitude at which the unmanned aircraft was operating. 
 
(3) The number of times unmanned aircraft have been operated 
over the property. 
 
(4) Whether the unmanned aircraft recorded or captured audio, 
video, or photographs while in operation over the property. 
 
(5) Whether the landowner has regularly allowed operation of 
unmanned aircraft over the property. 
 
(6) Whether the operation of the unmanned aircraft caused 
physical damage to persons or property. 
 
(7) Whether the operation of the unmanned aircraft caused 
economic damage. 
 
(8) The time of day the unmanned aircraft was operated over the 
landowner’s property. 
 
(9) Whether an individual on the land saw or heard the unmanned 
aircraft while it was over the property; and, 
 
(10) The operator’s purpose in operating the unmanned aircraft 
over the property. 
 
(c) Repeated or continual operation of an unmanned aircraft over 
a landowner’s property shall not give rise to prescriptive rights in 
the airspace 
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Definition of “Intrusions on Land”: 
 
SECTION 6: INTRUSIONS ON LAND. 
 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a person who, without 
permission, intentionally lands an unmanned aircraft on the land of 
another, or who intentionally causes an unmanned aircraft to come 
into physical contact with a structure, plant life, or individual on the 
land of another, commits a trespass to land. 
 
(b) A trespass to land does not occur under subsection (a) when: 
(1) the unmanned aircraft operator is forced to land the unmanned 
aircraft because of unexpected circumstances that reasonably 
justify such a landing; or, 
(2) the unmanned aircraft malfunctions or otherwise touches 
down upon the surface of the land because of weather or other 
factors beyond the operator’s control. 
(c) A person asserting the privileges provided in subsection (b) is 
liable for any damage caused by the unmanned aircraft’s operation. 
(d) Regardless of how an unmanned aircraft came to rest upon 
the property of another, the owner or operator of the unmanned 
aircraft has a right to recover the unmanned aircraft upon a request 
to the owner of such property. A landowner shall not unreasonably 
refuse a request to return the unmanned aircraft or to permit the 
unmanned aircraft’s operator to recover the unmanned aircraft 
from the property. 
 
Definition of “Violations of Privacy”: 
 
SECTION 8: UNMANNED AIRCRAFT AND VIOLATIONS OF 
PRIVACY. 
 
(a) Privacy related civil actions may be based upon the operation 
of an unmanned aircraft. 
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(b) A determination of whether an unmanned aircraft’s operation 
over property was used to violate a privacy-related right shall be 
based upon a review of the totality of the circumstances, including: 
 
(1) Whether by hovering or repeated flights the unmanned aircraft 
was likely to have provided the operator with the opportunity to 
use the unmanned aircraft to view, listen to, record or capture by 
camera, microphone or other device, individuals who were present 
at that place and time; and, 
 
(2) Whether the operator made statements or took other overt 
actions indicating a desire to use an unmanned aircraft to infringe 
upon rights of privacy recognized in this state. 
 
The full draft of the proposed Tort law on drones (which is still 




ee15c7e1eb20&tab=librarydocuments  (McNabb, 2019) 
 
Drone owners should take note of above. This may be the 
restrictive direction that drone tort law is heading. 
 
GPS Interference crashes drone in UK – Ligado debate rages 
Staying on the trend of legal interest, the next story is about GPS 
interference crashing a survey drone in the US. An expensive drone 
crashed into a house in December when it lost GPS signals due to 
interference, according to an accident investigation by the United 
Kingdom. The drone, a DJI M600 Pro was surveying a construction 
site when the mishap occurred. The DJI M600 Pro can weigh as 
much as 34lbs (15.5kg) and is listed at $5,699 on the vendor’s 
website. (Goward, 2020) 
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According to D.A. Goward ( (Goward, 2020), The mishap has given 
added impetus to those in the United States opposed to the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) decision to allow Ligado 
Networks to transmit on a frequency near to that of GPS. U.S. 
government tests have shown that high precision GPS receivers, like 
those used on some survey drones, may not have reliable signals 
whenever they are within 3,400 meters (2+ miles) of a Ligado 
transmitter. Drones with less precise, general purpose GPS 
receivers could be impacted within 1,040 meters (.6 miles). 
 
Drones with unreliable GPS can wander into areas they are not 
allowed and eventually crash. The larger and heavier the drone, the 
more dangerous this can be. Most commercial drones are less than 
100 lbs (45kg), though some models can weigh in at 200 lbs (90 kg) 
or more. While drones are supposed to remain within the line of 
sight of the operator, when GPS navigation is lost, many enter an 
“attitude mode.” This results in the aircraft maintaining its height 
above the ground and its wings level using on-board barometric 
and inertial sensors. It cannot hold its position over the ground 
though, without GPS and so will drift with the wind. Unless the 
operator takes manual control right away the drone can drift out of 
the operator’s sight. That usually also means it is unable to receive 
radio commands sent by the operator. (Goward, 2020) 
 
This is precisely is what happened in this case, according to the 
UK’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Board’s report. A survey of a 
construction site by drone was in its second day. The first three 
flights were without incident. On the fourth flight the drone took 
off and reached about 65 feet above the ground. The pilot’s 
controller then showed a GPS compass error. At that point, the 
drone stopped climbing and began drifting away in the wind at 
about 15 miles per hour. The pilot repeatedly selected the “return 
home” function to no avail before the aircraft flew beyond a line of 
trees and was out of sight. It hit the roof of a home several hundred 
yards beyond the trees and crashed in the backyard. (Goward, 2020) 
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After notifying police of the missing drone, the pilot prepared 
another drone to search for the lost one. However, shortly after 
takeoff, the controller again showed a signal‑interference error 
message and the pilot immediately landed it. The accident report’s 
analysis cites signal interference with GPS as cause of the 
malfunction of the drone that crashed and the second one that 
was to look for it. It says the source of the interference was not 
identified. The report also observes that serious injury or death 
could have resulted. (Goward, 2020) The report indicates: 
 
“… analysis indicated that a mass of more than 2 kg falling from 
the roof of the house could have resulted in a serious or even fatal 
injury to people if they had been struck. The aircraft mass, at 12.8 kg, 
was well in excess of this figure and therefore it is very likely that 
serious injuries would have occurred even if the person struck was 
wearing a hard hat for protection.” (Goward, 2020) 
 
Aviation interests in the United States had for years opposed 
the FCC granting Ligado Networks’ application. Despite this and 
the formal and strong opposition of the executive branch of 
government, the FCC approved Ligado’s request in April. The FCC’s 
approval of Ligado Network’s application has not silenced 
opposition. Rather it has caused opposition to spread across many 
industries and sectors. Vocal opponents now include agricultural, 
maritime, vehicle and industrial interests. 
Legislation is under consideration in Congress that would cause 
the FCC’s decision to be re-examined and prevent the Defense 
Department from doing business with any company that interferes 
with GPS signals. Some proposals would put a hold on the FCC’s 
approval. While the drone mishap in the United Kingdom can be 
seen as a relatively minor event, as a portent of things to come, it is 
MIGHT [8] have a huge impact in the United States. (Goward, 2020) 
 
Time to move from air to sea – specifically UUVs. 
Autonomous Underwater Glider 
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Teledyne Marine’s Slocum G2 Glider autonomous underwater 
vehicle (AUV) has completed a four-part circumnavigation of the 
Atlantic Ocean that lasted for over four years. The glider, named 
Silbo, covered a total of 22,744 km and spent approximately 1,273 
days at sea. The trip is the first such journey to ever be undertaken 
by an AUV. (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates 
Atlantic Ocean, 2020) See Figure 3.17 
Over the four legs of its journey, Silbo interacted with 
international science teams from several countries, and collected 
scientific and critical engineering data for a variety of programs. 
During its three stops, the glider received repairs to a scratched 
hull, an external cleaning, and a fresh set of batteries, and required 
no other maintenance. (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider 
Circumnavigates Atlantic Ocean, 2020) 
Following a factory upgrade to install an extended energy bay and 
thruster in preparation for its voyage, Silbo was launched in the 
early spring of 2016 from Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The first leg of 
its journey took it from Cape Cod to Ireland, covering a distance 
of 6557 km in 330 days. While in Ireland, Silbo participated in a 
Glider Training session hosted by the Marine Institute and P&O 
Maritime Services, Galway. (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider 
Circumnavigates Atlantic Ocean, 2020) 
Figure 3.17 Teledyne Marine’s Slocum G2 Glider autonomous 
underwater vehicle (AUV) 
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Source: (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates 
Atlantic Ocean, 2020) 
 
On the second leg, Silbo travelled from Ireland to the Canary 
Islands, covering 3695 km in 178 days, and participated in a “glider 
school” at the research facility Oceanic Platform of the Canary 
Islands (PLOCAN) and the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria 
(ULPCG). The third leg lasted 418 days, taking Silbo from the Canary 
Islands back across the Atlantic to St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, 
gliding 6256 km. Supported by staff and students from University 
of the Virgin Islands (UVI), St. Thomas, Teledyne technicians 
recovered, re-batteried and re-deployed Silbo in less than 24 hours. 
(Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates Atlantic 
Ocean, 2020) 
Silbo’s fourth and final journey from St. Thomas began on July 18, 
2019 and concluded on June 29, 2020 south of Martha’s Vineyard, 
completing the final 6236 km trek in 348 days. During this transit 
Silbo spent three months flying a butterfly pattern south of 
Bermuda contributing data to Bermuda Atlantic Time-series Study 
(BATS). Silbo then joined the Gulf Stream, becoming the season’s 
first storm glider as Tropical Storm Arthur passed directly over 
the glider. (Ball, Autonomous Underwater Glider Circumnavigates 
Atlantic Ocean, 2020) 
During this circumnavigation, Silbo collected hurricane data, 
corrected current models, and provided close to 5000 CTD 
(conductivity, temperature, and depth) casts that aided 
meteorological forecasting. With partners from Rutgers University 
and its student base, UVI, PLOCAN, UGCLP, the Marine Institute, 
and others, Silbo also participated in the Challenger glider mission. 
Silbo has also been used as a test bed for many new engineering 
hardware and software features for both existing and next 
generation Slocum gliders. Recent legs have provided data on new 
battery configurations, advanced software, and techniques for 
piloting long endurance missions and minimizing biofouling. (Ball, 
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New Autonomous Guard USV 
Author Mike Ball gives us another cool view. This time for a new 
autonomous Guard USV unveiling. 
A design for a new unmanned surface vessel (USV) concept, 
created by Sea Machines and a consortium of partners including 
C-Job Naval Architects, LISA Community, Seazip Offshore Service, 
Maritime Research Institute Netherlands (MARIN) and eL-Tec 
Elektrotechnologie, has been unveiled. The Autonomous Guard 
Vessel (AGV) is designed to provide a small, lighter, and more 
efficient alternative to current manned guard vessels used to 
protect maritime and offshore operations such as wind farms and 
cabling routes. (Ball, New Autonomous Guard USV Unveiled, 2020)  
See Figure 3.18. 
Figure 3.18 Sea Machines USV Concept 
Source: (Ball, New Autonomous Guard USV Unveiled, 2020) 
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The AGV can continuously monitor nearby marine traffic visually 
as well as via radar and AIS (automatic identification system) data, 
taking measures to secure the area in order to avoid collisions 
and damage to offshore infrastructure. The USV will attempt 
communications with any vessel that approaches the area, 
providing information on how to safely navigate the area as well as 
physical escort away from the site. The encounter will be recorded 
to provide video footage in case of any violation or accident. (Ball, 
New Autonomous Guard USV Unveiled, 2020) 
 
As the autonomous platform does not require an onboard crew, 
it is considerably smaller than equivalent manned guard vessels. 
This lowers the operational cost and also allows it to be sustainably 
powered by batteries, which can be recharged via a charging 
station. This station can be moored independently or connected 
to existing onsite equipment, such as an offshore transformer 
platform. Depending on the situation, charging could be performed 
either via a cable connection to the on-site equipment, or locally 
generated using renewable fuels.  (Ball, New Autonomous Guard 
USV Unveiled, 2020) 
The consortium envisions that a typical offshore site will require 
a number of AGVs, which can take turns in monitoring the area and 
recharging. In addition to autonomous operation, remote control is 
also being considered for the vessel, in order to deal with situations 
that require human intervention. The AGV would be connected to 
a command center on a mothership or at a shore-based location, 
where a human operator will control the AGV remotely to ensure 
correct action is taken. In addition, all data collected by the AGV will 
be sent to the command center. (Ball, New Autonomous Guard USV 
Unveiled, 2020) 
Frank Relou, business development manager at Sea Machines, 
stated: “Smart vessel technology will have the most significant 
initial impact on small workboats, such as this guard vessel. The 
development of autonomous technology for vessel operations are 
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occurring on an international level but namely in niche segments, 
such as the guard vessel and other examples, currently operating in 
(with supervised autonomy), marine survey, fire, patrol, aquaculture 
and offshore wind operations[10].” (Ball, New Autonomous Guard 
USV Unveiled, 2020) 
 
Protecting Undersea Cables – A National Security Priority 
Nadia Schadlow and Brayden Helwig [11]of Defense News (opinion) 
present a compelling national security case for protecting data 
transiting via underseas cables. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
 
Data is arguably the most important strategic asset to emerge 
in the 21st century. Access to data and the ability to protect its 
integrity are vital to American security and prosperity. As 5G and 
artificial intelligence transform our societies into highly integrated 
networks, protecting data will become even more crucial. In recent 
years, American efforts have focused on preventing Huawei, the 
party-controlled Chinese telecommunications giant, from gaining 
ground as the world’s largest supplier of 5G infrastructure. But 
defending a less understood part of our digital infrastructure — 
undersea fiber-optic cables — should be an equal priority. Without 
the approximately 750,000 miles of cables that crisscross the 
world’s oceans, our interconnected, digitally driven societies would 
be unable to function. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
 
In 1858, when the first submarine cable was installed, sending a 
message across the Atlantic took nearly 18 hours. Today, the fastest 
undersea cables can transfer data at speeds upward of 25 terabytes 
per second — more than twice the amount of data generated by the 
Hubble Space Telescope each year. 
 
Undersea cables make instant communications possible, 
transporting some 95 percent of the data and voice traffic that 
crosses international boundaries. They also form the backbone of 
the global economy — roughly $10 trillion in financial transactions 
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are transmitted via these cables each day. And undersea 
infrastructure is not just for civilian use. The U.S. government relies 
on cables to transmit information. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
America’s competitors consider undersea cables strategically 
significant. Tapping undersea cables could provide foreign leaders 
with valuable intelligence, while severing cables could slow 
communications between the U.S. and its NATO allies significantly 
— perhaps by even months. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
Data can also be siphoned from undersea cables. This is most 
easily done during the cable manufacturing process, when 
backdoors could be inserted to collect information. Similar 
vulnerabilities exist at onshore landing stations, where cables 
connect to terrestrial networks. Cables can be tapped at sea, though 
this is relatively difficult to do. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
Russia and China have developed capabilities in these areas. 
Russian submarine activity near undersea cables is well-
documented: The Yantar, a Russian spy ship, carries mini 
submersibles that can either sever or tap them. Russian activity 
often clusters around crucial, yet hard-to-reach cables because 
these are difficult to repair. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
Chinese officials view control of undersea infrastructure as part 
of a broader strategic competition for data. One official Chinese 
Communist Party outlet explained that “although undersea cable 
laying is a business, it is also a battlefield where information can 
be obtained.” Huawei Marine, a Huawei subsidiary, is a major player 
in the undersea cable industry. The company has built or repaired 
almost a quarter of the world’s approximately 400 submarine cables. 
But American officials worry that cables laid or serviced by the 
company may be accessed by the Chinese government. In 2019, 
amid increasing scrutiny from the U.S. and its allies, Huawei sold 
its subsidiary to Hengtong Optic-Electric, a Chinese fiber and cable 
manufacturer. But the sale failed to alleviate national security 
concerns: Hengtong’s director and founder is a Chinese government 
official. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) China could also integrate 
undersea cable disruption into its military strategy. Last year, a 
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Taiwanese think tank warned that in the early stages of a Chinese 
invasion of the island, the People’s Liberation Army may sever 
Taiwan’s undersea cables, isolating it from the U.S. and regional 
allies. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
 
Protecting undersea cable infrastructure must become a priority 
for U.S. officials and lawmakers. According to Schadlow and Helwig, 
there are several steps they can take to address the problem. 
 
First, the U.S. government should take more responsibility for 
repairing undersea infrastructure. Currently, cable repairs are 
considered a commercial responsibility, rather than a national 
security concern. Classifying cable repairs as matters of national 
security and developing a public-private operational plan — that 
includes a division of resources — to repair them is one step toward 
reducing the response time to a disruption or an attack. (Schadlow 
& Helwig, 2020) 
 
Second, as a 2017 report from the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence suggested, the U.S. should push for stronger 
protections for undersea infrastructure in international law, 
including criminalizing attacks on submarine cables. These efforts 
should be coordinated closely with America’s allies, especially those 
in Europe and East Asia. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
 
Third, telecommunications companies must better secure cable 
infrastructure against potential attacks. Companies such as Google, 
Microsoft, Facebook, and Amazon now own or lease nearly half the 
world’s undersea bandwidth. Companies could begin by securing 
cable landing stations, while investing in technologies that detect 
and deny undersea espionage. The executive branch could consider 
tax incentives to spur these steps. (Schadlow & Helwig, 2020) 
 
Finally, the Trump administration should sound a louder alarm 
on Huawei Marine. In order to reduce or prevent the exfiltration 
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of data, telecommunications companies should be required to use 
undersea infrastructure from verified suppliers. At the very least, 
owners of data transmitted this way should be aware of the 
undersea path their data is taking — and potential vulnerabilities. 
Ultimately, undersea cables help keep Americans connected, 
prosperous and safe. Protecting them from sabotage and espionage 
is a vital national security interest of the United States. (Schadlow & 
Helwig, 2020) 
 
Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: 
Background and Issues for Congress 
Although too large to summarize in this chapter, the author would 
like to bring to attention a report to congress by Ronald O’Rourke, 
Specialist in Naval Affairs entitled: Navy Large Unmanned Surface 
and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, R45757.
It can be found at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45757.pdf  
(O’Rourke, 2020) 
This report provides background information and potential issues 
for Congress for three types of large unmanned vehicles (UVs) that 
the Navy wants to develop and procure in FY2021 and beyond: 
 
• Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs). 
• Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs); and 
• Extra-large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs). 
 
The Navy wants to acquire these large UVs as part of an effort to 
shift the Navy to a new fleet architecture (i.e., a new combination 
of ships and other platforms) that is more widely distributed than 
the Navy’s current fleet architecture. The Navy is requesting $579.9 
million in FY2021 research and development funding for these large 
UVs and their enabling technologies. (O’Rourke, 2020) 
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify 
the Navy’s acquisition strategies and FY2021 funding requests for 
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these large UVs. The Navy’s proposals for developing and procuring 
them pose a number of oversight issues for Congress. Congress’s 
decisions on these issues could substantially affect Navy capabilities 
and funding requirements and the shipbuilding 
and UV industrial bases. (O’Rourke, 2020) 
 
In addition to the large UVs covered in this report, the Navy also 
wants to develop and procure smaller USVs and UUVs, as well as 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of various sizes. Other U.S. military 
services are developing, procuring, and operating their own types 
of UVs. (O’Rourke, 2020) The O’Rourke is a treasure trove of USN 
design, architecture, and strategic information. 
Drone Sightings: The Actual Non-Hyped Numbers Analyzed 
 
On Linkedin via sUAS News, a solid report by Jonathan Rupprecht 
popped up on 5 August 2020 exposed the disinformation, double 
counting and misinformation about drone sightings based on 
analyses of six (6) years of reported data from FAA and local 
government data / reports. It is an eye-opening report! (Rupprecht, 




For years and years, many have been talking about the FAA’s 
drone sightings reports. The drone sightings reports have been 
cited many times by the news media and elected officials who were 
rather alarmed about the data. Others in the industry cite the drone 
sightings as evidence of the greater need for the government(s) 
to do something by creating regulations. Some counter-drone 
companies have used it to show a need for their product. Others 
say it is hype and the sightings data is greatly flawed and overblown 
because after all, they are only sightings, not impacts. 
 
Regardless of where you come from in the industry and your 
motives, we need to accurately understand the drone sightings 
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data.  The report critically considers the growth of drone sightings, 
where they typically are located, and whether the data is alarming 
as many have said. (Rupprecht, 2020) 
 
Quick Summary of the Drone Sightings: 
 
• The reported drone sightings over time are NOT growing. They 
are decreasing. 
• The FAA has inaccurately reported on the drone sightings data 
and this is proven by their own data they released(more on 
that later). 
• There are more drone sightings reported in populated areas 
than unpopulated areas. 
• There are more drone sightings reported in warmer months 
than colder months. 
• States with larger populations have more reported drone 
sightings. 
• There are more medium or large animal impacts with manned 
aircraft than mere reported drone sightings. 
• Any discussions we have on this topic should be using numbers 
and not just percentages or words. (Rupprecht, 2020) 
 
Basically, population and weather/climate are the determining 
factors of when and where you will have drone sightings. The data 
also shows that we are past a peak in sightings and they are 
currently consistently decreasing. But how many of these sightings 
are verified sightings of drones and not white balloons, seagulls, 
etc.? (Rupprecht, 2020) 
 
How many of these reported sightings are of drones actually 
flying unlawfully, dangerously, or nefariously? Is there like a giant ? 
face on the drone that tells you it is bad? A drone being flown by a 
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good guy and one being flown by a bad guy are extremely difficult 
to tell apart. (Rupprecht, 2020) 
 
What Does the Word “Sighting” Mean? 
 
Sightings are just that….mere sightings. A pilot, person on the 
ground, law enforcement officer, etc. sees a drone and reports it to 
the FAA. It gets logged. The drone could be lawfully flying, safely 
flying, carelessly flying, or flying with criminal intent. It is all lumped 
into one thing – a sighting. 
 
“The accuracy of the reports cannot be verified. You could report 
you saw a drone all you want. No one can check. It is literally a giant 
hearsay list. And here is a very thought-provoking question….is 
there any way we can prevent people who would stand to benefit 
from higher drone sighting numbers from calling in false sightings? 
Who is to stop the FAA employees, FAA contractors, people working 
in counter UAS industry, or manned pilots from calling in more 
sightings that cannot be verified? Who is to stop over reporting 
where anything just gets reported as a drone?” (Rupprecht, 2020) 
 
“Keep in mind that 18 U.S.C. 1001 makes it a criminal offense to 
make false statements to the FAA so many will be deterred from 
doing that. Some of the reports have identifiable information so 
they are not really anonymous and less likely to false report. On the 
other hand, the Department of Transportation’s Inspector General’s 
Office does investigate FAA officials for illegal activity and police 
arrest people all the time for fraudulent activity.” (Rupprecht, 2020) 
 
“Provide what weight you will to the sightings. We are in a 
predicament. There is no evidence to prove that any of those groups 
reported falsely, but there is also no evidence to prove that 
everyone reported truthfully AND accurately. We need to be 
balanced in approaching this data.” (Rupprecht, 2020) 
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The rest of the Rupprecht report analyzes data from multiple 
FAA and LEO publicly available sources available from 2014. All the 
resources are available for the reader to follow the threads so 
engaged. 
 
Skyborg and Boeing’s Loyal Wingman Drone Projects 
 
Let us end our palate tasting with two of the newest CUAS Drone 
programs from the USAF. 
 
First up is Skyborg. It is USAF’s future AI fleet. According to 
analyst Harry Lye, The US Air Force is flying at supersonic speeds 
towards an AI-enabled fleet. Under project Skyborg’s direction, 
future fighter jets will not be supported by a wingman, but by an 
unmanned combat aerial vehicle. Harry Lye finds out more about 
the unmanned wingman of the future. (Lye, 2019) 
 
Finger four has been the dominant fighter aircraft formation since 
the 1930s. The world’s most advanced fighter jet, the Lockheed 
Martin F-35, costs around $100m per jet. Four of these in formation 
means almost half a billion dollars of hardware in the air (not 
including the per hour cost of flying them). Losing just one fighter 
would be catastrophic for the US Air Force’s budget. (Lye, 2019) 
 
The US Air Force’s (USAF) project Skyborg aims to address this 
cost risk by replacing some of these expensive fighter jets with 
more affordable unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) acting as 
unmanned wingmen. 
 
Teaming up with drones 
 
Under the project, the Kratos-built XQ-58 Valkyrie drone will 
team up with the F-35 and F-15EX, cutting the number of highly 
valuable fighters in the air, as well as cutting costs and risk to human 
life. See Figure 3.19. At a cost of a few million dollars per unit, the 
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autonomous Valkyrie drones are more easily replaceable, and could 
form a central role in the USAF’s air power. The F-35 is billed as a 
force-multiplier; when partnered with a Valkyrie it could get a new 
capability boost. (Lye, 2019) 
 
Skyborg program manager Ben Tran explained the significance 
of the program: “There is heavy investment by our near-peer 
adversaries in artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy in general. 
We know that when you couple autonomy and AI with systems like 
low-cost attributes, that can increase capability significantly and be 
a force multiplier for our air force. The 2023 goal line is our attempt 
at bringing something to bear in a relatively quick time frame to 
show that we can bring that kind of capability to the fight.” (Lye, 
2019) 
 
With Skyborg the manned aircraft is the center of the network, 
with the drones augmenting around it. Think of the fighter as 
Skynet and the Valkyrie UCAV as the T-100, only with added wings 
and less Arnold Schwarzenegger. AI will govern the autonomous 
wingman, reading telemetry, flight plans and weather, all the while 
acquiring targets and supporting the manned aircraft. (Lye, 2019) 
 
Cultural questions facing the air force 
 
If an autonomous combat drone is to act as a wingman who pulls 
the trigger? The US, UK, and Russia have pushed against the UN 
trying to ban autonomous killing machines, which gives a clue to 
where the Pentagon is currently leaning. 
 
“With the adoption of autonomous systems becoming imminent, 
armed forces will need to confront serious ethical issues. On the 
one hand, it makes sense to give the drone trigger control. A pilot in 
an F-35 performing counter-maneuvers to avoid an enemy fighter 
may not have time to pull the trigger. On the other, if an AI system 
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accidentally fires at a civilian site who is held accountable?” (Lye, 
2019) 
 
The pilot, of the networked fighter, or someone higher up the 
staffing chain. The US Air Force has not said it plans to give the 
Skyborg drones control of any weapons systems, but this could be 
regarded as the natural evolution of the system in the future. 
Figure 3.19 Kratos-built XQ-58 Valkyrie Drone 
Source: (Lye, 2019) 
 
Boeing Loyal Wingman Drone 
Finally, we end this chapter with the Boeing Loyal Wingman 
Drone. The Royal Australian Air Force has its first Boeing-built 
drone-jet hybrid prototype, which will use artificial intelligence to 
conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions to 
supply fighter pilots with more information during a conflict. 
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The company delivered its first “loyal wingman” prototype to 
Australia this week (7 May 2020); it is expected to be used in tandem 
with fourth- and fifth-generation fighters on the battlefield, 
officials said in a release. See Figure 3.20. (Pawlyk, 2020) 
Figure 3.20 Boeing Loyal Wingman Drone 
Source: (Pawlyk, 2020) 
 
It is also the first aircraft “to be designed, engineered and 
manufactured in Australia in more than 50 years,” Boeing said, 
adding that it is the company’s “largest investment in an unmanned 
aircraft outside of the United States.” (Pawlyk, 2020) 
The aircraft, which Boeing is co-developing with the government 
of Australia, was unveiled at the Avalon Airshow last year. Australia 
is investing roughly $40 million into the program, CNN reported. 
The jet is 38 feet long and can fly more than 2,000 nautical miles, 
according to its fact sheet. (Pawlyk, 2020) 
It uses artificial intelligence “to fly independently or in support 
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of manned aircraft while maintaining safe distance between other 
aircraft, the fact sheet states. The first prototype was constructed 
using digital engineering concepts, allowing developers to simulate 
parts via computer models, according to the company. 
The concept is similar to an ongoing U.S. military effort. The U.S. 
Air Force has been working to develop its own “Loyal Wingman” 
program, featuring unmanned fighters that could think 
autonomously sent out alongside F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, for 
example, to scout enemy territory ahead of a strike, or to gather 
intel for the aircraft formation. In January 2020, the Air Force 
conducted test flights of the XQ-58A Valkyrie drone at Yuma 
Proving Ground, Arizona, taking the unmanned aerial vehicle, made 




We end our tour de force having traveled through a palate of air 
and sea stories which should indicate to the student the diversity, 
complexity, technological growth, and ubiquitous nature of the 
unmanned industry. Definitely tip of the spear.  No homework or 
discussion questions. Build your own library of information “Bullets” 
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[1] The full citation is : PB2-21. – Proper attire required. 
No person ten (10) years of age or older shall intentionally expose 
his or her own genitals, pubic area, buttocks or female breast below 
the top of the areola, with less than a fully opaque covering in or 
upon any park or parkway, as defined in PB1-1. This provision does 
not apply to theatrical, musical, or other artistic performances upon 
any park or parkway where no alcoholic beverages are sold. (Code 
1960, As Amend., § 1010.321; Pk. Bd. Ord. No. 82-102, § 1, 4-21-82) 
[2] Lost on Everest Video trailer: https://youtu.be/fyE39a8f2Ao 
 
[3] The full Dunstan et.al research paper for the Raine Island Turtle 
count entitled: “Use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for mark-
resight nesting population estimation of adult female green sea 
turtles at Raine Island”  is found at: https://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0228524 
 
[4] Equipment Involved in the Study : The drones used in the study 
include the MFD 5000 from Watts Innovation, the Agras MG-1 from 
DJI, and M6A PRO G200 with a 16-liter tank from Homeland 
Surveillance & Electronics. North Dakota State University is lending 
SkySkopes the M6A PRO G200. “Each drone has its unique 
advantages. The MFD 5000 is extremely customizable. The MG-1 is 
water-resistant and a “tried and true” (tool) for precise agricultural 
spraying,” said Dunlevy. For example, the M6A PRO G200 is designed 
specifically for crop dusting and spraying. (Zimmer, 2020) 
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[6] Author opinion. 
[7] Note the Chinese influence here. 
[8] Author emphasis 
[9] Author emphasis 
[10] Author emphasis 
[11] Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. She 
previously served as the U.S. deputy national security adviser for 
strategy. Brayden Helwig is a national security and international 
affairs summer intern. 
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4. Chapter 4 Underwater 
Autonomous Navigation & 
Other UUV Advances 
[Mumm] 
Student Learning Objectives 
The student will gain knowledge of the concepts and framework 
as it relates to how underwater vehicles navigate as well as explore 
the current and proposed advances in the unmanned underwater 
vehicle (UUV) arena. 
The student will be able to: 
• Understand the basic navigation techniques used to operate in 
underwater environments 
• Gain an overview of how UUVs can safely operate around ports 
and manned vehicles. 
• Consider new technologies being developed for use in UUVs 
and how that may impact UUV future uses 
• Examine the direction of UUV technology to assist in exploring 
its intended and unintended uses and the consequences of 
these uses on the ocean and humankind. 
History of Undersea Navigation-What is it, and Why Does it 
Matter? 
The ability to navigate using roads, bridges coupled with maps, 
Global Positioning System (GPS), and the ability to see where to go 
are all modalities that are limited if not unavailable to underwater 
vehicles. We take for granted that we can see and sense our 
surroundings, even at night we simply turn on a light to illuminate 
our path. Underwater environments do not enable the use of so 
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many modalities, and thus, submarines and UUVs are quite literally 
navigating blindly most of the time. Unlike other forms of 
transportation and movement, most submarines and UUVs do not 
have windows. These vehicles must rely on sensors to guide their 
path to and from a destination. Near the surface, sailors can use 
a periscope, which was invented in 1902 by Mr. Simon Lake. 
Periscopes “are long tubes that have mirrors inside. The mirrors 
reflect images so sailors can see above the water.” (Joanne, 2019) 
Modern-day submarines use a “fiber optic imaging mast (which) 
sits in the sail outside the hull and sends electronic images to the 
crew…No periscope makes the hull of the ship stronger because it 
does not need to have an opening to poke through.” (Joanne, 2019) 
Sonar, which is short for sound, navigation, and ranging, detects 
undersea objects by transmitting powerful sound waves through the 
ocean and interpreting the returning signals that bounce off objects. 
Sonar systems have two modes, active and passive, 
“In active sonar, the system emits a pulse of sound, and then the 
operator listens for echoes. These sonar waves can be varied in 
frequency and strength in order to allow it to distinguish targets of 
interest, and sonar can be used as a means of identification of an 
object as well as offering the submarine or UUV the ability to have 
its own unique identifier. In passive sonar, the operator listens to 
sounds emitted by the object one is trying to locate” (Discovery of 
Sound in the Sea, 2020). 
The challenge with active sonar is that by sending out continuous 
signals through the water, the position of the submarine or UUV can 
be easily determined.  Passive sonar systems simply listen without 
sending out active signals as “Ships, submarines, marine mammals, 
and fish all make noise, and this noise can be used by passive Sonar 
systems to locate them, in much the same way humans use their 
ears to locate someone speaking in a room (Discovery of Sound in 
the Sea, 2020). 
Submarines and UUVs use “inertial guidance systems use 
gyroscopes to track the sub’s motion from a fixed starting point. 
These systems are accurate for up to 150 hours of operation. Then 
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they must be realigned with surface navigation systems such as 
GPS, radar, or satellite.” (Joanne, 2019). Figure 4.1 illustrates a typical 
gyroscope used in inertial navigation systems. 
 
Figure 4.1: Traditional Gyroscope 
Source: (Joanne, 2019) 
A gyroscope is a wheel or disk mounted to spin rapidly around an 
axis that is free to turn in various directions. (Joanne, 2019). 
A ships inertial navigation systems (SINS) can detect a change 
in the submarines geographic position (a move east or north, for 
example), a change in its velocity through the water (speed and 
direction of movement) and a change in its orientation (rotation 
about an axis). It does this by measuring the linear acceleration 
and angular velocity applied to the system. Since it requires no 
external reference (after initialization), it is immune to jamming and 
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deception. (Navigating a Submarine: Time and Navigation-The 
Untold Story of Getting from Here to There, 2020). 
An inertial navigation system (based on Newton’s second law) is 
made up of several gyros with accelerometers connected to one or 
more computers. The initial coordinates (location on the planet) are 
programmed in at dockside, and the inertial navigation systems is 
aligned before the submarine is launched. Once the sub is launched, 
the inertial navigations systems senses the acceleration and 
movements and reports this information to the computer that can 
calculate to within one to two nautical miles where the submarine 
is at on the planet. Generally, an accuracy of 1–2 NM should be 
acceptable with an accuracy of 1 NM (nautical mile) in 24 hours being 
a reasonable navigational drift error rate. The submarine can also 
surface to update its GPS fix or use any landmarks to correct its last 
known position. (Nobahari, 2017). 
USS Alabama has three navigations systems, as seen in Figure 
4.2. The three systems are the “ship’s inertial navigation system 
(SINS), a Loran-C receiver, and a Transit satellite receiver system 
for correcting the inertial system. It has since been fitted with a 
GPS receiver and the Trident II navigation system.” (Navigating a 
Submarine: Time and Navigation-The Untold Story of Getting from 
Here to There, 2020). 
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Figure 4.2: Parts of the USS Alabama Navigation System 
Source: (Navigating a Submarine: Time and Navigation-The 
Untold Story of Getting from Here to There, 2020) 
Minute errors in the measuring capabilities of the accelerometers 
or in the balance of the gyroscopes can introduce large errors into 
the information that the inertial guidance system provides. These 
instruments must, therefore, be constructed and maintained to 
strict tolerances, carefully aligned, and reinitialized at frequent 
intervals using an independent navigation system such as the global 
positioning system (GPS) (Inertial guidance system, 2020). 
Current inertial navigation systems, such as those used on 
commercial jetliners, booster rockets, and orbiting satellites, 
calculate their turning rates measured by ring laser gyroscopes (see 
Figure 4.3) or by fiber-optic gyroscopes. These laser gyroscopes 
can be purchased on the open market for less than four thousand 
dollars. (Inertial guidance system, 2020). 
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 Figure 4.3: Ring Laser Gyroscope 
Source: (Inertial guidance system, 2020). 
Active motorized precision laser ring gyroscope for inertial 
navigation system  (Laser Ring Gyroscope for Inertial Navigation 
System , 2020) 
 
Historically, there have always been navigational issues with 
submarines and the underwater environment. UUV navigation has 
been particularly hampered due to power requirements and the 
overall difficulty of communication signals/wave forms traveling 
through the water, in addition to interpreting caverns and signal 
instability or interruption from ocean sea life. With the introduction 
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of smaller, more efficient inertial navigation systems, GPS “suitable 
satellite communications, compact antennas, more capable 
underwater sensors, and powerful digital information processing, 
many other barriers to implementing quite ambitious UUV 
capabilities have fallen away” (Whitman, 2002). Some UUVs are now 
using fixed acoustic transponders to assist in triangulating position. 
A new acoustic navigation system was developed to determine 
the position and speed of moving underwater objects such as divers 
and underwater vehicles. The path of an object and its speed were 
determined by the Doppler shifts of acoustic signals emitted by a 
transmitter placed on the object and received by four hydrophones 
installed at the periphery of the monitored body of water. The 
position and speed measurements were affected by errors mainly 
caused by acoustic reflections (returns) from the water body 
boundaries and surface reverberations. (Ostrowski, 2020). 
The Office of Naval Research (ONR) contracted with Penn State 
Applied Research Lab to research and build enabling technologies 
for sonar-based continuous subsea autonomous navigation for 
manned and unmanned submarines. The joint effort is called the 
Advanced Broadband Navigation Sonar System Future Naval 
Capabilities program, and its main goals are to “improve undersea 
position and velocity estimation using sonar to give Navy manned 
submarines and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) enhanced 
navigational performance.” (Keller, 2019) 
Navigation capabilities can also be improved with exteroceptive 
sensors (optical or sonar) that identify specific landmarks in the 
environment and use them to localize the UUV. If a map is available, 
this approach is known as map-based localization. When no map is 
available, AUVs can perform simultaneous localization and mapping 
(SLAM), in which the vehicle concurrently builds a map of relevant 
features and uses it to navigate. (Petillot, 2019). 
The challenge facing UUVs is they will need to operate and 
navigate autonomously; the data collected must be accurate, 
reliable, and reusable. Using techniques such as SLAM “to help in 
autonomous navigation, namely in unstructured environments and 
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when the initial information is poor’ in this technique, the robot 
constructs a coherent map of its environment while, at the same 
time, determines its location within that same map.” (Ana Rita Silva, 
2019). 
This SLAM method can be used to inform and integrate into 
“Terrain‐aided navigation (TAN), a form of geophysical localization 
where physical features of the seabed are exploited to localize an 
AUV within an a priori digital elevation model (DEM), or bathymetric 
reference map.” (Salavasidis, 2019). 
As the navigation of UUVs moves from past technologies and 
techniques into the future, “The accuracy and reliability of 
navigation information are one of the guarantees for AUV’s 
successful execution…and the SINS/ Doppler velocity log (DVL) 
integrated navigation method can provide continuous and accurate 
navigation information for autonomous underwater vehicles” 
(Wang, 2020). However, this navigation method may contain large 
error or can be inaccurate when certain “beam measurements are 
inaccurate or outages for complex underwater environment… a 
novel tightly integrated navigation method composed of a SINS, 
a DVL, and a pressure sensor (PS) is proposed, in which beam 
measurements are used without transforming them to 3-D velocity” 
(Wang, 2020). 
The ability to navigate underwater was created for manned 
systems. In the new frontier of UUVs, precision navigation by both 
manned and unmanned systems must be able to operate 
autonomously, alongside of and ultimately integrate with each other 
resulting in a safe and exciting future. 
 
Advancements in the UUV Arena 
 
Previously UUVs had limited technology available to them, this 
lack of advanced technology forced simplicity. With the focus now 
on multiple autonomous systems working in concert with each 
other and the integrated use of UUV with manned systems and 
“the sophistication and complexity of these new technologies have 
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attendant risks. Future strategic submarine navigation development 
requires attentive observance to ensure that the real benefits of 
affordability are realized by the insertion of new 
technologies” (Vajda, 1998) 
In examining technology maturity models for the UUV arena, 
the examination quickly reveals that the technology is truly in its 
infancy state. As the model in Figure 4.4 indicates, simple 
automation is step one, and this is now being demonstrated with 
UUVs; however, UUVs are a long way off from being trusted 
independent, self-governing, with minimal human intervention. 
 
Figure 4.4: Levels of Autonomous Behavior 
Source: (Mumm, 2019) 
 
UUV advancements include such technology areas as propulsion, 
precise navigation, acoustic communication, low-speed vehicle 
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control, stealth, robotics, and mission control… both traditional and 
non-traditional navigation technologies, with traditional navigation 
encompassing improved inertial navigation, Doppler velocity sonar, 
and data fusion, and non-traditional techniques including terrain 
following, geophysical, and magnetic lines of position; acoustic 
underwater communications technologies that feature a high data 
rate and low bit error rate using channel equalization techniques; 
low-speed hydrodynamic control that employs an adaptive, 
nonlinear controller; and finally, command and control systems that 
utilize an intelligent controller with such capabilities as planning, 
re-planning, and fault tolerance. (Cancilliere, 1994). 
One of the keys to the success of UUVs will be to mature the 
navigation capabilities as “a profusion of emerging navigation 
technologies enables us to further advance the strategic submarine 
navigation system in a more affordable manner” (Vajda, 1998). 
Several of these new navigation technologies are “based on a simple 
concept of overlaying maps…what we are defining as the 
“Geospatial Revolution “” (Kumar, 2014) as Geographic Information 
System (GIS) “technology, which has long provided effective 
solutions to the integration, visualization, and analysis of 
information about land, is now being similarly applied to 
oceans.” (Wright, 2013) 
In 2012, Esri launched an Ocean GIS initiative in support of GIS 
in both coastal and open ocean applications. The ability to map the 
oceans and the environmental and human physical changes that are 
occurring will be vital for autonomous UUVs to operate successfully 
and navigate in the most efficient manner possible. Figure 4.5 offers 
a glimpse of the layers of information that the Ocean GIS initiative 
will be able to provide for mapping and navigational aids. 
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Figure 4.5: The Ocean GIS Initiative 
Source:(Kumar, 2014) 
 
The Ocean GIS Initiative: Taking GIS Underwater (Kumar, 2014) 
Esri’s Ocean GIS initiative is developing mapping and spatial 
analysis tools, geospatial data with the ocean’s community in five 
main areas: 
• Research and Exploration- Seafloor mapping and sampling, 
geomorphological studies, and tectonophysics 
• Benthic habitat mapping for estimating species abundance, 
identifying essential fish habitat, and ultimately conserving 
sensitive or endangered areas 
• Shoreline analysis, including calculation of rate-of-change 
statistics from multiple shoreline positions to analyze 
historical shoreline change 
• Climate change, including measuring or simulating the 
potential impacts of sea-level rise on shorelines and wetlands, 
impacts of storms due to increasing ocean temperatures, 
impacts to ecosystems due to increasing ocean acidification, 
and global energy transfer 
• Hazards, including the analysis of risk and potential loss of 
buildings and infrastructure due to hurricane winds, coastal 
Chapter 4 Underwater Autonomous Navigation & Other UUV Advances
[Mumm]  |  111
floods, tsunamis, and nearshore or onshore earthquakes. 
(Wright, 2013) 
Marine debris mapping and tracking is another area that GIS is 
attempting to assist with small plastics and other debris as they are 
not detectable with satellite imagery. In that past, it was not possible 
to integrate all of this data “Over 90% of cargo is shipped via Ships, 
and at least a hundred million people world over depend on the 
oceans for their living. Oil spills and other disasters in the past could 
not be modelled using GIS, but now we have the means to model 
them.” (Kumar, 2014) 
The different classes of UUVs is moving the industry from small 
hobby and research size vehicles of just a few meters in length into 
what is now known as an extra-large unmanned undersea vehicles 
(XLUUVs) “which are among the largest unmanned submersibles 
ever conceived, will be for long-endurance surveillance missions or 
undersea cargo vessels to deliver other sensor payloads and other 
UUVs.” (Keller, 2019). Figure 4.6 offers a glimpse as to how fast the 
defense industry is moving towards XLUUVs. These large unmanned 
undersea vehicles could be used as motherships to deploy and 
recover smaller surveillance UUVs or be used to pair and team 
with manned submarines in the open ocean or along coastlines and 
inside harbors. 
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Figure 4.6: World Large Autonomous Underwater Vehicles 
Source: (H, 2019) 
 
The Orca project is being built by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, 
and it “is developing a delivery system for payloads that could 
involve persistent-surveillance sensors, weapons, or other UUVs 
and UAVs.” (Keller, 2019). The Orca is being designed with modular 
construction principles and “will be an open-architecture 
reconfigurable UUV with the core vehicle providing guidance and 
control, navigation, autonomy, situational awareness, core 
communications, power distribution, energy and power, propulsion 
and maneuvering, and mission sensors.” (Keller, 2019) 
The advances in the UUV arena are notable from the control 
theories that will offer a gradual movement towards full autonomy, 
to the navigation, a real key to the ability for the UUV industry to 
become more mainstream in the defense, logistics, and commercial 
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arenas. The increasing investments in UUV technologies clearly 
signal the overall market acceptance of this unmanned system. The 
rapid escalation of both size and complexity of UUVs offers a 
glimpse of the integration of UUVs into the overall autonomous 
systems architecture and the emerging trust factor to team manned 
and unmanned systems together for the mutual success of all 
involved. 
 
New Challenges Require New Thinking for Underwater Bases, 
Ports and Inland Waterways 
Underwater bases for UUVs simply makes sense, as surface ships 
already operate in a known and agreed upon fashion in ports and 
waterways throughout the world. Attempting to add in UUVs to 
these already busy locations can add complexity that may create 
safety and economic issues that are not tenable in many locations. 
In the underwater domain … achieving interoperability is 
currently impossible due to the lack of common standards and 
protocols for wireless communication. 
Almost all underwater vehicles or sensors currently use 
proprietary interfaces and protocols for communication, especially 
for wireless communication in water. 
This implies that UUVs made by different manufacturers cannot 
communicate with each other, even if they operate in the same area 
and human operators afloat or ashore cannot control these UUVs 
unless they use the control systems supplied by each manufacturer. 
(Wilson, 2019). 
Up to this point, UUVs have been relatively benign sensor 
platforms; however, weaponization cannot be far behind. UUVs can 
quickly become formidable tactical and strategic weapons.  Current 
UUV technology allows them to become a precision weapon that 
can be used in many varied ways. They can be used at different 
levels of warfare and eventually by either or both sides in a conflict. 
The U.S. Navy’s top officer has ordered his staff to develop a 
comprehensive strategy to field unmanned systems in the air, on 
the water and under the sea over the coming years.  Dubbed 
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“unmanned campaign plan,” it looks to tie together all the disparate 
programs into a coherent way forward, Chief of Naval Operations 
Adm. Michael Gilday told Defense News in a July 16 [2020] interview. 
“We’ve got … a family of unmanned systems we’re working on,” 
Gilday said. “Undersea we’ve got extra-large, large and medium 
[unmanned underwater vehicles]; on the surface, we have small, 
medium and large [unmanned surface vessels]; and in the air, we 
have a number of programs. (Larter, 2020) 
At the lowest offensive conflict level, UUVs can be used to 
blockade a port, close off a straight, shadow ships or submarines 
or lie in wait around underwater bases. All these activities can be 
done with or without conventional warheads. Defensively, UUVs 
can provide a barrier to submarines, ships, and other UUVs. With 
a slight increase of the conflict level, UUVs can detonate enemy 
mines, eliminate enemy UUVs, and interfere with sonar systems on 
enemy ships or submarines. Should a UUV passively interfere with 
another vessel’s navigation system, this leaves the UUV blind to 
possible submarine attacks. To save a lot of power and significantly 
increase the potential danger to enemy ships and submarines, the 
UUVs can also act like Remora fish and attach themselves to the 
enemy vessel. Subsequently, the UUVs can detach at their leisure 
to avoid capture and remain viable for the next vessel. In a more 
combative action, the UUV could have a targeted minor collision 
with a submarine’s propeller; this in turn could cause significant 
increase in that submarine’s signature to passive sonar detectors. 
Rogue nations and non-state actors could likely occupy the next 
level of conflict by using UUVs to attack commercial shipping, oil 
platforms, undersea communication cables, offshore wind turbine 
power cables, undersea oil and gas pipelines or other defenseless 
targets. In this new type of asymmetric warfare, there are 
exponentially higher impact targets not traditionally defended. 
Government organizations and commercial entities will need to 
reassess how ocean assets are protected from this new threat. 
Organizations need to consider it is not only the UUVs abilities but 
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the UUVs host’s capabilities that need to be considered for threat 
analysis. 
In addition to the asymmetrical conflicts, there are also indirect 
levels of conflict. Cyber, drones, and some types of bioweapons are 
the current leaders in this arena. UUVs could soon be added to the 
list. Weaponized UUVs can render regional and international port 
facilities extremely vulnerable to disruption or even destruction. 
Additionally, vehicle and rail bridges, critical infrastructure on or 
adjacent to inland waterways could also severely disrupt the 
transportation system should a weaponized UUV find its’ target. 
Dams are difficult to attack from downstream. However, they are 
potentially vulnerable to lakeside attack.  In this case, the release 
vehicle would be a boat or truck upstream of the dam leaving a 
large vulnerable area. Drones could also be considered as a potential 
release vehicle, however due to size, the drone would most likely be 
detected before the release point. 
Inland waterways are often essential sources of water for towns 
and cities as well as to the commercial fishing industry and 
irrigation. These items can render the population vulnerable to a 
biological attack using a UUV as the release vehicle. These biological 
attacks may not be chemical but have the potential to use natural 
invasive species. 
Direct Warfare Port Scenario 
 
Direct warfare involves offensive and defensive operations 
directly related to the enemy’s military and war-making capabilities. 
UUVs would be relevant sensor platforms, offensive and defensive 
weapons systems. Defensive operations would include not only 
manned vessels but enemy UUVs. All combatants on the water or 
under the water would become potential targets and would require 
defensive capabilities to survive. A primary survival technique is 
likely to be speed. UUVs generally lack the speed of military vessels. 
Short UUV sprints by specifically designed attack UUVs could still 
create some danger for those vessels or cause them to be fast and 
noisy for easier detection by manned attack vessels. 
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Imagine this scenario: as tensions between Taiwan and China 
spike, U.S. intelligence reports that PLA Navy warships will soon 
sortie from various Chinese ports. In response, U.S. submarines 
discreetly place a set of large unmanned undersea vehicles — one 
per port — on the seabed floor of the Taiwan Strait. Once settled, 
each UUV waits for the order to release a half-dozen smaller craft, 
each armed with explosives and non-kinetic effectors. 
The order comes and the small craft deploy, maintaining 
connections to a command module via acoustic and satellite links. 
These tactical craft loiter just outside the ports, until one by one, 
they detect the unique acoustic signature of their assigned Chinese 
warship and break off to intercept it. Once in position, three feet 
under a Chinese keel, each tactical UUV signals its status back 
to a command center and awaits the order to immobilize its 
target. (Frandrup, 2019) 
Leveraging Underwater Bases 
 
As the rest of the world watches the scenario unfold, nations 
would establish underwater UUV bases to thwart these types of 
attacks. These same bases could also be leveraged to address the 
threat of quiet, cheap, manned attack submarines from rogue 
nations or illegal commercial activities. Quiet diesel-electric and 
fuel cell manned submarines could likely become a threat to coastal 
areas or that of our allies. Underwater UUV bases would allow 
continuous and routine UUV operations in the area. “The U.S. Navy 
is developing an underwater charging station for its unmanned 
undersea vehicles. The technology, which does away with cables, 
will make it easier for drones to recharge at sea.” (Mizokami, The 
Navy Is Working on Underwater Wireless Charging Stations for 
Robot Subs, 2017) The UUVs could also use these remote recharging 
stations to receive new mission instructions. UUVs with 
maintenance issues would be gathered up on a routine schedule by 
surface vessels, repaired, and released back to the base. 
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Figure 4.7: UUV Charging Station 
Source: (Mizokami, Why Russia’s Unique Supercavitating 
Torpedoes Are so Fast, 2019) 
 
Underwater UUV bases similar to Figure 4.7 would become a 
significant force multiplier for the Navy. Powering and 
communicating with these underwater bases have several technical 
challenges.  Power is potentially the easier issue to solve as there 
are geothermal, current turbines and even nuclear options available. 
Communications is often more challenging to achieve. For bases 
near to shore, a buried cable could be established. For those bases 
that are more remote, perhaps a dedicated UUV that surfaces 
randomly away from the base to communicate with a scheduled 
satellite link. Once the information is received from the satellite, 
the UUV could return to the remote base and download the 
information. Underwater optical links can be added if a distribution 
source is nearby, such as a modified undersea communications 
cable or a support ship. 
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Figure 4.8: Optical Links for UUVs 
Source: (Mohammad Ali, 2019) 
 
Mission Planning with Swarming UUVs 
 
The concept of swarming has been around for decades. Nature 
has led the way in providing successful examples of swarms with 
bees and ants. Part of the swarming theory is that no single entity 
has enough information to carry out a complex mission; however 
through mutual cooperation the swarm can successfully complete 
complex maneuvers in a multitude of environments. The swarming 
capability of unmanned systems has been demonstrated at 
rudimentary levels. Swarming capabilities are maturing as several 
UUVs are able to team with each other, as well as with manned 
submarines, surface vessels, and aircraft. See Figure 4.8 for how 
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UUVs could be linked together as a swarm. The capability for UUVs 
to act on their own mission objectives, and as a collaborative set 
with other UUVs to obtain a goal offers an almost limitless range of 
abilities for this technology. An example of this is the SwarmDiver, 
manufactured by Aquabotix Technology Corporation. 
The Swarm Driver test vehicle can dive as deep as 600 feet while 
working in synch with other UUVs submersibles. “The swarming 
algorithm allows vehicles to communicate with each other to make 
decisions as a group. This allows SwarmDiver to quickly and 
accurately self-arrange in various swarm formations, as well as dive 
simultaneously to collect synoptic data sets,” according to 
Aquabotix (Wilson, 2019). 
Curiously, the ability for multiple unmanned systems to be 
assigned specific mission parameters as a single unit, and then 
sense the need to swarm with other systems to successfully 
complete a task is quite difficult to program. The technology to 
act as a single unit, swarm, and then again as a single unit has not 
been demonstrated to the level of confidence to believe that the 
technology is ready for real world implementation. 
Current UUV operations almost exclusively involve a single 
vehicle performing a single task. In the future, UUVs will be able 
to operate in groups or even swarms. Size, speed, and range of 
UUVs coupled with the vastness of territory to be covered drive 
many offensive and defensive UUV scenarios to leverage the swarm 
theories. The possible exception to swarming is a category of very 
large UUVs or small manned hybrid powered submarines. 
 
Perimeter Protection Planning Considerations 
 
Swarms can be made up of homogeneous or heterogeneous 
UUVs. Unlike typical manned crafts where sensors, weapons, and 
decision-making authority are collocated, UUVs can split these 
functions up as required. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous 
UUV types are useful; however, these functions use power, take up 
space, and can be difficult to implement; this tends to drive the 
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heterogeneous UUVs towards swarms. Where some UUVs are the 
sensor platforms, some are the weapons platforms, and the decision 
making is distributed and collaborative. 
The primary sensors for these UUVs will most likely be a variety 
of active and passive sonar coupled with cameras for close up 
operations. There are several sonar techniques for single vehicles, 
but when multiple vehicles are leveraged in the swarm environment, 
the bi-static method becomes very useful. One UUV pings and the 
others listen. The UUV that pings rotates in a preplanned manner 
to best cover the area and provide additional data for processing. 
Several sonar strategies will need to be developed for swarm 
detection and engagement operations. Will the engagement be 
active, passive, or bi-static? How many UUVs will commit to the 
engagement? Will more than one UUV be actively pinging? Will 
there be unique ping frequencies, or will a type of unique pulse 
repetition be used like with radar? 
The term “asymmetric threat” is now familiar in the lexicon, and 
terrorist actions are a frequent occurrence. For naval forces, the 
classical terms “blue water” threat and “major threat axis” no longer 
hold the significance they once did. The threat environment has 
moved from the “blue water” to “brown water,” or littoral regions, 
placing emphasis on power projection, force protection, and 
expeditionary operations in littoral areas. (Board, 2005) 
Prior to the engagement, there must be several things to consider 
including identifying what types of weapons the UUVs might use? 
These weapons options can be divided into destructive and non-
destructive. The destructive can be further decomposed into those 
that have warheads, those that have an integrated directional 
warheads but survive the attack to be reused, those that attach 
the warhead and leave before detonation, and those that expend 
ordinance from a distance that can be reused. 
The first type of weapon may be a smart torpedo during the 
attack phase. The swarm is either deployed from a ship, sub, or 
underwater base and work as a team to acquire the target then 
determines the tactics to destroy the target using one or more of 
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the deployed UUVs. The next type of weapon would typically have 
a shaped charge as its destructive mechanism. This is most useful 
for eliminating mines, and it can also attack targets that are slow 
compared to the UUV. The weapon with an attack shaped charge 
warheads to targets are most useful in going after ships, 
Figure 4.9: Supercavitating Bullet 
Source: (Blain, 2019) 
 
submarines, pipelines, or other stationary targets in a port 
scenario. They can also place open ocean fiber optic cables, 
pipelines, and oil rigs at risk. Each type can put these valuable items 
at risk.  The last type allows for expanded tactics set and can engage 
targets faster than they are with enhanced success by operating as a 
swarm. The most common solution for this type of UUV is one that 
is large enough to deploy standard torpedoes. There are short and 
long standard torpedoes. It would be more likely for the UUV to use 
a shorter variety, but they could efficiently be designed for longer 
torpedoes. A less common, but more compact solution for this set of 
UUVs are the super cavitating weapons. These cavitating weapons 
come in two types: bullets or rockets. Bullets have a shorter range 
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and a smaller target set, but would be very effective against other 
UUVs, USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles), and other small boats. 
See Figure  4.9 as an example of a cavitating bullet underwater. 
“Norway’s DSG has used the drag-reducing abilities of super-
cavitation to produce some truly extraordinary projectiles that’ll 
hit submerged targets up to 60 m (200 ft) away, opening up some 
interesting new mission capabilities” (Blain, 2019). The super 
cavitating rockets would have a longer range and potentially an 
extensive target set. The Russian VA-111 Shkval torpedo is a large 
version of this type of weapon. Water creates a lot of drag and 
typically limits torpedoes to about 50 knots. 
Shkval solves this problem by diverting hot rocket exhaust out 
of its nose, which turns the water in front of it into steam. As the 
torpedo moves forward, it continues vaporizing the water in front of 
it, creating a thin bubble of gas. Traveling through gas, the torpedo 
encounters much less drag, allowing it to move at speeds of up 200 
knots. (Mizokami, Why Russia’s Unique Supercavitating Torpedoes 
Are so Fast, 2019) 
One type of warhead was intentionally left out of the previous 
discussion, and that is a nuclear warhead.  This type of warhead 
is unlikely to be used by the U.S. and its allies.  However, it could 
easily become a weapon of choice for terrorists or rogue nations. 
It is not by chance, that many of the world’s economic centers 
are located on coastal waters or major inland lakes and rivers. The 
threat acknowledgement by these cities would increase the need 
for new and different active defenses and additional channels for 
intelligence collections. 
Strategies and tactics for UUVs are only limited by the type of 
UUV, the sensors, the weapons (if any), the target set, and the 
mission planner’s creativity. It is expected that UUVs will expand 
significantly in both numbers and capabilities in the near future. 
 
UUV Policies and Governance for Consideration 
The ability to create UUV navigation lanes and standard operating 
procedures will require laws, policies, governance and leadership 
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from many organizations, host nations and port owners around the 
world. The U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is 
already tasked with providing geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) for 
navigable seaways as part of the Maritime Safety Office. The mission 
of the office is to “Provide global maritime geospatial intelligence 
in support of national security objectives, including safety of 
navigation, international obligations, and joint military 
operations” (Maritime Safety Information, 2020). Currently, there 
are no discernable leaders at the intersection of GEOINT and 
autonomous technology, security, and protocols — whether public, 
private, commercial, or international. There appears to be minimal 
government coordinated efforts that are actively examining the 
entire unmanned architecture and its massive GEOINT data needs. 
The amount of information that NGA will be required to supply 
in the future is not well documented. NGA must capture future 
needs and GEOINT collection requirements for navigational safety 
in the new world of autonomous infrastructures. Spatial-temporal 
anomalies will become the norm, and NGA must document and 
engage in the construction of autonomous communal 
infrastructures and what data is required to allow these 
infrastructures to act and react accordingly for the safe operation 
of all autonomous systems. 
The current autonomous system framework is fragmented 
without coherent oversight, direction, documented requirements, 
and lacks defined authorities, “Unmanned undersea operations 
continue to be limited by the complex, dynamic conditions of the 
ocean environment and the unique operational constraints they 
engender. Three critical capabilities – communication, energy, and 
autonomy – will drive future developments in this domain” (Analysis: 
Cyber in the Undersea, 2020). Advanced coordination and 
collaboration endeavors must be focused to include determining 
the responsibilities and authorities of an unmanned architecture, its 
specific uses, exceptions, and allowances for robotics operations; 
including studying the unintended consequences, future use, and 
misuse of such technologies. 
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Clear policies, laws, and governance are required as a danger to 
the nation, and a global response to UUVs is becoming undeniable. 
There is currently no single agency on a national or international 
level in charge of this issue. Currently, there are no policies, 
governance or doctrines in place for tracking or identification 
capable of offering reliable defenses against teamed autonomous 
systems. There is no single sensor type, defense posture, or reliable 
countermeasure to stop this evolving threat, although “The Navy 
also is moving forward with its new Unmanned Maritime Autonomy 
Architecture (UMAA) program to evaluate levels of autonomy in 
unmanned submarines, enable commonality of autonomy 
technologies, and reduce acquisition costs” (Wilson, 2019). This 
program will take years to solidify and become a part of the modern 
navy. The consequences can be catastrophic as asymmetric warfare 
becomes more asymmetric should governments fail to take a more 




UUV are an up and coming technology with many military and 
civilian uses already being explored. The technology breakthroughs 
that will allow UUVs to move towards their full potential will lag 
behind other autonomous systems; however UUVs will be included, 
integrated and connected to manned and unmanned systems within 
the next few years. Without ongoing, real-time communication with 
controllers, other vehicles and the framework to operate under 
“operators unmanned undersea systems will rely heavily on 
autonomy and artificial intelligence, and as operations increase in 
sophistication, intensity and complexity, the greater will be the need 
for trustworthy systems that can “OODA” (Observe, Orient, Decide, 
Act) in a dynamic and challenging environment” (Analysis: Cyber in 
the Undersea, 2020). The reliance on real time communication, the 
need for AI in UUVs and the immature nature of the laws, policies 
and governance for this unmanned technology (and all autonomous 
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systems) that will be so fully integrated into the waterways, 
economy and warfare in our world will slow the adoption of UUVs 
into everyday marine life. This slowness of adoption does not appear 
to be affecting the innovation, research and development and 
employment of the technology at the rudimentary level. 
Questions 
1. What is the difference between the navigation requirements 
for a manned submarine and a UUV? 
2. What mission are UUVs best suited for in lieu of a manned 
counterpart? 
3. Does the UUV size and composition matter? Why or why not? 
4. Describe examples of how a UUV could be used to protect a 
port area? 
5. Are optionally piloted submarines safer than deploying UUVs 
on their own? 
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5. Chapter 5 Autonomous 
Maritime Asymmetric 
Systems [Hood] 
Student Learning Objectives 
1. Students will be able to understand what asymmetric warfare 
is and how autonomous underwater systems can be utilized to 
conduct it. 
2. Current applications for autonomous maritime vehicles. 
3. Introduction to emerging AUV / UUV technologies and 
programs that will allow the student to better understand the 
potential for growing threats. 
Asymmetry in Warfare: 
War between belligerents whose relative military power differs 
significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. This 
is typically a war between a standing, professional army and 
an insurgency or resistance movement militias who often have 
status of unlawful combatants. 
Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the 
resources of two belligerents differ in essence and, in the struggle, 
interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic 
weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics 
of unconventional warfare, the weaker combatants attempting to 
use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality of their 
forces and equipment. (Thomas, 2010) Such strategies may not 
necessarily be militarized. (Stepanova, 2016) This is in contrast 
to symmetric warfare, where two powers have comparable military 
power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall, 
differing only in details and execution. (Thomas, 2010) 
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This chapter was written to expose the reader to current and 
envisioned autonomous maritime technologies under development. 
The likes of which could potentially be used in non-standard or 
asymmetric methods. With the unspoken goal of possibly subvert or 
attack US naval forces and the Department of Homeland Security. 
 
Naval Asymmetric Warfare 
The US Navy remains arguably the most powerful naval force 
in the world. With the ability to project global power and reach 
while influencing US foreign policy by its mere presence, potential 
state and non-state adversaries continually seek ways to mitigate, 
undermine or even attack US naval forces that pose a threat to their 
regional interests. Cost effective autonomous underwater vehicles 
have been identified by adversarial military and domestic criminal 
organizations as a means to cheaply subvert US naval capabilities 
and prowess. 
 
Autonomous Underwater Vehicle 
An autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV) is a robot that travels 
underwater without requiring input from an operator. AUVs 
constitute part of a larger group of undersea systems known 
as unmanned underwater vehicles, a classification that includes 
non-autonomous remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) – 
controlled and powered from the surface by an operator/pilot via 
an umbilical or using remote control. In military applications an 
AUV is more often referred to as an unmanned undersea 
vehicle (UUV). Underwater gliders are a subclass of AUVs. 
Until relatively recently, AUVs have been used for a limited 
number of tasks dictated by the limited technology available. With 
the development of more advanced processing capabilities and high 
yield power supplies, AUVs are now being used for more dynamic 
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Illegal Drug Trafficking: 
Submarines that travel autonomously to a destination by means 
of GPS navigation have been made and are currently in use by 
illegal drug traffickers. This would limit the need for “go fast” boat 
operators reducing overall cost, electromagnetic signature and risk 
to personnel. Recent semi-submersible seizures by the US Coast 
Guard in the Gulf of Mexico may be prompting criminal 
organizations to shift to autonomous operations. 
 
Air Crash and Maritime Search Investigations: 
Autonomous underwater vehicles, for example AUV ABYSS, have 
been used to find wreckages of missing airplanes, e.g. Air France 
Flight 447, and the Bluefin-21 AUV was used in the search 
for Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. (Mason, 2014) Developing 
technologies may soon provide a long endurance persistent 
presence throughout vast swaths of open ocean that could be used 




The U.S. Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master 
Plan (NAVY, 2004) identified the following UUV’s missions: 
• Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
• Mine countermeasures 
• Anti-submarine warfare 
• Inspection/identification 
• Oceanography 
• Communication/navigation network nodes 
• Payload delivery 
• Information operations 
• Time-critical strikes 
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Recently, The Navy Master Plan divided all known UUVs into four 
classes (Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, 2015): 
• Man-portable vehicle class: 25–100 lb displacement; 10–20 
hours endurance; launched from small water craft manually 
(i.e., Mk 18 Mod 1 Swordfish UUV) 
• Lightweight vehicle class: up to 500 lb displacement, 20–40 
hours endurance; launched from RHIBusing launch-retriever 
system or by cranes from surface ships (i.e., Mk 18 Mod 2 
Kingfish UUV) 
• Heavyweight vehicle class: up to 3,000 lb displacement, 40–80 
hours endurance, launched from submarines 
• Large vehicle class: up to 10 long tons displacement; launched 
from surface ships and submarines 
 
Underwater Gliders 
In addition to the list of standard UUV’s, the underwater glider 
(UG) is a type of autonomous underwater vehicle that uses small 
changes in its buoyancy to move up and down and uses wings to 
convert the vertical motion to horizontal, propelling itself forward 
with very low power consumption.  (See Figure 5.1) 
In 2004, the US Navy’s Office of Naval Research began developing 
large gliders that were designed to quietly track diesel electric 
submarines in littoral waters, remaining on station for up to six 
months. (XRay) 
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Figure 5.1 UUV US Navy Underwater Glider 
Source: (NOAA, 2020) 
Gliders are currently being used by NOAA to track oceanic data 
to help with hurricane forecasting. NOAA hopes the data collected 
from these gliders will help enhance our understanding of air-sea 
interaction processes during hurricane force wind events. In 2020 
a network of hurricane underwater gliders was implemented to 
assess the impact hurricane force winds on upper ocean density 
structure, and assess the impact of ocean profile data from 
underwater gliders in operational intensity forecasts. (XRay) 
Gliders remain a simple way to establish a persistent networks 
of sensors at low cost that could potentially carry payloads for 
various mission sets. They could then be used for tracking potential 
adversarial threats, while presenting multiple dilemmas the enemy 
would have to respond to at a very low cost compared to manned 
vessels that only have a fractional durational use. As sea glider 
technology continues to mature, communication and 
electromagnetic signature reductions for these suites will have to 
be taken into consideration in order to maintain a low observable 
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persistent presence. Figure 5.2 shows how sea gliders can be 
deployed in formations to create a network of arrayed sensors. 
 Figure 5.2 Underwater Glider Deployment 
Source: (NOAA, 2020) 
 US Navy’s NEMESIS Program 
The US Navy is currently working to develop an advanced 
electronic warfare program that uses drone swarms in the air and 
sea to cooperatively fool a wide variety of sensors dispersed over a 
large area. Known as “Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature 
against integrated Sensors” or NEMESIS. 
The Navy has spent the last several years developing and 
integrating multiple types of unmanned vehicles, shipboard and 
submarine systems, countermeasures, electronic warfare payloads, 
and communication technologies to give if the ability to give it the 
ability to project what is, in essence, phantom fleets of aircraft, ships 
and submarines. These realistic-looking false signatures and decoys 
have the ability to appear seamlessly across disparate and 
geographically separated enemy sensors systems located both above 
and below the ocean’s surface. As a result, this networked and 
cooperative electronic warfare concept brings an unprecedented level 
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of guileful fidelity to a fight. It’s not just about disrupting the enemy’s 
capabilities or confusing them at a command and control level, but 
also making their sensors tell them the same falsehoods across large 
swathes of the battle space. (Tingley, 2020) 
 
DARPA’s Ocean of Things 
The name is a play on the Internet of Things and the aim is to 
achieve persistent maritime situational awareness over large ocean 
areas. While satellites can provide some information, DARPA project 
manager John Waterson points out that there are gaps in their 
coverage – optical satellites cannot see through clouds, radar 
satellites only have limited coverage, and none of them can say 
much about what is going on underwater. (Hambling, 2020) 
Figure 5.3 Ocean of Things (OoT) Concept – floating sensors 
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Source: (Hambling, 2020) 
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Ocean of Things concept of operations, as the float senses activity 
on and under the water and passes back details via satellite – DARPA 
image. 
 
Floating sensors, known as floats, can gather far more detailed 
information, and can remain at sea for months at a time. There is 
a network of almost 4,000 Argo science floats around the world, 
gathering data on ocean temperature and salinity. Waterson wants 
to see much larger arrays of low-cost floats with more sensors, 
floats which would carry out missions lasting up to a year before 
scuttling themselves and degrading. The floats are environmentally 
friendly, avoiding the use of toxic materials. (Hambling, 2020) 
The cellphone industry has developed plenty of affordable, 
miniature sensors, and the OoT is leveraging this technology. The 
new contract was awarded at the end of July to technology 
company PARC, whose 18-kilo, solar-powered glass float design 
won out ahead of two others in the first phase. The floats are 
sensor nodes which will pass data via satellite to a cloud network for 
real-time analysis. The OoT will combine data from multiple floats, 
seeing the whole picture rather than the single pixel gathered by 
one sensor. (See. Figure 5.4) 
 
Figure 5.4. The eighteen-kilo float houses a variety of sensors 
and operates for up to a year on solar power 
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Source: (Hambling, 2020) 
 
A key element of the OoT is its hydrophone, a sensitive 
underwater microphone or passive sonar which can pick up 
engines, screws and other sounds from ships and submarines. 
Floating sonobuoys dropped from aircraft have been used to locate 
submarines since WWII, but these only operate for a few hours. 
The OoT hydrophone has to operate for a whole year – and it has 
to be affordable. In 2019, researchers from Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography made a prototype high-fidelity hydrophone for the 
OoT which they estimated could be mass produced for $100-$150. 
(Hambling, 2020) 
DARPA plans to carry out tests with thousand-float arrays in the 
Southern California Bight and Gulf of Mexico later this year. Initially 
they will be arranged at about one float per three square kilometers. 
Waterson believes separation can be increased to one float per 
twenty square kilometers while maintaining coverage. He is also 
talking about much bigger arrays in future, of tens of thousands of 
floats. (Hambling, 2020) 
In addition to obvious military and border protection use – no 
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vessel could slip through the dense field of OoT sensors, on or under 
the water – the OoT will produce a mass of data of interest to 
oceanographers, meteorologists and biologists, with plans to share 
raw data online with researchers. The OoT may be able to monitor 
marine mammal like whales, watch hurricanes form from the inside, 
and track changes in ocean temperature. (Hambling, 2020) 
In this context, Waterson says that people often mention Flight 
MH370, the Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 that disappeared in 
Southern Indian Ocean in 2014. If there had been an OoT in the 
area, a plane crash could have been detected and the crash site 
located. However, DARPA’s main interest is likely to be in military 
applications. (Hambling, 2020) 
“The persistent coverage provided by dispersed sensors provides 
round-the-clock coverage that other sources of data like an MPA 
[maritime patrol aircraft] or a SAR [synthetic aperture radar] 
satellite, which cover a given area for a certain amount of time 
before moving on, cannot,” says Dr. Sidharth Kaushal, an expert on 
sea power at the U.K. defense think tank RUSI. (Hambling, 2020) 
Kaushal notes that as well as directly observing vessels and 
aircraft, the OoT will be able to measure variables like temperature, 
ocean salinity and ambient underwater noise, which are important 
for calibrating sonar during anti-submarine operations. The OoT 
will not be limited to any specific role; the variety of sensors, 
coupled with powerful data-processing techniques, mean it might 
be reconfigured to deal with emerging threats. For example, OoT 
might form a defensive picket to detect, track and locate incoming 
Russian Poseidon nuclear torpedoes so they could be 
intercepted. (Hambling, 2020) 
“This fits into a wider concept of Mosaic Warfare creating a 
system the components of which can reform and interact in 
multiple ways rather than relying on a hierarchical system,” says 
Kaushal. (Hambling, 2020) 
In some ways the OoT parallels the network of surveillance 
platforms China is building in the South China Sea, which are also 
gathering scientific and military data. However China’s Blue Ocean 
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sensors are tethered in place and appear to be mainly for radar and 
optical observation; there are believed to be hydrophone arrays on 
the sea bed. By contrast the OoT is much smaller and expendable, 
and could be deployed anywhere that the U.S. requires detailed, 
persistent observation of maritime activity, thousands of floating 
eyes to see over, on and under the sea. (Hambling, 2020) 
 
Conclusions 
Autonomous underwater vehicle applications continue to grow 
and expand as fast as emerging maritime technology allows.  While 
the United States maintains naval supremacy throughout the world 
and the Department of Homeland Security continues to grow and 
develop, potential adversarial and criminal entities will seek ways to 
subvert and penetrate and exploit known and unknown weaknesses. 
This could be done by overt air and sea attacks against maritime 
vessels and infrastructure or most likely by low profile, low 
signature and low cost autonomous systems. These autonomous 
systems will be used to track surface and subsurface vessels, 
providing potential adversaries a clear picture of how US naval 
forces are arrayed. They will also be used to covertly strike by means 
of delivering small payloads to specific targets while remaining 
undetected. 
 
As other advancing nations continue to conduct similar research 
as DARPA, NOAA and the Office of Naval Research, the growth 
of autonomous under water vehicles will remain constant for the 
foreseeable future. The next new wave of technological advances 
will be centered on how to effectively counter these AUV / UUV 
systems before they can be effectively employed against US naval 
and maritime assets across the world’s oceans. 
 
Questions 
1. Give an example of asymmetric warfare from recent world 
events that would have benefitted from UUV technologies that 
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DARPA and the US Navy are developing. 
 
2. Which application in the text has the most potential for 
successful employment against US interests? 
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6. Chapter 6 UUV Integrated 
Autonomous Missions & 
Drone Management [Mumm] 
Student Learning Objectives 
The student will gain knowledge of the concepts and framework 
as it relates to the unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) missions, 
including military and civilian uses for surveillance and 
reconnaissance, research, as well as offensive and defensive 
employment of such technology. The student will be able to: 
• Understand the historical nature of underwater missions and 
why UUVs are becoming more important to the military and 
industrial arena. 
• Discuss the differences in manned versus unmanned 
underwater vehicle deployment. 
• Analyze and differentiate missions that are best suited for UUV 
missions and which missions might be best served by manned 
submarines. 
• Explore the ever-increasing list of sensors and mission 
packages available for UUVs, which allow UUV deployment 
envelopes to expand and occupy more of the underwater 
marketplace. 
 
History-What is it, and Why Does it Matter? 
This chapter explores the differences and similarities of how 
manned and unmanned underwater vehicle technology is employed 
for different mission sets and some of the challenges the industry 
faces as UUVs become the norm, and manned submarines become 
more focused on specialized missions, as well as tasking and 
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integrating UUVs into existing manned architecture. UUVs come in 
all shapes and sizes, starting from about a meter in length going 
up to what is now known as an “Extra Large Unmanned Undersea 
Vehicle” (XLUUV). The wide variety of sizes and shapes of UUVs 
offers mission flexibility in an arena that is at its infancy stage. 
The mysteries of the seas fascinate humankind. The vastness of 
the seas with all of its wonders spawned ancient Greek religion to 
believe in Poseidon; known as the “king of the seas…lord of the 
sea-gods, as he dwelt in a golden palace on the sea bed with his 
queen Amphitrite and son Triton” (Sea Gods, 2017).  For centuries 
sailors prayed to “Amphitrite, goddess who spawned the sea’s rich 
bounty–fish and shellfish–as well as dolphins, seals, and whales” 
(Sea Gods, 2017). Sailors also prayed to these deities for a safe 
journey and a bountiful catch. Humankind’s desire to learn, conquer, 
and use the sea for its betterment creates the need for technologies 
and techniques to allow humans to obtain their goals. 
As early as 1578, an “English mathematician and royal navy gunner 
published a book that described his idea for engineering a 
submarine” (Joanne, 2019). In 1620 the first working submarine 
known as the Drebbel was invented by Cornelis Drebbel and was 
propelled by oars that were under the vehicle. By “1623, Drebbel’s 
watercraft carried 16 passengers under the River Thames in 
London…staying underwater for about three hours” (Joanne, 2019). 
Forty years later, the first submarine with an engine was created 
known as the Diver. This submarine engine used compressed air. 
The air was forced from a tank into a cylinder, and this air 
movement pushed a piston that turned the propeller. John Philip 
Holland improved the design and “engineered a submarine that 
used battery power…batteries created electricity-powered a motor 
to turn the propeller” (Joanne, 2019). 
Submarine inventors took great risks even with their own lives as 
they worked to perfect the ability to survive underwater for longer 
time frames. In 1850 “Wilhelm Bauer built his first submarine… but 
only narrowly escaped with his life after it sank in 50 feet of water 
during a demonstration” (Andrews, 2018).Wilhelm Bauer would be 
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undeterred by this setback as he received financial backing from 
the Russian government and went on construct the “Sea Devil.” 
The Sea Devil made more than one hundred and thirty successful 
dives and “boasted several technological breakthroughs including 
multiple ballast tanks for added buoyancy, a crude airlock and a 
propeller that was powered by crewmen operating an internal 
treadmill” (Andrews, 2018). 
 
Early American Submarine Usage 
For almost two hundred and fifty years, submarines have been 
used as a wartime vessel. The first attempt to use submarines as 
an attack vessel was during the American Revolutionary War; and 
on “September 6, 1776, an American named Sergeant Lee tried to 
attack a British ship using the Turtle. Lee drilled a hole in the ship, 
but he ran out of air before he could attach the mine” (Joanne, 
2019).  In 1863, a privately funded venture in Mobile, Alabama, using 
a recycled iron steam boiler ushered in the first successful primitive 
attack submarine known as the H.L. Hunley. This attack submarine 
offered new naval tactics to be introduced during the US Civil War. 
Breaking the stronghold of the Union naval blockades allowed the 
Confederacy to move supplies and keep the Union naval ships at 
risk. The Hunley was known as the “peripatetic coffin”—and for good 
reason. It sank on two occasions during its trial runs, killing a total 
of 13 crewmen including its namesake, marine engineer Horace 
Lawson Hunley” (Andrews, 2018). 
Commissioned on October 12, 1900, the USS Holland became the 
first US Navy submarine. Although the USS Holland was never 
employed in combat, “The ship’s armaments consisted of a single 
torpedo tube and pneumatic cannon known as a “dynamite gun.” 
It was powered by a 4-cylinder gasoline engine for surface travel, 
but also included a 160-horsepower electric motor to move 
underwater” (Andrews, 2018). 
World War I saw the introduction of the German U-boats, better 
known as “undersea boats.” Built on production lines to allow for 
economies of scale and training of its crew, the U-boats were 
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introduced into the German fleet to attack enemy military ships. 
Later, the U-boats were used to “attack merchant ships and 
passenger liners. In just one day in September 1914, a German U-
boat sank three British ships. Between February and April 1917, U-
boats sank more than 500 merchant ships” (Joanne, 2019). 
New technologies such as sonar and radar allowed submarines to 
take an important leap forward in their importance in contributing 
to military successes. Submarines became a key component to 
WWII as “Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were major sea powers 
during World War II by adding submarines to their surface fleets. 
That combination remains the key to sea power today” (Wilson, 
2019) 
Submarines were used in the Gulf War (1990-1991) to launch land-
attack missiles, and submarines are currently used in the ongoing 
War on Terror. The ability to be stealth and persistent allows 
mission planners flexibility in employment, and UUVs will broaden 
this flexibility envelope in future years. 
Submarines and UUVs continue to illustrate their importance to 
the world although “it is only in the last thirty years that progress 
in propulsion; control, hydrodynamics, and sensor technology have 
enabled the development of more broadly capable vehicles and free 
the imaginations of naval planner to propose new and innovative 
operational applications for them” (Whitman, 2002). 
The ability to remove the human from a submarine and allow 
the vehicle to be remotely operated by wire and later fully 
autonomously is still in a formative stage, as illustrated in Table 
1; however, the capability increase is being heavily funded and is 
moving quickly to the forefront of the UUV arena. 
 
Table 6.1: The Evolution of UUVs and Their Capabilities 
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Source: (Petillot, 2019) 
 
In the modern-day US Navy, it has taken nearly three decades of 
development and experimentation in the unmanned systems arena; 
however, “unmanned underwater vehicles are close to joining the 
fleet in meaningful numbers and substantive roles…UUVs are 
rapidly gathering momentum and critical mass of supporters” 
(Whitman, 2002). 
 
Submarine and UUV Current Military Missions 
The primary roles and missions for the U.S. submarine force are 
peacetime engagement, surveillance and intelligence, special 
operations, precision strike, battlegroup operations, and sea denial 
using naval or port blockades. 
Keeping in mind that in the current global security environment, 
naval forces have an ideal disruptive technology in UUVs that offers 
“many challenges both in the form of asymmetric threats and 
confrontations between peers” (Newswire, 2018) while allowing 
human assets to stay out of harm’s way. UUVs will have “initial 
emphasis on minefield reconnaissance, intelligence collection, 
trailing, tagging, deception, and attack capabilities are potential 
future options” (Whitman, 2002). These UUV capabilities will 
include a range of command and control options including creating 
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an optionally piloted submarine with the on the fly ability to 
transition to near-total autonomy or full autonomy. 
The US Navy published The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 
(UUV) Master Plan in 2004 and then updated the plan in a February 
18, 2016, Congressional report “using Sea Power 21 for guidance, 
nine Sub-Pillar capabilities were identified and prioritized: 
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
2. Mine Countermeasures 
3. Anti-Submarine Warfare 
4. Inspection / Identification 
5. Oceanography 
6. Communication / Navigation Network Node 
7. Payload Delivery 
8. Information Operations 
9. Time Critical Strike” (The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 
(UUV) . See Figure 6.1, US Navy UUV Systems Vision. 
 
The UUV Master Plan identifies four basic signature capabilities 
and provides an outline for the development of the underlying 
technologies required to implement these signature capabilities for 
littoral operations. The signature capabilities include: 
• Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) – centers on the Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) functions, target 
designation; launch and coordination of UUVs for battle 
damage assessment; and intelligence collection. 
Undersea Search and Survey (USS) – provides the ability to rapidly 
survey selected areas through the use of networks of small UUVs, 
performing functions 
• such as mine hunting/neutralization, underwater object 
location and recovery, and hydrographic/bathymetric surveys. 
• Communication/Navigation Aid (C/NA) – provides a 
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communication/navigation relay for other underwater 
vehicles operating within the immediate area and is expected 
to serve as a gateway for an autonomous underwater 
communication/navigation network. 
• Submarine Track and Trail (ST&T) – provides a mobile cueing 
function, but could grow into a fully autonomous system 
offering multiple levels of engagement (Wenli, 2000). 
Figure 6.1: US Navy UUV Systems Vision 
Source: (Clark, 2020) 
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is a difficult mission the Navy must 
perform, and this is a good reason why the Navy should increase the 
use of UUVs in the performance of ASW. Although sonars are used 
to detect submarines; sonars have only a “fraction of the range and 
precision possible using radars or visual sensors against ships above 
the water. Unmanned aircraft could deploy sonobuoys or stationary 
sonar arrays, and unmanned undersea or surface vehicles could 
tow passive sonar arrays” (Clark, 2020). The integration of UUVs 
with unmanned surface vehicles would allow the deployment  of 
“low-frequency active sonars like those carried by U.S. undersea 
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surveillance ships that can detect or drive off submarines from 
dozens of miles away” (Clark, 2020). 
In a March 9, 2020 article by Lyle Goldstein titled “New UUSs: 
China’s plan to ‘attack from the seafloor,” Mr. Goldstein explains, 
“The robot submarine (and unmanned surface ship) era is now 
nearly upon us. Chinese naval strategists have stated explicitly that 
they intend to circumvent their long-recognized weakness in 
submarine warfare by cultivating undersea AI and by developing 
highly capable UUVs” (Goldstein, 2020). 
In an August 2019 article published by Military & Aerospace 
Electronics it was disclosed that 
 
In 2018, China announced it was working on an AI-run underwater 
base, equipped with autonomous submarines to extend its reach. 
According to published reports, the submarines would deploy for 
investigation and scientific surveillance missions, then return to the 
unmanned base to download data and recharge. The base itself, 
located on the ocean floor as deep as 36,000 feet, also would 
conduct research on the immediate area, process and fuse all 
collected data, and transmit the results to a surface ship or land 
station (Wilson, 2019). 
The Chinese government is also conducting an interesting 
counter tactic to UUVs as “the secretive world of naval underwater 
surveys rarely breaks the surface” (Sutton, 2020). The Chinese 
government rewards its fishing industry when vessels are able to 
capture (or report on) foreign UUVs operating near its coast 
(international waters). “China has been holding the annual awards 
ceremonies since 2016. This year 11 (2020), fishermen were 
rewarded for handing over unidentified underwater vehicles which 
they had found” (Sutton, 2020). 
 
Submarine and UUV Civilian/Academic Missions 
The academic and environmental research communities are 
steadily increasing their use of UUVs as “interest in using UUVs 
in private industry is growing simultaneously, and internationally, 
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at least half-dozen firms have begun to commercialize UUV 
technology developed in university and military laboratories” 
(Whitman, 2002). Although oceans cover most of our planet, 
humankind’s knowledge of its mysteries appears to be small in scale 
as “only a fraction of these vast waters has been explored, and 
much of the underwater world is little understood” (Loria, 2016). 
The Aquarius Reef Base is currently the only permanent underwater 
research laboratory in the world. It is operated by Florida 
International University in cooperation with NASA, the US Navy, and 
other research facilities around the world. 
Poised for rapid growth, the list of commercial uses of UUVs 
continues to increase. Some of these commercial and civilian 
missions for UUVs include underwater tourism, logistical movement 
of goods, infrastructure monitoring of bridges, oil pipelines, 
underwater sea cables, undersea mining, and bottom mapping. 
Additional missions are being explored, such as law enforcement 
applications, long term monitoring of environmental issues, and sea 
traffic management in shipping lanes. 
As Mr. Stockton Rush explained in an April 17, 2017, Popular 
Science Magazine article titled “Deep Sea Tourism Could Become 
a Thing”, Humankind has explored only about five percent of the 
ocean, and the federal government isn’t doing much to improve 
that… There’s a huge demand for travel that’s different,” he says. 
“People want to do something meaningful” (Fecht, 2017). 
UUV technology, along with most submarine technology is 
commercially available and sometimes can be used in unintended 
applications such as human trafficking or illegal drug smuggling. 
In November 2019, Spanish authorities captured a drug-smuggling 
submarine and indicated that “This new attempt to use the narco 
submarine to bring drugs into Europe in the first place is a much 
more ambitious undertaking and appears to have largely succeeded 
on a general technical level” (Trevithick, 2019). In 2010 a drug 
smuggler was found in Africa building a $20 million submarine to 
smuggle illegal drugs to the United States.  As UUV technology 
becomes more reliable and affordable, illegal uses are sure to 
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increase as illustrated by international drug smugglers “it is a clear 
indication that the use of narco subs in those activities may be an 
increasingly viable tactic” (Trevithick, 2019). 
 
UUV Markets 
The majority of the Earth’s surface is covered by water, and 
approximately “40% of the population living near coastlines, with 
many energy resources found in the sea and with shipping being 
the arteries of global commerce” (Newswire, 2018). the potential for 
UUV manufacturing, parts, service, research and development, and 
future uses is almost limitless. 
Although the larger markets for UUVs is clearly the defense 
sector, the private sector use will drive profitability of the 
manufacturing and services support channels. Several mission 
enhancements will boost these markets “in the fields of autonomy, 
batteries and power management, underwater 
telecommunications, underwater charging, sensors, and most 
importantly in Artificial Intelligence” (Newswire, 2018). The UUV 
markets are poised for rapid expansion and growth. In 2018, the 
international market value was estimated to be worth US $9.4 
billion. This estimate was based on growing requirements, 
availability, manufacturing  and other industrial 
indicators (Newswire, 2018). 
Senior officials have a stated goal of pursuing a 355-plus-ship 
fleet of manned vessels, but unmanned systems are “probably the 
future of the Navy,” according to Robert Levinson, a senior defense 
analyst at Bloomberg Government, during a recent webinar. 
It is estimated that about $7.9 billion in the future year’s defense 
program would support drones…An additional $2.2 billion would 
be allocated toward unmanned surface vessels, or USVs, and $1.9 
billion for unmanned underwater vessels, or UUVs. Navy plans call 
for spending $941 million on USVs and UUVs in 2021 alone, a 129 
percent increase over 2019 spending allocations (Harper, 2020). 
Unmanned vessels are generally expected to be less expensive 
to procure, operate, and maintain than manned platforms, which 
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make them attractive as the sea service invests in new capabilities 
(Harper, 2020). 
The world’s economy and its’ ability to fund research and 
development to expand markets and encourage innovations such 
as UUV underwater tourism, UUV transportation of goods and 
passengers, and undersea UUV bases will have a deciding impact on 
the speed and overall success of the UUV industry. This global UUV 
market is heavily influenced by political turmoil as the importance 
of the seas cannot be understated. The South China Sea is a good 
example where “Amid the growing push for decoupling and 
economic distancing, the changing relationship between China and 
the rest of the world will influence competition and opportunities 
in the Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) market” (Research, 
2020). 
 
Teaming UUV with Manned Equipment 
As UUVs become more capable and societies continue to seek 
“bloodless wars,” the militaries of the world will work to integrate 
“unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) as adjuncts to conventional 
manned platforms in many of the submarine missions that arise in 
expeditionary warfare” (Whitman, 2002). This transition will start 
slowly with simple minefield reconnaissance, intelligence 
collection, and deception mission; however, as confidence in the 
UUV rises, “attack capabilities are potential future options, with 
command modalities that range from simple remote control to 
near-total autonomy” (Whitman, 2002). 
 
Optionally piloted UUVs will allow the expansion of manned and 
unmanned teaming and will bring it into the normative technologies 
for military and civilian missions alike. This teaming arrangement 
will only work if the manned operator can understand and trust 
what the unmanned systems actions are or will be during the 
missions. Pre-planned missions will be the start of this relationship, 
however as AI is introduced and the need for mission deviation 
and flexibility is required, pre-planned mission execution will give 
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way to AI goal seeking with extended mission capabilities. These 
extended capabilities and teaming opportunities are being explored 
as a “detection method for submarine oil pipeline leakage under 
complex sea conditions by UUVs… the usual practice is to check 
whether there is oil spill on the sea surface by chartering ships to 
patrol the line regularly or in the event of leakage accidents” (Zhao, 
2019). 
Navy special forces conduct missions that require shallow-water 
reconnaissance in support of amphibious landings and other 
intelligence-gathering activities. The Navy is looking to pair manned 
and unmanned systems for this type of an operation, and “small 
UUV denoted the Semi-Autonomous Hydrographic Reconnaissance 
Vehicle (SAHRV) has been identified as a leading solution” (Whitman, 
2002). 
The Naval Undersea Warfare Center is working on concepts that 
would allow teaming to occur in a seamless way including have 
“several very large, flatfish-shaped UUVs mated externally to a 
“mother” submarine could provide a powerful and flexible adjunct 
to the combat power of their host in off-board operations” 
(Whitman, 2002) as seen here in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3  demonstrate the Notional MANTA concept 
developed by the Naval Undersea Warfare Center that MANTA 
vehicles could carry significant payloads of sensors and 
heavyweight weapons (Whitman, 2002). 
 
Figure 6.2: Notional Manta Concept 
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Source: (Whitman, 2002) 
 
Figure 6.3: Notional Manta Layout Capabilities 
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Sources: (Whitman, 2002) 
 
AI and its Influence in the Future of the Integrated Architecture 
of UUVs 
Advances in sensor systems, hull materials, propulsion 
technologies, and data science will drive the UUV missions to places 
that have not even been considered at the moment. These 
technologies will include all the subsystem level technology 
developments allow for the  increase in “survivability and adaptive 
control of vehicles in complex/dynamic/tactical environments; 
reduce communication and human supervision requirements; 
enable cooperative, multi-vehicle operations with navigation aids 
and communication relays; and provide increased levels of 
situational awareness” (Wenli, 2000).Specific areas of interest in 
autonomy include: 
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• Planning and control architectures 
• Path planning (including obstacle and dynamic threat 
avoidance, adaptive route planning) 
• Behavior development 
• Mission planning/re-planning 
• Multiple vehicle behavior and control 
• Multiple vehicle imaging, localization, and data fusion 
• On-board mapping of environmental variability, identified 
objects and moving contacts 




The traditional navigation pattern is depicted in Figure 6.4, 
however, this scheme is limited, and it is being improved upon 
through the use of a communication bridge which “allows vehicles 
to send information from a distant operating area back to a remote 
operator” (Lockheed Martin, 2017) as seen in Figure 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.4: The scheme of a navigation, guidance, and control 
architecture for a UUV 
Source: (Petillot et al., 2019) 
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Figure 6.5: Depiction of an Undersea Communication Bridge 
Source: (Lockheed Martin, 2017) 
 
Figure 6.5 displays the ability for UUVs to autonomously create 
a communication bridge in order to relay data back to the host 
ship (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Collaborative Missions A 
Decentralized Approach to Operating UUV Teams, 2017). 
The underwater environment is not conducive to real-time 
command and control, and this communication limitation makes 
some form of AI use mandatory. UUVs are driving pioneering 
research in artificial intelligence, unmanned swarming technology, 
navigation, and underwater communications. The U.S. Navy is 
seeking additional AI capabilities, especially undersea: 
 
“As the current submarine force trusts mechanical and electrical 
technology to execute the mission, the future force will need to 
trust AI to extract and exploit actionable patterns among an ocean 
of data,” the session says. “The advent of big data and deep learning 
technology has rendered signal detection and classification an 
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increasingly automated process. Furthermore, advances in 
autonomous navigation have enabled unmanned platforms to 
operate alone or in swarms (Wilson, 2019). 
Extending trust to AI systems is one of the goals of the DARPA’s 
Explainable Question Answering System (EQUAS) Project. The 
EQUAS Project will show users which data mattered most in AI 
decision-making, and it was created “to build trust, we have to 
give the user enough information about how the recommendation 
was made, so they feel comfortable acting on the system’s 
recommendation” (Wilson, 2019). The idea is that “We know why 
humans may mess up a decision; there’s no intuitive way to know 
when machines are wrong,” says Bill Ferguson, lead scientist at 
Raytheon BBN Technologies” (Wilson, 2019). 
DARPA is also working on the “Ocean of Things” Project that 
will analyze information from thousands of float sensors in the 
ocean. This project is targeting towards “affordable ocean sensing 
at large scales and high resolution, the project’s analytics portion 
seeks to provide detailed understanding of the ocean environment 
to protect natural resources and enable the military to operate 
more effectively on the high seas” (Keller, 2020). This information 
can then be used to train UUV AI systems and allow for as close 
to real-time updates as technically available in the oceanic 
environment. Continuous information updates from the Ocean of 
Things Project can move the UUV arena towards full autonomy with 
the ability of on the fly mission deviations and re-tasking of the 
UUVs as required as “only speed, endurance, and the adequacy of 
onboard autonomous control and decision-making will limit what 
UUVs can do” (Whitman, 2002). The Ocean of Things can build 
capabilities that can become key to UUVs “because today’s naval and 
commercial ships typically can use only their onboard sensors for 
situational awareness” (Keller, 2020). 
The future missions of UUVs is discussed at length at the U.S. 
Post Naval Graduate School and it was the subject of a 2013 paper 
titled “2024 Unmanned Undersea Warfare Concept”. Coupling AI into 
this concept would allow UUVs to “remain one of the top priorities 
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of the Chief of Naval Operations, as UUVs serve as effective force 
multipliers, while greatly reducing 
risk, in critical missions in A2AD environments” (Blandin, 2013) as 
illustrated in Figure 6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6: 2024 UUV Concept of Operations 
Source: (Blandin, 2013) 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates what undersea warfare might look like in 
FY2024 and how forward operating UUVs would autonomously 
function in hostile A2AD environments with multi-layered enemy 
defenses including submarines, aircraft, ASCMs, ASBMs, and 
mines. (Blandin, 2013). 
The scalability of future missions and full integration of UUVs 
into an operating architecture will require a several technologies 
to mature at once and work in concert with each other for the 
mutual success of all involved systems. AI is the component that 
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will sew all of these technologies together and allow UUVs to reach 
their full potential in the shortest amount of time. The security of 
these systems, along with the laws, policies, and worldwide agreed-
upon governance of UUVs, is work that has barely even begun to 
be tackled, and a much more concerted effort is required to move 
forward on these fronts. 
Personnel/Human Implications 
The human aspect of UUVs should not be overlooked as the 
training and re-training of personnel will affect the overall readiness 
of seaborne operations. While this chapter is not focused on this 
issue, it is an issue that must be factored into the current and future 
mission planning cycles and technology refresh cycles for seaborne 
operations, including UUVs. The psychological effects of turning 
over a traditional manned mission to a robot and allowing that robot 
at times to operate with more autonomy than allowed by manned 
systems can create distrust and resentment within the workforce. A 
March 30, 2020, Congressional Research Service report offered the 
following: 
Another oversight issue for Congress concerns the potential 
personnel implications of incorporating a significant number of 
large UVs into the Navy’s fleet architecture. Potential questions for 
Congress include the following: 
• What implications might these large UVs have for the required 
skills, training, and career paths of Navy personnel? 
• Within the Navy, what will be the relationship between 
personnel who crew manned ships and those who operate 
these large UVs? (O’Rourke, 2020) 
Additional thought must be given to issues such as liability 
boundaries, acceptable losses of UUVs when the traditional 
calculation is acceptable human losses. Environmental, economic, 
and economic disparity must be considered in the personnel/
human implication of UUV missions and mission expansion. 
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Conclusions 
The UUV arena is still very much in its infancy stages. The ability 
to transverse over, on top of, and under the vastness of the oceans 
offers humankind learning opportunities that are boundless. As the 
strategic importance of the world’s oceans continues to grow, so 
will the desire to understand, control, and harness this importance. 
The military aspects of UUVs are driven by the ability to use 
the technology to carry out dull, dirty, and dangerous missions 
without putting human operators in danger. The missions assigned 
to UUV will grow exponentially as trust in the systems becomes as 
commonplace as using a smartphone. 
The advent of UUV underwater basing operations and the use 
of AI in UUVs will usher in a new era in manned/unmanned and 
optionally piloted submarines missions and uses for military, 
commercial and academic research. The ability to team with these 
systems with other manned platforms at sea as well as air and land 
assets are already accounted for in future integration architectures. 
As UUVs and all unmanned systems become trusted agents, their 
utility, as seen in Figure 6.7, is almost limitless; the issue will become 
one of laws, regulations, policies, and how different countries 
deploy such technology against each other. 
 
Figure 6.7: Teledyne Technologies portfolio of undersea 
products, capabilities, and systems 
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Source: (Teledyne, 2018) 
UUV missions are only beginning to be discovered, the advent 
of underwater tourism, commercial shipping, commercial 
transportation, and the academic support of UUVs all will keep pace 
if not rival the missions assigned to UUVs by the world’s militaries. 
Questions 
1. List four advantages and disadvantages of using an 
autonomous UUV and a manned submarine. 
2. What are some of the integration challenges facing UUVs as 
they integrate into the world’s military arena? 
3. For surveillance and reconnaissance, does the UUV size and 
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composition matter? Why or why not? 
4. How would you position multiple sensors to surveil a given 
area with a UUV? 
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7. Chapter 7 Principles of 
Naval Architecture Applied 
to UUVs [Jackson] 
Student Learning Objectives 
The student will understand the concepts of applying naval 
architectural principles to the design of unmanned underwater 
vehicles (UUVs). 
The student will be able to: 
• Gain an understanding of the design processes associated with 
UUVs and the role of the naval architect. 
• Be aware of the application of naval architectural principles to 
the dynamics and control of UUVs. 
• Examine the need for functional design tools to design UUVs. 
 
Introduction 
Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) are categorized as two 
types of drone (Button, 2009).  The first is the autonomous 
underwater vehicle (AUV) and the second is the remotely operated 
underwater vehicle (ROUV) (Department of the Navy, 2004). Both 
types serve different purposes but are designed using the same 
naval architectural principles (Pengelly, 1956).  Multiple navies are 
using these types of vehicles and include the United States of 
America (US), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
(UK), France, Russia, and China. Figure 7.1 shows a battlespace 
preparation autonomous underwater vehicle (BPAUV) used by the 
US Navy and manufactured by Bluefin Robotics Corporation. The 
propeller is protected by a nozzle casing and two appendages are 
seen in top of the craft, one being the bridge fin. 
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Figure 7. 1. Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Underwater 
Vehicle (BPAUV) in use during a US Navy exercise. 
Source: Courtesy of Bluefin Robotics Corporation (Copyright 




Military applications of UUVs include collecting information, 
timed strikes, oceanography, payload delivery, mine hunting, 
network navigation modes, surveillance, anti-submarine operations, 
reconnaissance, inspection, intelligence gathering, communications 
enhancement and identification of foreign objects (Department of 
Defense, 2011) (Department of Defense, 2012).  Figure 7.2 shows the 
Pluto Plus AUV used for mine identification and destruction by the 
Norwegian Navy. 
Chapter 7 Principles of Naval Architecture Applied to UUVs [Jackson]  |  169
Figure 7.2. Pluto Plus AUV for underwater mine identification and 
destruction used by the Norwegian mine hunter, KNM Hinnøy. CC 
BY-SA 3.0. 
Source: Created by KEN (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:MiniU.jpg) 
 
They are also used for civilian applications such as oil and gas 
exploration (mapping the sea floor), research vehicles to monitor 
movements of fish and inspect fauna such as reefs, drug trafficking, 
air crash investigations, oceanography and many more uses.  UUVs 
are equipped with sensors such as sonars, thermistors, conductivity 
probes and magnetometers. Biological sensors include chlorophyll 
sensors, turbidity sensors and sensors that measure acidity, PH, and 
the magnitude of dissolved oxygen. 
Typically, UUVs lose their GPS signal quickly due to the 
attenuation of radio waves in water, so they rely on dead reckoning 
to navigate in water. Acoustic underwater position systems are 
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based on long baseline navigation techniques that can be connected 
to GPS by allowing the UUV to surface in order to establish its 
position globally. Owing to the need for surfacing, UUVs are 
equipped with brush or brush-less motors connected to a gearbox 
that rotates a propeller that is protected by lip seals and a nozzle. 
Rechargeable batteries are used and are typically lithium-ion or 
lithium polymer. Larger UUVs are equipped with fuel cells, but the 
latest trend is to combine different types of electrical power sources 
to a supercapacitor. 
 
Role of the Naval Architect 
The role of the naval architect is complex and becoming quite 
broad due to the effects of extreme weather and the minimization of 
using the earth’s scarce resources (Rydill, 1994).  The naval architect 
will need to work more closely with natural scientists, such as 
marine biologists and environmentalists, in order to design vessels 
that work with nature to minimize the impact on the natural 
world (Comstock, 1967). The role will continue to work with 
engineers from other disciplines, project managers and business 
administrators and we may see the development of new academic 
programs that blend the principles of naval architecture with 
business studies that includes the commercial aspects of naval 
systems such as ‘naval systems architecture’ or ‘marine systems 
engineering’ (Lewis, 1988) (Taylor, 2006).  In addition to teaching 
naval architecture from a systems approach, the development of 
‘forensic naval architecture’ may provide the safety, reliability and 
regulatory aspects of naval architecture with the information 
needed to create naval architects whose design function is clearly 
guided by knowledge gained from failures using incident/accident 
reports of submarines that provide valuable data that are contained 
in codes and standards that allows the design of UUVs that are fit-
for-purpose. When designing UUVs, the naval architect must pay 
special attention to hull shape and to the dynamics of control and 
its effect on hull shape and associated dimensions. 
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Naval Architectural Design of UUVs 
The design of traditional underwater vehicles (submarines) are 
based on vessel requirements, weight estimates, initial size, weight 
and buoyancy balance, arrangements, longitudinal balance, vertical 
balance and stability, speed and power, propeller, propulsion 
coefficient, equilibrium polygon, and dynamic stability.  The design 
of UUVs are very sensitive to weight and buoyancy and the naval 
architect must balance the cumulative weights with buoyancy of the 
hull form. A standardized system is used to describe hull structure, 
propulsion system, electrical system, command and surveillance, 
auxiliaries, furnishings, armaments, margins and acquisition, and 
loads (Hughes, 2010). 
The use of software in the design of UUVs is prevalent especially 
when one considers the interdependency of the various aspects of 
design. Specialized modules of programs are designed to focus on 
the hull, resistances, loads, and control aspects of the UUV.  The 
major features of a UUV include the control surface, hull, battery 
pack, pressure vessel and stiffeners, the battery system, ballasting, 
controllers, and the payload. Current designs of UUVs have variable 
hull geometries based on torpedo shapes but some are rectangular 
shaped that can be hydrodynamically very challenging. 
The standard hull envelope for a UUV is axisymmetric having an 
ellipsoid fore-body, a parallel mid-body and an aft-body shaped like 
a parabola (Figure 7.3).  This is known at the Jackson hull-form and 
the diameter of the hull envelope (Eq. 7.1): 
                                                               D = L / (L/D)          (7.1) 
Where, D is the diameter of the hull envelope and L is the length 
of the hull.  The length of the fore-body, Lfwd, is a function of the 
forward hull section length factor, Cfwd, and the diameter of the hull 
(Eq. 7.2): 
                                                    Lfwd = D.Cfwd = Cfwd . (L/(L/D))     
 (7.2) 
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Figure 7.3. Jackson hull-form geometry. 
Source: [Adapted from Openclipart Vectors by Pixabay (Public 
Domain Image)] 
 
Also, the length of the aft-body, Laft, is a function of the hull-
section length factor, Caft, and hull diameter, D,    (Eq. 7.3): 
                                                                      Laft = D.Caft = Caft. (L/(L/
D))         (7.3) 
The parallel mid-body length, Lmid, (Eq.7.4) 
                           Lmid=L-(Lfwd Laft )=L-{(D.Cfwd ) (D.Caft 
)}=L[1-((Cfwd Caft ))/((L/D) )]       (7.4) 
The sum of the forward and aft length factors must be less than 
the length-to-diameter ratio. If it is equal, then the UUV will have no 
mid-section.  Ellipsoidal forward sections have a radial offset, yfwd, 
from the centerline of the full length of the UUV body at a local 
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distance, xfwd, measured from the aft component of the forward 
body and the forward hull section curvature factor, nfwd (Eq. 7.5) 
 yfwd=D/2 [1-(xfwd/Lfwd )^(nfwd ) ]^(1/nfwd )           (7.5) 
Paraboloid aft-sections have a radial offset, yaft, from the 
centerline of the full length of the UUV body at a local distance, 
yfwd, measured from the aft-component of the forward body and 
the forward hull section curvature factor, naft (Eq. 7.6) 
                                                          yaft = D/2 [1-(xaft/Laft )^(naft ) ] 
                   (7.6) 
The construction of tables of offsets allows one to calculate 
principal characteristics in accordance with naval architectural 
practices such as prismatic coefficient (Cprismatic), wetted surface 
area (S), sectional area, and area of the UUV envelope (Veffective). 
The resistance to motion is a function of the basic control surface 
and its propeller.  The calculated resistance allows the naval 
architect to select the appropriate battery power for the UUV, so it 
is important to calculate propulsion resistance. 
The total ship resistance, Rtotal, is composed of a number of 
collective resistances that are expressed as non-dimensioned 
coefficients. The total resistance coefficient, Ctotal, is a function of 
water density, ρ, the wetted surface area, S, and the velocity of the 
UUV, (Eq. 7.7) 
                                                       Ctotal = Rtotal/(1/2 ρSV^2 )          
 (7.7) 
When the UUV is operating near to the air-water surface, the 
resistance is dominated by wave-making resistance and viscous 
resistance of the fluid.  The wave-making resistance is a function of 
the Froude number (Fr) and viscous resistance is a function of the 
Reynolds’ number (Re).  Froude number is a function of velocity, V, 
gravitational acceleration, g, and length of the hull, L (Eq. 7.8) 
                                                                         Fr=V/√(g.L)                
 (7.8) 
Viscous resistance is given by Re which is a function of velocity, V, 
length of the hull, L, and the kinematic viscosity of water, υ, (Eq. 7.9) 
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                                                                             Re=(L.V)/υ                
(7.9) 
The total resistance coefficient, Ctotal, is a function of the Froude 
number and the Reynolds’ number and is approximated as the sum 
of the coefficients of wave-making and viscous resistances (Eq. 7.10) 
                                                          Ctotal ≈ C(wave.) Fr + Cviscous.Re   
     (7.10) 
It is noted that the wave-making resistance is work done by the 
hull on the surrounding fluid to generate waves.  However, there 
is no resistance of this kind when the UUV is submerged three 
diameters from the surface of the air-water boundary.  Therefore, 
at lower depths, resistance is purely viscous and is composed of 
frictional and residual resistances (Eq. 7.11) 
                                                   Ctotal = Cviscous =  Cfriction+Cresidual 
       (7.11) 
Frictional resistance in water is a function of Reynolds’ number 
(Eq. 7.12) 
                                                     Cfriction=0.075/(log10. (Re)-2)^2     
(7.12) 
Equation 7.12 is based on tank towing models and not full-scale 
models.  It is important to calculate empirical resistances that 
approximate to a value that is similar to actual conditions of 
submerged motions.  Therefore, the following models provide an 
estimation of total resistance of UUVs assuming that the hull form 
is deeply submerged. 
Bottaccini Model: 
         Ctotal=[(S.Cfriction)/(A.(L/D)^4 )].[(L/D)^4+1/2 (L/D)^3+6] 
  (7.13) 
The hull form is deeply submerged in a viscous fluid operating 
at small angles of motion. The maximum cross-sectional area, A, is 
function of hull diameter, D, such that (Eq. 7.14) 
                                                A = (πD^2)/4 = π/4 (L/{L/D} )^2        
   (7.14) 
The coefficient of total resistance is also considered to be a 
function of the coefficient of frictional resistance, the geometry 
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of the hull and the roughness of the surface of the UUV.  This is 
incorporated in the Gilmer and Johnson model (Eq. 7.15) 
Gilmer and Johnson Model: 
          Ctotal = Cviscous+Croughness = {Cfriction [1+D/2L+3(D/L)^3 
]}+Croughness      (7.15) 
The Jackson Curve-Fit Model is a model that is a function of the 
non-dimensional hull parameter, K (Eq. 7.16), which is based on the 
length, L, diameter, D, and wetted area, S, of the UUV 
                                                   K = (L/D)-(S/(πD^2 ))        (7.16) 
And the coefficient of residual resistance is (Eq. 7.17) 
Jackson Curve Fit Model: 
                                                          Cresidual=0.0008/((L/D)-K)        
  (7.17) 
Another model that accounts for the residual resistance is the 
Jackson-Hoerner model that is a function of frictional resistance, 
hull diameter and the length of the aft-body (Eq. 7.18) 
Jackson-Hoerner Model: 
                                   Cresidual=Cfwd {[1.5(D/Laft )^1.5 ]+[7(D/Laft 
)^3 ]}        (7.18) 
Eq. 7.18 is used when the aft end of the UUV has a significant wake, 
or a large effect on the form coefficient owing to the separation of 
flows.  The shape of the UUV in terms of its prismatic coefficient is 
described by the Jackson Parallel-Mid Body model (Eq. 7.19) 
Jackson Parallel Mid-Body Model: 
    Ctotal={Cfwd (1+[1.5(D/Laft )^1.5 ]+[7(D/Laft )^3 
]+[0.002(Cprismatic-0.6)])}+Caft    (7.19) 
And to include the effects of the forward and aft hull section 
curvature factor of the UUV, the Martz model is used to account for 
the effect of shape of the UUV (Eq. 7.20) 
Martz Model: 
          Ctotal={Cfwd (1+(1/2(L/D) )+[3(D/L)^((7-nfwd-(1/(2naft ))) ) 
])}+Caft     (7.20) 
Design algorithms incorporate the resistance models to predict 
the total bare hull resistance of the UUV (Eq.  7.21) 
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                                              R(hull total)=0.5ρSV^2 [0.2(Ctotal )]     
 (7.21) 
The appendages that are attached to the control surfaces produce 
their own contribution to flow resistance of UUVs. The equation 
accounts for hull geometry (length and diameter) and the wetted 
surface area, S, (Eq. 7.22) 
                                            Cappendages = (L.D)/(1000.Sappendages )     
  (7.22) 
The total appendage resistance is given by Equation 7.23 
                              Rappendages=0.5ρSappendages V^2 
Cappendages=(ρLDV^2)/2000      (7.23) 
For the total control of the UUV, the lateral surface area must be 
known (Equation 7.24) 
                         A(control surface) = 0.028.A(control surface hull) = 
8.A(control surface lateral area)     (7.24) 
The size of all control surfaces is important when specifying the 
amount of power needed to move the UUV through the fluid and the 
effective horsepower associated with the UUV is (Eq. 7.25) 
                                                             Peffective = V(Rhull-Rappendages 
)/550     (7.25) 
For the set operating velocity, the shaft horsepower is that used 
to provide the primary propulsion in the direction of travel, thus (Eq. 
7.26) 
                                                           Pshaft=Peffective/Cpropulsion         
 (7.26) 
Once the amount of power is known based on the resistances 
and the shape and size of the UUV, then an estimate of how many 
batteries and the type of batteries to be used in the UUV can be 
calculated. 
 
Control and Dynamics of UUVs in Water 
The shape of a UUV has significant effects on hydrodynamic 
signatures and places limitations on the control surfaces relative 
to the center of gravity.  The shape can be changed by adding 
appendages and the positioning of rudders and spaces for 
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hydroplanes, which usually affects the dynamics and control of such 
vehicles when submersed.  This also changes the amount of power 
required to provide thrust (MAN Energy Solutions, 2018). The 
motion in the six degrees-of-freedom is usually referred to as heave, 
yaw, sway, roll, surge, and pitch (Figure 7.4). 
 
EQUATIONS OF MOTION FOR UUVs 
The equations of motion describe the axes that are aligned to 
UUVs such as longitudinal, vertical, athwartships that allow the UUV 
to move in three dimensions in hydrospace, the center of which 
is set by the center of the geometric center of the UUV, or the 
center of gravity (Mollard, 2013). The following equations describe 
the equations of motion in accordance with the convention shown 
in Figure 7.4. 
Surge equation: 
                                                     mu ̇=XP+XU+XM+XA        (7.27) 
The surge equation describes the mass of the UUV multiplied 
by its acceleration being equal to the sum of its forces acting in 
the longitudinal direction, where XP is the propulsive thrust force, 
XU is the hydrodynamic resistance force, XM is the drag force due 
to lateral motion and XA is the hydrodynamic force due to lateral 
acceleration. 
Horizontal plane equations: 
                                                      m(v ̇+  rU)=YV+YV ̇ +YR+YControl 
      (7.28) 
And 
                                                        Izzr ̇=NV+NR+NR ̇ +NControl       
(7.29) 
Equation 7.28 represents the action of mass of the UUV and its 
sideways acceleration through the horizontal plane of motion and 
Equation 7.29 describes the product of rotating inertia about the 
vertical axis through the center of gravity and its angular 
acceleration in yaw to the sum of horizontal moments of 
hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull of the UUV. 
Vertical plane equations: 
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                                             m(w ̇+qU) = ZW+Z+Zθ+ZControl         
(7.30) 
And 
                                             Iyyq ̇=MW+MQ+Mθ ̇ +MControl         
 (7.31) 
Equation 7.30 represents the action of rigid mass of the UUV and 
its acceleration in the vertical plane of motion to the sum of the 
hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull and Equation 7.31 describes 
the product of rotating inertia about the horizontal axis through the 
center of gravity and its angular acceleration in pitch to the sum 
of vertical moments of hydrodynamic forces acting on the hull of 
the UUV, supplemented with a restoring moment due to movements 
away from the horizontal (Rydill, 1994). 
 
Figure 7.4. Freedom of motion for UUV. 
Source: [Adapted from Open Clip art Vectors by Pixabay (Public 
Domain Image)] 
Roll equation: 
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                                                                      IxxΦ =Kv+KR+KΦ         
(7.32) 
The roll equation (Eq. 7.32) describes the product of rotating 
inertia about the longitudinal axis and its angular acceleration in 
roll to the sum of athwartships moments acting on the hull due to 
hydrodynamic restoring moments owing to movements away from 
the vertical axis. Control forces are those that account for rigid 
body forces and those considered control forces owing to motions 
in vertical, horizontal, and longitudinal directions. Hydrodynamic 
forces should also be considered as they are considered to be 
directly proportional to small changes in velocity when UUVs depart 
from initial straight-line motions.  They are known as derivatives 
owing to those small changes from the straight-line path of 
motion (Lewis, 1988). 
 
HYDRODYNAMIC DERIVATIVE FORMS 
                                                             Y^’v= YV/(0.5ρUL^2 )       (7.33) 
The derivative form is dimensional and as an example, Equation 
7.33 is dimensionless owing to its constant characteristic of the 
UUV’s geometry. In its dimensioned form, hydrodynamic derivatives 
are dependent on the square of the velocity of the UUV. 
 
STABILITY AND CONTROL IN THE HORIZONTAL PLANE 
When the derivative approach is applied to the equations of 
motion and adapted to include control terms appropriate to the 
rudder’s deflection to the angle, δ, the linear equations is sway 
velocity, v, and yaw rate, r, are defined (Eq. 7.34 and 7.35). 
Equations in derivative form: 
                                                       m(v ̇+rU)=Yv v+Yv ̇ v ̇+Yrr+Yδ 
δ             (7.34) 
And 
                                                           Izzr ̇= Nvv+Nrr+Nr r ̇+Nδδ    
               (7.35) 
Equations 7.34 and 7.35 show two unknowns, v, and r (sway 
velocity and yaw rate), as a function of the control term, δ. For 
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dynamic stability, it is assumed that the UUV is moving in water on 
a straight path with no control input (δ=0). 
Dynamic stability: 
                                                           v ̇(m-Yv ̇ )=Yv v + r(Yr-mU)   
       (7.36) 
And 
                                                        r ̇(Izz-Nr ̇ ) = Nv v+Nr r            
       (7.37) 
The equations shown here can be solved using transformations 
into a single linear equation for either v and r. The general form 
of equations can be expressed in real or imaginary terms and tend 
to indicate whether the UUV is stable or unstable along its path of 
motion. The control effectiveness of the rudder can be understood 
by analyzing steering motions as function of rudder force (Lewis, 
1988). 
Steering motions: 
                                                       Yvv+(Yr-mU)r+Yδ δ=0              (7.38) 
And 
                                                           Nvv+Nr r+Nδ δ=0                    (7.39) 
And 
                                                r/δ = Yδ/((Yr-mU) ) (xv-xδ)/(xr-xv )     
   (7.40) 
Here, it is understood that all terms associated with derivatives 
are omitted and we are left with constant velocity terms.  Equations 
7.38 and 7.39 can be solved to give a steady state turn, r, as a function 
of rudder deflection, δ, (Equation 7.40).  The equation tells us that 
the rudder should be placed aft of the body as far as possible in 
order to gain the best control of the UUV due to the sway of the 
hydrodynamic forces on the hull (Comstock, 1967). 
 
STABILITY AND CONTROL IN THE VERTICAL PLANE 
For vertical control of the UUV at velocity, w, and pitch angle, θ, 
the rate of change of pitch angle is needed. It is also required to 
know two sets of control surfaces with two deflection angles of δf 
on the forward and aft hydroplanes (Eqs. 7.41 – 7.43). 
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Equations in derivative form: 
                                                     m(w ̇+rU) = Zw w+Zq q+Zδfδf+Zδa 
δa           (7.41) 
And 
                                               Izzq ̇=Mw w+Mqq+Mθ θ+Mδfδf+Mδa δa 
            (7.42) 
                                                             Mθ=W.(BG) ̅                              
              (7.43) 
The hydrostatic restoring moment in Equation 7.42 is associated 
with the pitch angle that indicates a preferential motion in the 
vertical plane. The UUV can be considered moving along a straight 
line with no input from the rudder (δf and δa = 0), which leads us to 
define dynamic stability. 
Dynamic stability: 
                                                                (w ̇-qU)=Zww+Zqq            
(7.44) 
And 
                                                              Iyyq ̇= Mww+ Mwq  +W.(BG.θ) 
̅          (7.45) 
Equations 7.44 and 7.45 are simplified forms of the equations of 
motion and have three roots that will be dependent on the speed of 
the UUV.  When the control surfaces are operating in response to 
rudder motions, Equations 7.46 – 7.50 apply.  The combined effects 
of control forces are shown in Equation 7.46. 
Motion control with surfaces operating: 
                                                           Zαα+Zδcδc=0                 (7.46) 
And 
                                                          Mαα+Mθθ+Mδcδc=0       (7.47) 
Equation 7.46 allows us to derive the vertical velocity as the 
function of control surface angles of deflection (Eq. 7.48). 
                                                         α = -(Zδcδc)/Zα                 (7.48) 
Here (Eq. 7.48), the vertical velocity is related to the control force 
and the hydrodynamic resistance of the UUV in vertical and 
horizontal directions.  Using the solution from Equation 7.46 to feed 
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into Equation 7.47, the pitch angle is a function of angles of 
deflection of the control surfaces (Equation 7.49): 
                                                        θ = (Zδc δc (xα-xc ))/Mθ              
(7.49) 
Where xc=(Mδc)/Zδc and xa=Mα/zα                                                 
 (7.50) 
Equations shown in 7.50 are the effective locations of control and 
heave forces, respectively.  The equations shown in this section are 
used to control pitch and plane setting in UUVs and are critical 
when coupled with the shape of the hull to reduce flow signatures. 
It is noted that hull form and shape and appendages are critical 
aspects of control dynamics, so much analysis is performed by the 
naval architect to perfect the design of UUVs prior to 
construction (American Bureau of Shipping, 2019). 
 
Structural Integrity 
Once the shape, form and control aspect of the UUV is accepted, 
the structural integrity of the UUV is calculated by understanding 
the structure of materials and how they can withstand hyperbaric 
pressures at known depths (American Bureau of Shipping, 2019). 
External hydrostatic pressures are calculated for each control 
surface and materials are selected by understanding the three 
primary failure modes (Lewis, 1988): 
• axisymmetric yielding of the shell between stiffening frames 
characterized by elastic-plastic collapse (concertina effect); 
• shell buckling between stiffening frames characterized by 
buckling forming inward and outward bulges of the shell; and 
• Instability that occurs between bulkheads and frames and 
results in elastic buckling of the frame-shell of the hull. 
Knowledge of materials are required to select the best material for 
the UUV shell. This means that design factors such as buckling 
pressure, yielding pressure at the frame, yielding pressure at mid-
bay, general instability, frame instability buckling pressure, frame 
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hoop stress and total frame hoop stress for the structure need to 
be calculated (Hughes, 2010). The current ABS Rules governing the 
design of UUVs considers the following structural design factors: 
• Stiffener strength; 
• Buckling strength; 
• Longitudinal frame strength; 
• Inner stiffener strength; 
• Local stiffener flange buckling strength; 
• Local stiffener web buckling strength; and 
• Combined stiffener and shell moment of inertia. 
Stiffener and web spacings are calculated to avoid the three modes 
of failure based on the strength properties of the material(s) 
selected for the UUV shell (American Bureau of Shipping, 2019). 
 
Discussion / Conclusions 
The detailed information generated by the naval architect to 
design the hull shell and its appendages according to its mission in 
the water is used to allow the architect calculate how much battery 
power is needed for the UUV (Rydill, 1994). The selection is based 
on the propulsive and static loads needed to move the UUV and its 
apparent and real volume.  Batteries need to be carried on board, so 
the size related to their energy density is critical.  Typically, lithium-
ion batteries are used because they have such a large energy density 
(~1300 HP.min/ft3), whereas lead-acid batteries are typically not 
used because of their low energy density (~160 HP.min/ft3).  It 
should be noted that current battery technology severely limits 
the naval architect who is responsible for the design of UUVs. 
Advances in the field of fuel cells and associated systems such as 
supercapacitors are long awaited. 
 
Questions 
1. What is a naval architect and how does it affect the design of 
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UUVs? 
2. Describe the shape of a UUV and how its shape can affect how 
it operates. 
3. Explain the differences in the flow resistance models and how 
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8. Chapter 8: Unmanned 
Logistics Operating Safely & 
Efficiently Across Multiple 
Domains [Lonstein] 
Student Learning Objectives: 
Increasingly exposed to the reality that automation, artificial 
intelligence, and unmanned technology, many of us become 
simultaneously captivated and concerned by the velocity of new 
products and technologies introduced daily. Students must prepare 
to function in a world of near-total connectivity. What happens 
on the ground and in water, above below, requires a homogenous 
technology ecosystem? The interaction of humans, machines, and 
the environment will be a critical concept for students to consider 
in a world where man, machine, and technology operate in concert 
safely and economically. That interaction will not only require 
interaction between humans and machines but will also require 
interaction between humanoids, humans, unmanned technology, 
and other intelligent technologies operating at different levels. 
Students will explore how subterranean automation will impact 
what may happen in space and at each level of our atmosphere. 
Once Completed Students Should: 
 
• Understand that automated technology needs to communicate 
effectively with its primary control systems and other 
technology, both manned and unmanned, within the same 
domain. 
 
Chapter 8: Unmanned Logistics
Operating Safely & Efficiently Across
• Include in their assessment or design of Unmanned Systems, 
both commercial and military, significant consideration of the 
interaction of Unmanned technology within a particular 
stratum of operation and other systems and humans operating 
at different levels of the physical world, be it underground, on 
surface waters, underwater, on land in air, space as well as 
virtual environments. 
 
• Appreciate that the global reach of automated technology will 
not only require local and national communication and 
interoperability; they must also function globally and in space 
where the environment will have a similar, simultaneous 
operation by manned and unmanned technology from other 
nations, commercial entities, non-state actors and individuals. 
 
• Plan for and address the inevitable conflict between civilian, 
commercial, military, or unknown or undetectable unmanned 
systems. 
 
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow 
This chapter is a product of the lessons learned from co-author 
Dr. Hans Mumm. In his writings, teachings, and lectures, Dr. Mumm 
stresses the importance of robust multi-directional command, 
communication, and control between manned and unmanned 
technology operating on land or under it, in the air, on water or 
under it as well as in space. He refers to the concept known by many 
as Connectivity and automation in transport (“CAT”). Safe Uniform 
Traffic Management (“UTM”) systems must allow for autonomous 
vehicles and other intelligent systems such as humanoids to 
communicate instantly and seamlessly. (European Commission, 
2017) As we continue to examine the past, current, and future of 
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unmanned logistics, it is essential to remember Dr. Mumm’s 
cautionary words. 
Commercial delivery by drone is now a reality in many parts of 
the world. Companies ranging from Fed Ex to United Parcel Service 
to Amazon and Walmart in the United States currently have or are 
planning to use autonomous logistics as an essential part of their 
operations. While in China, food and light package UAV delivery 
has been in use by companies including SF Express, JD.com, and 
Ele.me. Similar light package and food delivery by Drone services 
are underway or anticipated in over 26 different countries globally. 
Table 8.1 is a partial list of the ongoing and planned parcel and food 
delivery by drone globally, as compiled by. (Unmanned Aerospace, 
2019) 
Table  8.1 Partial list of the ongoing and planned parcel and food 
delivery by drone globally 
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Type of operation For more information 
Australia Project Wing 
October 2017, first trials of goods 
deliveries by drone to rural 
Australian customers. 








August 2018, Transport Canada 




China Ele.me May 2018, Ele.me starts food delivery by drone in Shanghai. https://www.unmannedairspac
China JD.com 2015 – Rural drone deliveries start. 
https://www.unmannedairspac
rakuten-and-jd-link-to-pro
China SF Express 
March 2018 – SF Express secured 
China’s first provisional drone 
operating license to begin 
deliveries of food within the 
country’s pilot zones approved 




Dubai Costa Coffee 
September 2017 – First trials of a 
coffee drone delivery system 
https://www.arabianbusiness.c
379426-costa-coffee-tests-dr
Estonia SESAR GOF program 
Parcels deliveries between 
Helsinki and Tallin planned as 




Finland SESAR GOF program 
Parcels deliveries between 
Helsinki and Tallin planned as 








March 2019 – K-Maret deliveries 




In January 2018 trials of drone 
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Germany Emqopter 
February 2019 – Trials began 
delivering pizza and industrial 







Iceland Aha and Flytrex 
Commercial drone delivery 
flights began in Reykjavik from 




Ireland A Post and Sky Tango 
In July 2018 – A Post starts trials 





Indonesia JD.Com Drone delivery trials began with JD.com. 
https://www.unmannedairspac
chinese-retailer-jd-com-star
Japan Rakuten January 2019 – Drone delivery packages in rural Japan. 
(https://www.unmannedairspac
rakuten-start-drone-package-deliv
Singapore Airbus Skyways 
February 2018 – Airbus Skyways 
Singapore parcel delivery drone 




Singapore Airbus and Wilhelmsen 
March 2019 – the two companies 





Korea Korea Post 









September 2018 –Mercedes 









March 2019 – BVLOS drone 
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USA Project Wing 
August 2018 – in Virginia, Project 
Wing starts BVLOS urban area 





October 2018 – drone deliveries 
to King’s Walk Golf Course in 









Herndon, VA – the program will 
facilitate package delivery in 









Loveland, OH – Workhorse 
Group Inc.’s Horsefly 
truck-launched Autonomous 
Drone Package Delivery System 
is now making package deliveries 









for Holly Springs, North Carolina 











Memphis-Shelby County Airport 
Authority, Memphis, TN: 
inspection of FedEx aircraft and 
package delivery. 
https://www.faa.gov/uas/pr
Source: (Unmanned Aerospace, 2019) 
 
While there are many reasons for optimism based upon 
unmanned logistics’ initial global adoption, as we can see in Table 
8.1, widespread implementation of autonomous technology in the 
supply and delivery chain remains in its infancy. Challenges such as 
payload capacity, environmental considerations, UTM, and overall 
CAT technology are a few of the challenges which must be met 
before widespread automated logistics operations can become a 
reality of our everyday lives. 
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Yesterday 
The noted Scientific Historian James Burke wrote in the 1978 book 
“Connections: Alternative History of Technology” that “When you 
read a book, you hold another’s mind in your hands.” “Why should 
we look to the past in order to prepare for the future? Because 
there is nowhere else to look.” (Burke, 1978) When introducing new 
technology to society, there is always a significant dose of wonder, 
futurism, and promise, which helps drive adoption. Once the 
theoretical starts its metamorphosis into reality, there will 
inevitably be challenges and consequences that were not envisioned 
but need resolution to achieve adoption at scale. 
In book one of this series, we examined the delicate balance 
between innovation and regulation, too much of one can negate the 
other’s value and vice versa. 
“Unlike the introduction of the railroads in in the 1800’s, 
automobiles presented a greater challenge. Trains and trolleys were 
limited to travelling on rails, which made the design of 
infrastructure and regulation of operation less challenging. By 1920 
it was clear that affordable automobiles were the conveyance of the 
future. People were migrating away from the mass transit staples 
of trains, busses and trolleys, and opting instead for personalized 
on-demand, motorized transportation.” (Nichols, Mumm, Lonstein, 
Ryan, & and Carter, 2018) 
When considering the widespread introduction of autonomous 
transportation, the challenge of maintaining order, safety, reliability, 
and efficiency become far more complex. While they were all 
incredibly disruptive and transformational technologies, the 
automobile, mechanically powered sea transport, submarine, 
subterranean, air and space travel were not simultaneously 
introduced into day-to-day life. When it comes to unmanned 
operation we are witnessing the near-simultaneous introduction of 
technology at every level of our environment and beyond. 
One If by Land or beneath it 
In his 2008 book Fighting Traffic, Peter D. Norton conducted an 
extensive analysis of the many considerations which contributed 
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to the development of rules and regulations for the operations of 
automobiles on streets previously used for pedestrians and animal-
drawn traffic. Almost immediately accidents and death soared 
largely due to the fact in the early 1900’s there were few or no laws 
for regulating motorized ground transport, many pedestrians were 
caught by surprise due to the noise, speed and a general public 
unfamiliarity with the automobile. Norton observed the tension 
caused by the introduction of this new technology. 
“Most historical studies in the social construction of technology 
examine distinct artifacts that can be produced in quantity and that 
need not be shared. Streets are different. A mother cannot conceive 
of a street as a playground for her children while a motorist thinks 
of it as a path for driving at speed—at least not for long. The 
incompatibility of different constructions of a shared technology 
raises the stakes for relevant social groups. In a shared system, 
when a new construction becomes dominant, one group cannot 
easily secede from the prevailing denomination into a dissenter 
group where the minority construction is preserved.”  (Norton, 
2008) 
Over the last 125 years, the automobile has gone from something 
that was primarily for the elite to a ubiquitous technology that most 
adults in developed nations can either own or access regularly. It 
has become a staple of modern life. When Henry Ford introduced 
mass assembly lines in the early 1900s, automobiles became more 
affordable, and so the number of vehicles operating on roadways 
grew exponentially. With increased volume came more significant 
interaction between vehicles, pedestrians, animals, and the 
environment. 
With more frequent operation came more interaction, more 
mishaps, accidents, and sadly deaths. In the 1950s and ’60s, it 
became apparent something had to change if “a car in every garage” 
was to become the American dream instead of a nightmare. 
1963 and 1964 represented a tipping point of traffic management 
and automobile safety in the United States. In just one-year 
automobile, fatalities rose and astronomical ten percent to 47,700 
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deaths. In response, the Highway Safety Act of 1966 was passed 
by Congress. Significant safety enhancement followed as Figure 8.1 
depicts, between 1966 and 2013 the fatality rate per 100 million 
miles went from over 5 to just over 1 in 2013. (Federal Highway 
Administration, 2017) 
Figure 8.1 Vehicle Fatality Rate per 100 Million miles Travelled 
Source:(Federal Highway Administration, 2017) 
 
The success achieved in terms of vehicle safety is impossible to tie 
to any particular strategy, practice, or regulatory scheme. Instead, 
it is a multidisciplinary approach that allowed a vast reduction in 
automobile-related fatalities. The Four E’s of Engineering, 
Education, Enforcement, and Emergency response is primarily 
credited with the overall success and are essential components 
of Uniform Traffic Management. (Federal Highway Administration, 
2017) 
Land-based autonomous transportation is limited to automobiles, 
busses, and trucks; many new technologies continue to develop, 
revolutionizing land-based locomotion. Currently, in China, an 
Autonomous Rail Transit (ART) system began operations in 2018. 
According to reports, the ART system operates on long-lasting, 
quick charging batteries and can travel up to 25 miles at up to 
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43 mph. The ART system can charge at stations along the route 
or the end of the line in approximately 10 minutes. It also runs 
on rubber wheels and virtual pathways using sensors so that no 
fixed rails or tracks are needed, and flexibility of routing can be 
dynamic. ART’s are seemingly the “next big thing” in metropolitan 
transportation. (Railway-News, 2019) 
Autonomous rail systems are not merely limited to inner-city 
commuter transportation. 
Figure 8.2 Rio Tinto – Hitachi Autonomous Freight Train 
Source:(Hitachi Corporation, 2020) 
 
The first large-scale autonomous freight rail system commenced 
operation in the Pilbara region of Western Australia. The Rio Tinto 
Railway System, in collaboration with Hitachi Corporation, 
developed what they call the Auto-Haul™ System. According to 
its Case Study, Hitachi & Rio Tinto claim “more than 7.5 million 
train kilometers operated fully autonomously – without the need for 
an onboard driver – all while increasing safety outcomes.” (Hitachi 
Corporation, 2020) 
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Recently a new reality has begun to evolve where an autonomous 
technology operates below the earth’s surface. Earlier in 2020, the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency organized and 
conducted the Subterranean Challenge Urban Circuit (SubT). 
According to DARPA: 
“The SubT Challenge Systems and Virtual competitions aim to 
create community of multidisciplinary teams from wide-ranging 
fields to foster breakthrough technologies in autonomy, perception, 
networking, and mobility for underground environments. The 
Tunnel Circuit took place in August 2019. The Cave Circuit is 
planned for August 2020, and the Final Event incorporating all three 
underground environments is targeted for August 2021.” (Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2020) 
Figure 8.3 Prototype DARPA SubT 
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Source: (Carnegie Mellon University, 2019 ) 
 
Another autonomous technology is operating in the subterranean 
space in the mining and tunnel construction industries. One recent 
example can is in Mali, Africa. According to AZO Mining, the Syama 
Mine has engaged in a three-year partnership with Sandvik to 
provide: 
Syama with its full suite of proven autonomous equipment and 
digital solutions, some of which include their full fleet of Sandvik 
TH663i trucks, DL421 autonomous drills, and fully autonomous 
loaders. Syama will also utilize Sandvik’s OptiMine®3D Mine 
Visualizer, which will provide Resolute Mining workers with a real-
time three-dimensional (3D) model of the entire mining 
environment that can be accessed from remote locations. One of 
the key advantages associated with the visualization system is that 
users can effectively analyze and immediately respond to events 
occurring in the mining environment. The system also allows users 
to efficiently plan future mining activities and operations, 
investigate problematic areas of the mine and track the 
development of the mine over time.” (Cuffari, 2019) 
 
Maritime traffic management has also seen a historical arc where 
a once non-existent and mostly an ad hoc reaction to disasters 
cost thousands of lives. History is replete with maritime disasters, 
like the Fleet of Kubla Khan, The Spanish Armada of the 1500s and 
the R.M.S. Titanic in 1912, related to the sea and environmental 
conditions or the inability of the crews to navigate, or ships to 
withstand the conditions. (Marine Insight, 2019)  Others, such as the 
S.S. Andrea Doria, M.S. Stockholm, and the SS Admiral Nakhimov, 
sank due to collisions with another surface vessel. Finally, the 
Submarines USS Gatto and the U.S.S.R. K-19 collided approximately 
200 feet below the surface. Both survived but were severely 
damaged. (Mizokami, 2017) 
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Figure 8.4 R.M.S. Titanic Sinking 2012 
Source: (National Geographic) 
 
Most of us are familiar with the R.M.S. Titanic’s ill-fated maiden 
voyage in April of 1912, where over 1500 passengers and crew died 
in icy waters of the North Atlantic. While the reality is awful, 
Hollywood has, over the years, both romanticized and dramatized 
the events on that fateful night. Why did the new ship need to set 
a speed record? Why had none of the greatest maritime engineers 
in the world discovered the fatal design flaw of having watertight 
compartments in its hull, which could be sealed off in case of 
damage to the hull and thereby making the vessel theoretically 
“unsinkable.” Sadly, in reality, a design flaw did not account for 
the fact that seawater after a hull breach could flow over the 
compartments, into the next thereby making the ship extremely 
vulnerable to sink in the event of a collision. (Bassett, 1998) 
The disaster left the world in shock and immediately calls for 
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investigation and regulation grew. As a result, the International 
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”) became law. SOLAS 
is currently under the aegis of the International Maritime 
Organization who has modified the Convention numerous times 
in the century following the sinking to the Titanic. (International 
Maritime Organization, 2020) 
Numerous other maritime disasters have occurred over the years, 
many of which involved collisions between vessels or environmental 
obstacles such as icebergs, pack ice, the seafloor, and reefs. As the 
seas grew crowded, vessels became larger, faster, and ports, canals, 
and navigational straights became congested, the risk of disaster 
grew. To that end, Robert Frump, author of “until the Sea Shall 
Set Them Free,” and Pulitzer Prize nominee, said, “Changes occur 
only when there is a meaningful disaster.” “I think that most people 
will tell you that changes in marine safety are almost exclusively 
disaster-driven,” agrees Dr. Josh Smith, a professor at Kings Point 
and interim director of the American Merchant Marine Museum.” 
(Keefe, 2014) 
Figure 8.5 Panama Canal Backup 
Source: (Today Panama, 2015) 
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Like the automobile, regulation of nascent technology can be a 
painfully slow process, not only in terms of time but also in the 
cost of human lives and the environment. History of regulation 
shows that with time, technology, and safety improvements, and to 
that end, common-sense regulation is the best way to protect the 
public, crews, and the environment while allowing for technology to 
advance. Students should note that the history of maritime safety 
and traffic management closely parallels that of the automobile. 
Both technologies vastly improved with the advent of mechanical 
propulsion and the advances made during the early to mid-1900s. 
While subterranean automation is just becoming a reality, 
Unmanned Underwater Vehicles have a long history of functioning 
beneath the waves. In 1957 the Applied Physics Lab of the University 
of Washington developed the Special Purpose Underwater Research 
Vehicle (SPURV). The SPURV was controlled remotely by acoustic 
communication. (Gafurov, 2015) 
  
Three if by Air or in Space 
            A few short years ago, this section would be limited to air 
traffic. It is now clear that autonomous technology is and will have 
an increasing role within and beyond Earth’s atmospheric airspace. 
In Chapter 2 of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber 
Domain, I wrote extensively about the history of the regulation 
of new technologies such as automobiles and aircraft. (Nichols, 
Mumm, Lonstein, Ryan, & and Carter, 2018) While autonomous 
vehicles continue to rapidly improve and evolve, so too does traffic. 
What was once considered acceptable UTM in controlled and 
unregulated airspace has now become less efficacious given the 
increasing proliferation of UAS in global airspace. 
While autonomous vehicles continue to improve and evolve 
rapidly, so too does traffic. What was once acceptable UTM in 
controlled and unregulated airspace has become less efficacious 
given the increasing proliferation of UAS in global airspace. 
As a case in point, the issue’s complexity has become and why 
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regulation alone will not ensure that safety or reliability comes from 
personal experience. On June 29th, 2019, as a passenger on United 
Airlines Flight 1849 from Newark, New Jersey, to Atlanta, Georgia. 
Shortly after takeoff and well below 10,000 feet in altitude I noticed 
an odd and irregular series of maneuvers far different than those 
many travelers are familiar with as noise avoidance maneuvers and 
operation at major metropolitan airports. (Port Authority of New 
York & New Jersey, 2020) 
 
It was a sunny summer day with mostly clear skies and a bit of 
the haze associated with metropolitan airspace. Since the airspace 
is complex and crowded with three of the busiest airports in the 
nation nearby, I like to film takeoff and landing since one never 
knows what you will see. Towards the east,  I saw a small Drone in 
between my flight and the aircraft depicted 
further to the east, just at the time, the odd maneuver occurred. 
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Figure 8.6 Photograph of departure from Newark Airport June 29, 
2019 
Source: (Lonstein, Takeoff Photo Newark to Atlanta June 29, 2019, 
2019) 
 
 I recounted the event in a Forbes.com article entitled “Are Drone-
Aircraft Collisions a Real Threat to Airline Passengers and Crews?” 
in August of 2019. (Lonstein, Are Drone-Aircraft Collisions A Real 
Threat To Airline Passengers and Crews?, 2019) 
Merely suggesting the risk of small, unregulated UAVs operating 
in skies where other commercial traffic also operates is a recipe 
for collision did not sit well with the “hobbyist,” or consumer drone 
manufacturers. The article’s central premise was to point out that 
even if there are laws and regulations in place to deal with traffic 
management of unmanned aerial vehicles, it does not necessarily 
equate that operators will obey the laws much less be aware of 
them. This more significant challenge today is that the barriers to 
individual ownership, such as price, availability, and difficulty of 
operation, served as a natural limitation no longer exist. 
Figure 8.7 Major League Drone Delay 
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Source: (Fox Sports, 2020) 
 
The trend of smaller and smaller UAS also presents a more 
significant regulatory issue. On August 4, 2020, a Major League 
Baseball game between the Minnesota Twins and the Pittsburgh 
Pirates was delayed due to a drone’s appearance over the stadium. 
It is the first known baseball “drone delay.” (Fox Sports, 2020) 
While controlled airspace and large public venues are a daunting 
challenge, unmanned aerial traffic management is not strictly 
limited to the earth’s atmosphere. According to a 2019 report from 
the United States Defense Intelligence Agency entitled Challenges 
to Security in Space, many instances are cited where near-collisions 
and actual collisions between manned and unmanned space vehicle 
and debris. According to Appendix “A” of the report: 
“Between 1998 and 2017, the International Space Station, which is 
in LEO, has maneuvered at least 25 times to avoid potential orbital 
collisions. With an expected increase in large constellations of 
satellites and space debris, there is higher potential for satellite 
collisions, particularly in LEO.” (United States Defense Intelligence 
Agency, 2019) 
                       
Are we prepared for Autonomous Logistics? 
            The answer lies with all of us. Many of today’s students 
will find themselves confronted with the challenge, which has 
confounded many technologists over the past few centuries. What 
is sufficient to handle today’s technological requirements may be 
outdated tomorrow, and by “tomorrow,” that means the next date 
on the calendar. The speed with which autonomous technology 
develops seemingly leads to new products and discoveries each 
day. What was an acceptable form of military defense on August 5, 
1945, was obsolete the next day? What changed? That was the day 
that the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan. (British 
Broadcasting Company, 2020) 
What should be done? 
Following the suggestions of Dr. Mumm to ensure an 
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interconnected Multi-Domain across autonomous technology 
platforms makes much sense. A World that relies upon Multi-
Domain Autonomous systems is currently evolving. When 
considering how best to manage such complex systems, the key 
to understanding how best to maximize safety and efficacy is 
communication. 
As with much autonomous technology, the military is often a 
driver of innovation in no small part based upon its need to function 
on short notice anywhere in the world. In a recent White Paper by 
Martin Kahn and Sean Thatcher on behalf of Lockheed Martin, the 
authors summarized the design as follows: 
Figure 8.8 Lockheed Martin JADO 
Source: Collaboration Strategy (Kahn, 2020) 
 
“Lockheed Martin’s Integrated JADO Collaboration Strategy 
provides a JADO architectural framework for future combat 
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operations in a joint and coalition environment. Our approach is 
an open architecture solution designed to incorporate existing 
systems and new technologies. Spectrum dominance capabilities 
provide undetectable communications in the HCE as well as a fused 
common operating picture.” (Kahn, 2020) 
Figure 8.9 Multi-Domain Traffic Management 
Source: (Canstock Photo, Inc., 2020) 
 
Transitioning from the battlefield to static civilian environments 
provides an opportunity to create Multi-Domain Autonomous 
Logistical systems, which will allow for commerce to benefit safely 
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and effectively from automation. In recent years, the debate on 
how best to accommodate autonomous vehicles on highways has 
narrowed, at least for the time between two models. The first, 
known as Self Reliant Vehicles (SRV), uses sensors to create 
awareness of its operating environment. The sensors include 
technologies such as “Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) and 
Radio Detection and Ranging (RaDAR) sensors that provide visual 
and locational data to the car, and possibly to other similarly 
equipped cars.” Recently, the focus has shifted to technology that 
does not solely rely upon in-vehicle sensors alone; rather, it relies 
upon the Vehicle to Infrastructure regime or (V2I). (Ray, 2019) 
While some might think it makes sense to build a communication 
and traffic management system for all forms of autonomous 
transport, very little Multi-Domain technology exists.  A significant 
amount of study needs to occur with adequate foresight into how all 
autonomous systems can communicate. 
That means new roadways, airports, seaports, and other 
infrastructure must be capable of supporting the autonomous 
operation; they must also be pre-fitted with the necessary 
technology to allow data and communication flow on, above and 
below simultaneously. 
Only having traffic management for UAV’s will quickly prove to be 
inadequate and dangerous as soon as multi-domain vehicles enter 
service.  UAV’s which are capable of operating on land and in the 
sky is already a reality. If there is no way to communicate, navigate, 
and safely operate on land, sky, and water in a safe, efficient, and 
commercially viable manner. The promise of autonomous 
technology may never be a reality. As this chapter is written, 
SpaceX, NASA, and similar technology are repeatedly proving the 
efficacy of unmanned vehicles operating in multiple domains. 
Traveling from land to Low Earth Orbit transitioning back into the 
earth’s atmosphere and landing on the sea or land is now a reality. 
With the success of SpaceX and others, the seas, skies, and space 
may quickly become much more crowded and require traffic 
management in order to achieve commercial viability. On August 7, 
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2020, a Falcon-9 Unmanned Rocket took off from Cape Canaveral, 
Florida, and successfully deployed 57 Starlink™ internet-beaming 
satellites. After delivering its payload, the rocket successfully landed 
in the sea.  One mission, five domains, Land, Air, Space, then back to 
Air, finally landing at sea. 
Figure 8.10 SpaceX Falcon 9 Takeoff August 7, 2020 
Source: (space.com, 2020) 
 
Conclusions   
 
While the SpaceX mission enjoyed the luxury of governmental 
authorities maintaining adequate traffic control, when thousands 
of unmanned logistical activities are co-occurring, the challenge 
becomes exponentially more challenging. Multiple domains, 
multiple nations, and multiple autonomous vehicles must function 
in harmony with each other, manned and human traffic in each 
domain, not to mention the weather and environmental interaction. 
With subterranean and underwater automation, the challenge 
seems daunting. Uniform traffic management systems for effective 
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logistics must work across the globe in multiple languages and with 
security. Any network is vulnerable to attack. Network design is far 
too broad and complex to examine in this chapter; however, it is a 
subject that must be in the front of all of our minds if the promise of 
autonomous logistics is to come to fruition. 
 
Questions for students to consider 
1. In the event of war, terror attack, dispute, embargo or other 
what is your vision to best mitigate the risk of calamity should 
the global UTM system lose functionality? 
 
2. What type of UTM network would you design in order to 
minimize to the greatest extent possible security flaws and 
inevitable DDOS and other attacks? Assuming the success of 
such attacks how would you harden the system and provide for 
multiple redundant capabilities not dependent on each other 
to function? 
 
3. Should the global UTM system be operated by nations 
individually under agreed upon rules, or operate under a 
multinational body such as the United Nations or a similar 
organization? 
 
4. Who will pay for this massive infrastructure investment? If 
paid for solely by governments and private companies using 
the technology are profiting from it, how would you recoup the 
investment? 
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5. If, after much study, planning and debate individual nations 
decide to establish their own independent UTM systems, will it 
be possible to reliably and safely operate autonomous logistics 
between nations? If so, how would the system operate 
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9. Chapter 9: Chinese 
Advances in Stealth UAV 




The task of planning a flyable, safe, paths for stealth UAVs to 
penetrate the US or allied forces Air Defense Systems (ADS) is 
considered.  Students will gain a fundamental knowledge of path 
planning in terms of computer modelling of the path objective 
functions and cost of paths from node to node in a network. 
Constraints of collision avoidance, maneuverability, control, torsion, 
2D /3D, communications,  kinematics, SCADA are interwoven in 
the coverage of modeling goals. Special emphasis will be on the 
advances reported by Chinese researchers in improving the 
standard path planning models by including model-based predictive 
control and multi-step search methodology to increase the threat 
effectiveness for penetrating an ADS using stealth UAVs. 
 
Introduction 
In our previous books on UAS and CUAS, the authors covered 
a huge range of topics: UAVS, threats, vulnerabilities, 
countermeasures, radar, IFF, DEW, AI, autonomy, advanced systems 
technology, stealth design, safe flight activity in the NAS, legal and 
regulatory considerations, cyber taxonomies, INFOSEC, INFOWAR, 
SCADA, SWARMS, acoustical defenses, US ADS, ADS-B, GPS 
spoofing, Chinese New Silk Road Land and Sea Strategic advances, 
and more. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019)(Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) 
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The authors were concerned with the Counter- UAS Problem (see 
below). (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) Essentially, the authors were 
reactive in dealing with hostile UAS penetration of US ADS 
networks. What the authors did not cover was the path planning for 
a stealth UAV in static or dynamic civilian or combat environment. 
This chapter explores some of computer models and methodology 
to plan strategic UAV penetrations into a host civilian or combat 
complex environment. 
 
The treatment is cursory as our students do not need to be 
aviation engineers or Red / Blue team members. They do need to 
be familiar with the behind the scenes technology. This chapter 
starts off with the C-UAS problem and attack on the Abqaiq Oil 
Facilities by Houthi terrorists. It then morphs into questions of how 
the Houthis ’succeeded where they had failed in the past; what the 
Chinese technology addition did for them; how this attack could be 
modelled / enacted with advanced UAV path planning techniques; 
and what elements are common to the modelling of such dynamic 
environment for UAS / UAV penetration. 
 
What Is the Counter -UAS Problem? 
                                                                                       
The risk of successful terrorist attacks on USA Air Defense 
Systems (ADS) via sUAS/UASs is greater because of improving 
commercial capabilities and accessibility. Advanced small drones, 
capable of carrying sophisticated imaging equipment and 
significant payloads, are readily available to the public.  A range of 
terrorist, insurgent, criminal, corporate, and activist threat groups 
have demonstrated their ability to use civilian drones and gather 
intelligence. How does the (or any)  country defend against a 
growing UAS threat? This is also known as the counter – UAS 
Problem. General James D Mattis, SECDEF summed up the Problem 
succinctly: (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) 
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“Unmanned Aircraft are being developed with more 
technologically systems and capabilities. They can duplicate some 
of the capabilities of manned aircraft for both surveillance/ 
reconnaissance and attack missions. They can be small enough and 
/ or slow enough to elude detection by standard early warning 
sensor systems and could pose a formidable threat to friendly 
forces.” (Chairman, 2012) The Saudi Arabian government has 
incorporated / purchased many of the US and Israeli ADS 
technologies into its own ADS. 
 
Implications from Attack by Iran on Saudi Arabian Oil Fields 
 
On 14 September 2019, Houthi rebels in Yemen claimed their 
attack on the Abqaiq and Khurais oilfields in Saudi 
Arabia. (Gallagher, 2019) The effect was to temporarily take out 5% 
of the global oil production capacity. (Gallagher, 2019) Houthi rebels 
claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that 10 drones (mixed 
origins) and 17 missiles were deployed. (Lister, 2019)  Ballistic missile 
attacks by the Houthis have been previously deployed using old 
Soviet and Iranian “Scud” SRBMs. No prior attack, since the Yemen 
conflict began four years ago, has interrupted oil supplies. 
 
The Houthis have sent dozens of drones and short-range ballistic 
missiles against Saudi Arabia in the past two years. Many have been 
intercepted by Saudi Air Defenses; others have fallen harmlessly. 
Very few have caused limited damage and casualties. (Lister, 2019) 
The Abqaiq oilfield is 800 miles from Houthi-held parts of Yemen. 
The drones used were from North Korean  Iranian and Chinese 
technology origins. (Lister, 2019) The Iranian drones were dubbed 
the UAV-X and have a range of 740 – 930 miles. This is a step up 
from the SRBMs that were based on North Korean technology with 
a maximum range of  186 miles. (Lister, 2019) The Chinese drones 
have several names: “Qaseth-1” (“Striker-1”), a rebrand of the Iranian 
Ababil-2 UAV and the “Mirsad-1” used by Hezbollah until 
2018. (Gallagher, 2019) The step-up in the conflict game is the Iranian 
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clone, KH-55 with a range of 1,550 miles. These were reportedly used 
in the Saudi Arabian oil field attacks. (Gallagher, 2019) The Iranian 
clone uses Chinese path planning stealth penetration technologies.[1] 
 
The take-away from this attack is not just the loss of global oil 
processing capacity and H2S stabilization processing facilities[2] 
but the vulnerability and exposure of the Saudi Arabian Advanced 
Air defenses. Most of the Saudi Arabian ADS are designed to defend 
against traditional threats and are ill-equipped to tackle the 
asymmetrical aerial threats such as drones.  The vulnerability is 
enhanced when so many essential oil-related infrastructure parts 
are concentrated in a small area: storage, processing, compressor 
trains and distribution. (Lister, 2019) Threats and vulnerabilities of 
US ADS were covered in (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) and apply to the 
ADS used by Saudi Arabia (SA) Over the last two decades, SA has 
purchased many of their ADS from both US and Israel. 
 
Think of this problem more globally. China, North Korea, and 
Iran [referred to as CNKI technology cooperation] are aggressively 
cooperating on drone technologies for use by terrorists against a 
major oil production region. The technology is cost-effective as well 
as human capital efficient. Drones substituting for manned aircraft. 
Drones penetrating the SA ADS. 
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Figure 9-1 Shows A haze of smoke is seen from the attacked oil 
plant in Saudi Arabia 




Let us expand the threat. Refer to Figure 9-2. Note that the Strait 
of Hormuz lies between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with Bahrain, Qatar, 
UAE, and Oman in the sandwich. Between the Gulf of Oran and 
the Persian Gulf, about 20% of the global oil movement / supply 
travels through the Strait of Hormuz. (EIA, 2019) The US 5th Fleet 
currently protects this oil flow. There have been several clashes 
between Iranian vessels and US Vessels. Drones cross over the US 
Fleet every day and test its patience. 
Remember, payloads can be anything: CBRN deployment devices, 
drugs, surveillance packages, shaped charges, lasers, super 
resolution cameras, weather instruments, GPS/GNSS cyber 
weapons, missiles, etc. 
The problem is twofold: what is the risk assessment for CNKI 
drone technologies cooperation acted on either target (US 5th Fleet 
or Saudi Oilfields -both in range of  KH-55’s) and what 
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countermeasure technologies are available to counter the threats 
presented and to mitigate those risks and system vulnerabilities? 
Previous works have covered the topics of conventional 
countermeasures against SUAS / UAS and  aggressor counter-
countermeasures specific to UAS deployment – SWARMS. (Nichols 
R. K., et al., 2020) 
Figure 9-2 Strait of Hormuz 
 
Source: (Stratfor, 2019) 
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What else did the Chinese give the Terrorists besides the 
advanced KH-55 Missiles and Drones? 
The answer is they taught the terrorists how to use the drones 
more effectively by showing them how to computer model and 
plan the penetration paths for their stealth UAVs in a combat 
environment. 
 
Chinese Advances in Rapid Path Planning for Stealth UAV in 
Complex Environment with Bandit Threats 
In a recent paper slated for publication in the International 
Journal of Aerospace Engineering, Drs Zhang, Wu, Dai, and He, 
presented computer modeling results from their research into the 
subject of low altitude combat. Their paper addresses “a novel 
algorithm for stealth UAV to realize the rapid penetration path 
planning, which aims to devise a penetration strategy based on the 
improved A-Star algorithm to address problems of path planning 
and planning (sic) for stealth UAV in the complex dynamic 
environment. The proposed method introduces the kinematic 
model of stealth UAV and detection performance of netted radar 
in the process of low altitude penetration. Combined with the 
prediction technique and path planning algorithm, the multi-step 
search strategy is developed for stealth UAV to deal with POP-UP 
[3]threats and complete the planning  (sic)of the path in different 
scenarios. Furthermore, the attitude angle information is integrated 
into the improved A-Star algorithm, which reflects the 
characteristics of the dynamic radar cross-section(RCS) and 
conforms to the actual flight requirements for the stealth UAV. 
Finally, the improved A-Star algorithm, learning real-time A-Star 
algorithm(LRTA-Star), and dynamic A-Star algorithm(D-Star) are 
respectively adopted to settle the problem of penetration path 
planning for stealth UAV in three different threat scenarios. 
Numerical simulations are performed to illustrate that the proposed 
approach can achieve rapid penetration path planning for stealth 
UAV indifferent dynamic threat scenarios and verify the validity of 
the improved A-Star algorithm.”  (Zhang, 2020) 
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Novelty 
The Zhang paper presents a novel addition to the A-Star 
algorithm for path planning in a dynamic combat environment with 
“POP-UP” / Bandit threats. The novelty is an upgrade from the 
standard EW training on radar systems and Air Defense Systems 
(ADS). (Adamy D. -0., 2015) (Skolnik, 2008) The optimization 
techniques and computer algorithms (in present day computer 
programming languages) have been well researched and are not 
novel. (Reklaitis G. R., 1983) (Horowitz, 1978) 
What is novel about the authors’ paper is the real time dynamics 
and predictive control applied to stealth UAV path planning via 
computer modelling. It results in a computationally multi-step 
search pattern. The non-exclusive but mathematically necessary 
goals of flyable paths, collision avoidance, computational efficiency 
and reduced RCS are ably met with the authors’ improved A Star 
algorithm. This gives us an insight into how far ahead the Chinese 
may be in the field. 
 
Keep in mind that UAVs at low altitude rarely have IFF capability 
due to SCADA constraints and that Counter UAS (CUAS) 
technologies can bypass stealth features in combat and civilian 
UAVs. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2020) (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) The 
validity of the algorithm is demonstrated in known mathematical 
bounded datasets with cases for  single, dual, and networked radar 
surveillance systems. No real flight data is used. To many students 
in UAS, the above material is like jumping out of plane without a 
parachute. 
 
UAV Path Planning 
Time to take a stroll down cooperative path planning for UAVs 
in various environments. Then maybe we can recycle back to the 
Zhang paper with just enough knowledge to get a sense of the 
novelty of the technology about to be published by the Chinese 
researchers. The clearest reference on the subject of Path Planning 
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of UAVs is by Tsourdos, White and Shanmugavel. (Tsourdos, 2011) 
We will draw heavily from this fundamental textbook. [4] There 
are other fine textbooks on this subject to enhance the student 




Path planning is a complex problem, which involves meeting the 
physical constraints of UAVs, constraints from the operating 
environment and operational requirements. Paths must be flyable. 
Flyable paths meet kinematic constraints of the UAV. Satisfaction 
of this constraint means that the motion of the UAV stays within 
bounds on maneuver curvature. Paths must exhibit CA for threats, 
obstacles, and other UAVs. Minimum fuel, energy conservation, 
and shortest distance come into play for an efficient and better 
performance path. (Tsourdos, 2011) Path planning algorithms 
produce one or more safe flyable paths for the UAVs. Path length, 
limited range, survey area, and flying direction all make a difference. 
The UAV trajectory must comply with speed and maneuver 
constraints; deployment of several UAVs in a coordinated manner 
which involve CA and simultaneous arrival at one or more locations. 
Lastly the algorithm that optimizes all these conditions must be 
computationally efficient, work in real-time, re-plan its trajectory if 
needed and with no significant delay. (Tsourdos, 2011)[5] 
 
Path Planning Formulation 
The primary aim of path planning is to provide structured 
mobility and to facilitate moving or flying multiple UAVs from one 
location to another. Several locations may mean several paths 
before reaching the final destination. On any known or partially 
known map /area there may be several points of interest (POIs).[6] 
The UAV has a specific attitude, which combined with its location 
to give the UAV pose[7] P(x, y, z, θ, Ψ), where x, y, z, is the UAV 
location or waypoint and (θ, Ψ) are the horizontal and vertical 
angles , respectively. (Tsourdos, 2011) 
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Consider a UAV moving from one starting pose, Ps to another, 
finish Pf . Path planning involves producing one or more flight paths 
r(q) connecting Ps and Pf  represented as 
                                                    r(q) 
Ps ————>Pf                                                           (9.1) 
 
Where r(q) is the resulting path, and q is defined as a path 
parameter. This parameter can be a lengths variable (0 < q < s) for a 
straight-line path or an angle variable (0 < q > θ). The choice of the 
path variable depends on the path formulation. 
Equation (9.1) is re-written  for a single UAV as: 
 
                                                          r(q) 
 Ps (xs, ys, zs, θs, Ψs) ————>Pf (xf, yf, zf, θf, Ψf)                     (9.2) 
 
Extending for N UAVs, where each pair of poses are connected by 
paths ri (q): 
 
                                                                        ri(q) 
Ps (xsi, ysi, zsi, θsi, Ψsi) ————>Pf (xfi, yfi, zfi, θfi, Ψfi)                    
(9.3) 
 
Where I =1,…..,N. 
 
Equation (9.3) connects a pair of points by a path. This also 
represents route planning for one or more nodes of a network. 
The UAV route is usually defined by a set of waypoints joined by 
straight-line segments.  However, these may not be flyable because 
UAVs cannot turn instantaneously through each waypoint. This is 
why waypoints require orientation for each segment to match – 
essentially a common tangent to produce a continuous path. 
(Tsourdos, 2011)Thus, some segments might be curved or curvy-
linear to meet the common tangent condition. SAA sensors for 
ISTAR missions must be pointed in specific directions for effective 
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detection and identification. (Nichols, et al., Counter Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations, 2020) 
 
Path Planning Constraints 
 
Various constraints are involved in path planning.  There are two 
general types: UAV-specific and those arising from obstacles in the 
environment. (Tsourdos, 2011) Violation of these constraints (i.e. 
communication failure) may lead to the complete loss of the UAV 
or sensor platform. Safety is a consideration for the mission.  Turn 
radius also dictates which paths are flyable. 
 
                             
Figure 9.3 Simple Block Diagram Approach to Path Planning for 
UAVs 
Source: Author drawn 07252020 
 
Turn radius also dictates which paths are flyable. Paths must 
balance safety and flyability. Flyable paths meet kinematic  or 
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motion constraints  and dictate maneuverability of the 
UAVs. (Tsourdos, 2011) Let Џ represent constraints. So (9.3) is 
written to include constraints (9.4). We now have enough 
information for a simple Black Box representation, Figure 9.1. 
The inputs to Figure 9.1 are the poses, with additional constraints, 
uncertainties, and measurements. The feedback loop senses the 
measured states of the UAV and feeds back the success in terms of 
meeting the constraints to the path planner. (Tsourdos, 2011) 
 
 
                                                                      Џ ri(q) 
Psi (xsi, ysi, zsi, θsi, Ψsi) ————>  Pfi (xfi, yfi, zfi, θfi, 





Figure 9.4 Autopilot and Guidance Control Loops 
Source: Author drawn, 07252020 
 
Paths need to meet the dynamic constraints of the UAV . They are 
influenced by the motion of the UAV. Essentially we have a SCADA 
control system. (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) Refer to Figure (9.2) which 
shows autopilot and guidance control loops. 
 
The inner feedback loop is the autopilot and the outer feedback 
Chapter 9: Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path Planning in
Combat Environment [Nichols]  |  227
loop is the guidance system. The guidance system provides lateral 
acceleration commands to keep the UAV on path. The autopilot 
controls the UAV elevator, ailerons, and rudder to achieve the 
required lateral acceleration. (Tsourdos, 2011) 
 
UAV dynamics include the aerodynamics, which produces forces 
and torques on the airframe. (Durham, 2013) Newton’s third law 
of motion dictates that forces and torques produce lateral, 
longitudinal, and rotational accelerations. The accelerations are 
usually expressed in UAV body axes and these provide the link to 
kinematics. (Tsourdos, 2011) Kinematics is produced by integrating 
the UAV lateral and rotational acceleration vectors to obtain the 
UAV velocity vector.  The attitude angles and current UAV position 
in the inertial frame give the UAV’s translational and rotational 
velocity. The 2D path planner uses the kinematic model in equation 
(9.5a-b): 
 
ẋ = / v / cos (θ)                                                 (9.5a) 
ẏ = / v / sin (θ)                                                  (9.5b) 
 
where v is the UAV velocity and (θ) is the horizontal heading angle. 
(Tsourdos, 2011) 
 
Whether a given path is flyable is determined by the curvature 
of the path. The path planning algorithm has to produce a path 
r(q) that meets the dynamic turn rate constraint of the UAV, which 
is translated into the kinematic curvature constraint in 3D. It is 
determined by both the curvature and torsion. (Lipschutz, 1969) The 
curvature at any point on the path must be less than the maximum-
curvature constraint of the UAV because it is proportional to the 
lateral acceleration. (Lipschutz, 1969) A curve segment of zero 
curvature is just a straight line and a curve segment of a constant 
curvature is an arc of a circle. At any given speed, v, the lateral 
acceleration a is proportional to the curvature k such that: 
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/ a / = / v2 / k ∞ k                                        (9.6) 
 
 
                                                  Figure 9.5 Curvature and Torsion 
Source: Author drawn 
 
Where a is the lateral acceleration vector, k is the curvature, v
is the velocity vector and ∞ is a vector operator. For a constant 
speed, the acceleration vector a is normal to the velocity vector v. 
This ensures that the velocity vector rotates without changing its 
magnitude. Refer to Figure 9.3where the velocity vector is aligned 
with the tangent vector t and the acceleration vector is aligned with 




All maneuvers ca that coincide with the path tangent vector. n 
be defined by reference to a set of coordinates. 2D path planning 
confines the maneuvers to a plane.  If the plane is horizontal, this is 
equivalent to flying at a constant altitude. In 3D space, flyable paths 
need to accommodate both curvature and torsion in their design. 
Curvature defines the turn radius of the path in 2D, which is defined 
as a rotation about an axis normal to the maneuver. Torsion is 
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defined as a rotation about an axes. See Figure 9.3 Note that positive 
curvature and positive torsion are defined as being clockwise along 
the appropriate axis viewed from the origin. For a UAV, in terms 
of body axes, curvature is equivalent to yaw rate turn and torsion 
is equivalent to a roll rate turn. In practice, UAVs will perform the 
turn by rolling to a fixed bank angle and then using the elevator to 
produce a maneuver normal to the wings. [8] (Tsourdos, 2011) 
 
Generation of Safe Paths 
 
The second important constraint of path planning is safety. Safety 
is measured by the ability of a UAV to avoid fixed and moving 
obstacles, and other AC or UAVs. Safety is represented in terms of 
a constraint that maintains flyability and collision avoidance. It is 
represented by Џsafe and is used to modify path planning equation 




                                           Џsafe Џk ri(q) 




Other constraints could be added to the above equation. For 
example, communication constraint on UAV separation distance 
could be represented by Џcomm.  (Tsourdos, 2011) 
 
Collision Avoidance (CA) 
 
Collision avoidance between two flight paths r1(q) and r2 (q) can 
be represented by: 
 
             r1(q) ∩  r2 (q) = 0                                                                    
(9.8) 
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This equation captures the condition required to be satisfied for 
CA. A cooperative path planning of multiple UAVs for CA can be 
formulated as producing flight paths {r1(q), r2(q),….,rn(q)} subject to 
the following constraints: 
Џ =  Џk,     k  ≤  kmax; and  Џτ,   τ  ≤  τmax; and Џsafe   ri(q) ∩  rj 
(q) = 0            i ≠ j 
 
Such problems are solved by optimization algorithms which 
involves heavy computation. In many cases the problem is broken 
down into phases / stages. (Tsourdos, 2011) Here we have our first 
intersection with the Chinese improvements on the A star algorithm 
for path planning. (Zhang, 2020) 
A huge amount of work had been done in optimization algorithms 
to solve UAV and other problems. The best reference on the subject 
is Reklaitis. (Reklaitis G. R., 1983) Of interest to the reader are three 
optimization path finding algorithms: A-Star, D-Star, and improved 
A-Star with predictive control. Focus will be on what makes them 
different / useful for UAV path planning rather the details of the 




The A-Star algorithm is a heuristic search algorithm, which is 
widely performed to various agents in the path planning problems 
to various agents. The main thrust of the A-Star algorithm is as 
follows. First, select the appropriate heuristic function, estimate the 
generation value of the extensible search points in the target search 
area, comprehensively. Compare the different cost values of each 
point. Consider the operation time and distance cost of the track 
point search. Last, find an optimal path. (Wikipedia, 2020) A-Star 
selects the path that minimizes: 
 
f(n) = g(n) + h(n)                                                  (9.9) 
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where: h(n) is the heuristic function, the estimated distance from 
next node n on the path to the goal node; and g(n) is the cost of the 
path from start node n to the goal. F(n) is the path cost function. 
At each iteration of its main loop, A-Star needs to determine 
which of its paths to extend. It does so based on cost of the path and 
an estimate of cost required to extend the path all the way to the 
goal. (Wikipedia, 2020) 
A-Star has some disadvantages: A) only the position information 
of the stealth UAV can be obtained in the path, and the dynamic RCS 
characteristics and attitude information of the stealth UAV cannot 
be obtained; B) unknown path cost estimation cannot be accurately 
calculated in path planning, the final path cannot guarantee to be 
globally optimal[9]; and C) performance improvements include 
search validity, real-time performance in face of unknown threats 




D-Star algorithm is a variation of the A-Star algorithm suitable 
for solving path planning problems in unknown environments. The 
main idea of the algorithm is to search the reverse path from goal 
to the origin when a new obstacle is found in the path. The path 
between the target location and the path node within the range of 
the new obstacle will not change due to the appearance of the new 
obstacle, but the path between the UAV and the node within the 
range of the obstacle will change during flight. The whole path is 
only partially re-planned. The heuristic expression for the D-Star 
algorithm is given by: 
 
f(X, E) = h(X) + g(X, E)                                              (9.10) 
 
where: h(X) represents the actual journey cost from goal to state 
X and g(X,E) represents the estimated journey cost from the state X 
to the current position of the stealth UAV. (Zhang, 2020) 
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Chinese Improved LRTA-STAR Algorithm 
Zhang describes the learning real-time A-Star algorithm (LRTA-
STAR) as a heuristic search algorithm which satisfies the 
requirements of real-time planning in a dynamic environment by 
establishing and updating the evaluation cost from each state to the 
target point. However, the flight path planned by the single step 
search is composed of a series of broken lines. The maneuverability 
of the UAV is limited so that there is some difficulty to achieve 
accurate flight path tracking control. Search results are prone to 
traps in local dead loops, leading to failure of path planning. Zhang’s 
team overcame these issues by combining LRTA-STAR with two 
big improvements: 1) model-based predictive control (MPC) and 
2) multi-step optimal search method. (MSSM) Zhang’s team 
extensively compared all the variations and the improved LRTA- 
STAR algorithm performed exceedingly well in a simulated combat 
scenario using stealth UAVs! Clearly they are thinking about 
penetration of allied ADS, something the military should take note 




Model-based predictive control is an optimization control 
method, which includes model prediction, rolling optimization, and 
feedback correction.  MPC is described in detail by Zhang. (Zhang, 
2020) MPC optimal control law for a multi-step prediction is given 
by: 
 
         N                                              W 
J = ∑ qi [ yp (k+i) – yr (k+i)]2  +  ∑ δj 
[u(k+j-1)]2                                                 (9.11) 
         i=1                                             j=1 
 
where: N = length of the prediction domain; W is the length of 
the control domain; qi is the output prediction error, and δj is the 
weighting coefficient of the control variable. (Zhang, 2020) 
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Multi-Step Search Method (MSSM) 
 
MSSM is a further refinement on the LTRA-STAR algorithm. It is 
novel search strategy based on multi-step optimization to achieve 
re-planning for a stealth UAV in a dynamic environment. In MSSM, 
the track cost of each predicted track is considered as a cumulative 
value of N predicted track nodes. The objective function of UAV 
flight planning can be obtained according to the optimal control law 
of the MPC system. The cost of the predicted flight path in N steps 
from the kth node is given by: (Zhang, 2020) 
 
 
         k+N                                                                     k+w 
J(k)  = ∑  [ b1T ( j/k) B1b1 ( j/k) +    εj Pnet  ( j/k)  +  ∑ δj uT  ( j/k) u 
( j/k)          (9.12) 
           j=k                                                                       j=k 
                            
Conclusions 
This chapter has touched on a premier concern of ADS systems – 
path planning for stealth UAVs in a combat or civilian environment. 
Chinese researchers appear to have a novel approach to penetrating 
US ADS systems with stealth UAVs.[10] Their “improved LRTA-STAR 
algorithm presents a new solution for path re-planning control of 
stealth UAV in complex network radar environments with Bandit 
threats. 
The improved A-STAR algorithm is based on a multi-step search 
strategy designed by model-based predictive control and LTRA-
STAR algorithm. The attitude angle information of the stealth UAV 
is added to the calculations. This demonstrates the variation 
characteristics of dynamic RCS. [11] Kinematic analysis of the stealth 
UAV and detection performance analysis of netted radar, the 
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original paths and the re-planning paths can satisfy the actual flight 




How would you implement the Chinese improved A-STAR 
algorithm in onboard UAV computers? The calculations are 
computer  / storage intensive. Could part of them be done by 
ground stations and the intermediate results be communicated up 
to the UAV in real-time? How about on missiles? Rockets? A really 
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[1] Chapter solely represents author’s conclusion based on his 
research into Chinese weapons / technology. 
[2] H2S is a problem for transportation of oil in tankers. It must 
be reduced from the raw oil so that the vapor pressure in the 
containers is stable. Unstable vapor pressure = explosion. Abqaiq 
facilities are the largest H2S desulfurization facilities in the Middle 
East (ME). 
[3] The author identified the use of the term ”POP-UP” as a major 
descriptive flaw. Almost every age group in society would use this 
term to describe the irritating browser pre- or post-fetch interrupts 
on their PC covering a slew of offensive  subjects / offers / 
ransomware / invitations / fraudulent requests, etc. We do not 
think “POP-UP”.  We think “Bogie or Bandit.”  Aircraft threats that 
are suddenly painted by radar well inside the radar’s range that were 
not seen earlier at a greater range are called BOGIE or BANDITS 
not “POP-UPS”. Bogies are radar or visual contacts whose identity 
is unknown but not necessarily unfriendly. Bandits are aircraft 
identified as enemy, in accordance with theater identification 
criteria. Both Bogie and Bandit terms are based on criteria as 
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defined elements within ROE to protect friendly ADS from hostile 
aircraft. 
[4] Tsourdos takes the discussion into 2D, 3D, Dubins paths, clothoid 
paths, Pythagorean hodographs, guidance geometry, torsion 
variations, and Frenet-Serret frames on 3D surfaces. These 
mathematical devices although interesting are way beyond the 
scope of this chapter. 
[5] The computer modelling algorithms described in this chapter 
are elegant, efficient, and complex requiring advanced knowledge 
of optimization techniques, coding, differential geometry, and 
Pythagorean hodographs.   Only the results or final equations that 
can be digested will be discussed. 
[6] AKA waypoints. Same meaning for boat navigation 
[7] Pose = 1) Present or constitute a problem , danger, or difficulty or 
2) to move into a particular position, in order to be photographed, 
painted, recognized, etc. (N/A, 2020) 
[8] This is known as a bank-to-turn maneuver. 
[9] It may also be computationally inefficient. 
[10] It is not mere speculation that such advanced path planning 
modelling may have been tested in the Abqaiq attacks. The UAVs 
were successful in reaching their target with only loss of ~3 drones. 
[11] The Radar Cross Section (RCS) and radar detection probability 
methods are covered in many references. (Adamy D. , 2001) (Adamy 
D. L., 2004) (Adamy D. , 2015) (Alford, 2000) (Monahan, 
2004) (Skolnik, 2008) Derivations were not included in this chapter. 
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Student Learning Objectives 
The student will obtain an understanding of how the federal 
regulation of UAS operations by the FAA, are affected by current 
Fourth Amendment, privacy laws and their interpretation at 
national, state, and local levels.  Earn an understanding of how 
privacy laws have been applied to UAS and the common 
technologies they carry in their payloads.  Develop an 
understanding of layered system of FAA regulation, matched with 
state and local level UAS legislation. 
Key Concepts 
1. Understanding the creation and evolution of the UAS 
legislative and regulatory operating environment, both 
federally and locally. 
2. Understand the relationship between the CoViD-19 pandemic 
and UAS systems, their diverse technical payload and freight 
carrying abilities. 
3. The ability for UAS to enable a “Surveillance State”, facilitating 
fear and the potential ‘over-regulation’ which could hinder and 
undermine continued UAS industry growth in America. 
4. Application and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 
privacy laws, and why they matter to UAS operators and 
industry. 
5. FAA Regulations v. State Laws: Which is better for the 
continued growth and progression of the UAS industry and 
public privacy rights as a whole. 
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A Recent Rise in UAS Operations, Privacy Concerns and A 
Pandemic 
The recent novel coronavirus (CoViD-19) pandemic has been a 
black swan event which has brought many modifications to our 
local, national, and global societies and norms. (Taleb, 2007)  Many 
of these required changes, such as those related to the desire for 
increased usage and relaxed regulation of unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS) will likely have the intended effect of increasing UAS usage 
but may the unintended consequence of affecting the interpretation 
and application of constitutional law. 
The UAS industry with the rapidly evolving technologies it 
employs, is by definition a disruptive technology.  According to 
Margaret Rouse on WhatIs.com, “A disruptive technology is one that 
displaces an established technology and shakes up the industry or 
a ground-breaking product that creates a completely new industry.” 
(Rouse, 2016)  This disruption of legacy industry will continue and 
gain momentum, as UASs increasingly make their way into the 
average American experience. 
 
These flying robots are natural candidates to perform pandemic 
related tasks categorized into the “three Ds”: dull, dirty, or 
dangerous. (Diab, 2014)  Until recently, the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) regulatory framework governing UAS and 
their industry was evolving at a slow, methodical pace.  With the 
onset of the pandemic, UAS regulation has loosened to allow more 
industry partners to help the government combat the disease.  Due 
to the ever-growing list of payloads and tasks UAS can and do 
perform, their new uses have made some citizens nervous and 
rightfully concerned about their privacy.  As with all innovation and 
change, the UAS disruptions will have pros and cons.  UAS sensors 
and payloads have the potential to capture, record, and upload huge 
amounts of data to their corporate owners and sponsors in near real 
time.  Whether you are a willing part to this collection or not, there 
are privacy concerns regarding the collected data and for what it 
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can and will potentially be used.  The Fourth Amendment protects 
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures of individuals and 
their property. (Smentkowski, 2020)  Whether or not the data 
collected and used by UAS, that pertains to individuals and their 
activities in both public and private locations, is protected by our 
Fourth Amendment rights or not is a brewing debate and one that 
could delay this disruptive technology’s contributions to our society 
and economy. 
 
As UAS use continues to grow without specific legislation or 
regulation protecting privacy, a legal conflict will likely ensue.  This 
conflict and its outcome will undoubtedly affect the interpretation 
and application of constitutional law.  We will look at the changes in 
the FAA’s regulatory environment applicable to UAS, the court cases 
most likely to be referred to as precedence when UAS operation 
affects privacy concerns, any current cases in the federal system 
with potential to become or change the legal precedence for UAS’ 
impact on Fourth Amendment rights[1], and the pros/cons of UAS v. 
‘Public Privacy’ being regulated at the national level by the FAA or by 
a more Federalist approach at the local and state levels. 
 
Background to the FAA’s Regulatory Environment 
 
To examine an environment and the effects a new technology 
has on that environment, we first need to understand how the 
environment was created and existed prior to the new technology. 
It is important to understand why the FAA and not the legislative 
bodies, have the authority to regulate private and commercial UAS 
operations within the national airspace (NAS).  Congress grants this 
regulatory authority to ensure experts with aerospace experience 
are making the decisions concerning the safety and accessibility 
of the NAS.  When Congress mandated the FAA establish rules for 
the regulation of UASs, they started with drafting new rules for 
private and commercial operators to establish CFR Title 14, Part 107. 
Commercial operators who wanted to carry freight via UAS would 
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also be regulated by meeting the applicable requirements in CFR 
Title 14, Part 135, which all air carriers must comply with. 
 
To appreciate the different roles of the FAA and state legislations, 
as they pertain to UAS, and their effects on public privacy, it helps 
to review an online press release dated 20 July 2018, from the FAA. 
The title of the web page is, “Press Release – FAA Statement–Federal 
vs. Local Drone Authority.” (FAA, 2018)  The primary purpose of the 
press release is to remind readers what gives the FAA its authority 
over the entire NAS, and allows it to preempt state and local 
governments from legislating UAS operations; EXCEPT for areas 
traditionally governed by state or local legislation i.e. land use, 
zoning, privacy, trespass[2], and law enforcement usages. (FAA, 
2015) 
 
There are two congressional laws which encompass most of the 
federal legislation pertaining to UAS; the FAA Extension, Safety, and 
Security Act (FESSA) of 2016, and the FAA Reauthorization Act of 
2018 (H.R. 302).  There are others, such as the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2017, which makes it legal for the Department 
of Defense to shoot down UAS over certain areas, but these only 
have small or single sections pertaining to UAS. (Rupprecht J. ) 
The FESSA provided one key article of particular importance to 
this chapter; the article which streamlined the FAA process for 
approval of interagency teams to use UAS in emergency situations. 
(U.S. Senate, 2016)  We’ve included a summary of the Part 107 and 
135 changes made by the FAA to address the CoViD-19 pandemic 
in Appendix C.  In short, the FESSA was exactly what the FAA used 
when it issued the emergency changes at the beginning of the 
pandemic to rules established under the direction of H.R. 302. (FAA, 
2020) 
 
As stated, most of the relevant legislation Congress has passed 
pertaining to UAS was included in H.R. 302.  For reference, we’ve 
included a summary in Appendix A.  The primary UAS result of 
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H.R. 302 was the FAA’s establishment the regulations in the Code 
of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 14, Part 107 requirements.  The 
operating environment created by H.R. 302 can be summarized by 
the following: operators of UAS must obtain a certification from the 
FAA, must be operated below 400’, must be operated within visual 
sight of pilot, a pilot can only operate one UAS at a time, cannot 
be operated over people, and cannot be operated at nighttime.  For 
reference, a summary of the complete set of CFR 14, Part 107 rules 
pilots or UAS operators must follow is located in Appendix B.  Since 
the establishment of the Part 107 rules, any operators who wish to 
deviate outside these rules is required to request a waiver through 
the FAA. 
 
To review the legal operating environment created by the H.R. 
302, and its impacts on privacy, a few sections of the law, and the 
deliverables required by those sections, are of particular importance 
to this study.  The first of these is Section 357, titled “UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS PRIVACY POLICY UAS.”  The summary of this 
section is quite brief but clear, “UAS operations shall be carried out 
in a manner that respects and protects personal privacy consistent 
with the United States Constitution and federal, state, and local 
law.[3]”  Although this statement in the law appears to be quite 
vague, it ensures the state and local authorities will have a say in 
how UAS operations and their effects on privacy will be litigated. 
 
The next applicable area of H.R. 302, Section 358, and titled “UAS 
Privacy Review” mandates a deliverable from the Comptroller 
General of the United States National Telecommunication and 
Information Administration.  The deliverable is a report to congress 
from the Comptroller General because this is the office of 
government that has been working on a review of federal, state, and 
local statutes, meant to address UAS impacts on personal privacy. 
The Comptroller General’s office was originally tasked with this 
review by President Obama in his Presidential memorandum 
“Promoting Economic Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, 
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Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems,” dated February 15, 2015. (Obama, 2015)  This 
report was originally due to Congress 180 days after the signing of 
the law, around April 2019, and has not been produced or delivered 
according to the authors’ research. 
 
The final section of H.R. 302 pertaining to this study is Section 
378, titled “Sense of Congress.”  The purpose of this section is to 
require anyone who operates UAS for hire, except the media, to 
have a written privacy policy which must be made available to 
customers and the public.  This policy is required to disclose the 
collection, storage, use(s), destruction, and sharing of any data 
collected during the UAS operations. (Zoldi, 2020) 
 
It should be pointed out concerns over the changes made to UAS 
regulation by the FAA have not created a wild west free for all of UAS 
activity in the U.S.  The changes made to the FAA’s regulations were 
largely administrative. (FAA, 2020)  There is an increasing amount of 
UAS operating companies working to get into the CoViD-19 fight. 
Here are examples of newly approved applications for waivers to 
operate UAS during the pandemic: 
• March, Wing begins making home deliveries of dry goods and 
medicines to homes in Virginia during CoViD-19 induced lock-
down, through FAA approved trial (Summers, 2020) 
• April 27, UPS and Matternet get approval to support a 
quarantined retirement community with UAS deliveries from a 
local CVS pharmacy (Bonifacic, 2020) 
• May 27, the FAA granted Zipline an emergency BVLOS waiver 
to fly medical supplies in North Carolina. The flights will cover 
20-30 miles and carry up to 4 lbs of medical personal 
protective gear and supplies (de León, 2020) 
• July 14, UPS and Matternet approved to deliver time and 
temperature critical medicines and PPE to medical facilities in 
N.C.(McNabb, Matternet and UPS Expand Hospital Delivery 
250  |  Chapter 10 UV, Social Networks & Covid-19 Defense [Shay]
Network, 2020) 
• July 28, Cotton Bowl is first outdoor stadium to use UASs 
spraying disinfectant in an effort to combat CoViD-19 and 
support sporting events. (Davis, 2020) 
 
How Previous Case Law Concerning UASs or the Technology 
They Carry, Has Been Applied Toward Privacy and Fourth 
Amendment 
 
To begin the examination of cases involving UASs, privacy 
concerns and the Fourth Amendment; we will start with a relatively 
recent case, Brossart v. North Dakota (2015)[4].  The following is 
a summary of the case and its related features to our study.  The 
case involved local law enforcement requesting a UAS from the U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol to take photographic evidence when 
local authorities were confronting Brossart over allegations of cattle 
theft.  This is the first known incidence in the U.S. where evidence, 
collected by a UAS, without a warrant, was used against an American 
citizen.  Brossart looked to dismiss the charges due to his belief his 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the UAS invading his 
privacy. 
 
His defense cited support from a SCOTUS decision in Kyllo v. 
U.S. (2001)[5].  In this case SCOTUS ruled to throw out evidence 
obtained by infrared technology without a warrant.  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court ruled the evidence from the UAS was 
admissible due to the precedence set by SCOTUS in the ruling 
of California v. Ciaraolo (1986)[6].  In this case SCOTUS ruled an 
individual’s privacy and Fourth Amendment rights are not violated 
when their actions can be observed from an aircraft in navigable 
airspace, in this case, from 1000 feet above ground level (AGL). 
With these decisions by the North Dakota Supreme Court, Brossart 
was the first American citizen to serve federal prison time, due to 
evidence obtained with a UAS. (Bomboy, 2014) 
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To further examine the issue of UASs and privacy, it is sometimes 
necessary to form a scenario using a very particular set of 
assumptions.  This was precisely the case made by David Sella-Villa 
in his work, Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy.  We 
will look at just how a UAS would affect privacy within the set of 
assumptions he describes in his paper, and what happens when you 
alter the assumptions.  Let us start with a UAS being operated with 
a simple visual light spectrum camera.  The visible light spectrum 
simply put is light or images visible to the naked eye.[7]  Further 
we are only looking at scenarios where the UAS are being operated 
and piloted legally.  Finally, it is important to know the author’s 
definition of privacy, which is “privacy simply means freedom from 
unwanted visual observations in and about the home.”[8] (Sella-Villa, 
Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy, 2020) 
 
Another key condition to be noted concerning this paper and the 
author’s view point is the statement and reference that UAS flights 
beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS), “have been reserved exclusively 
for military and search-and-rescue operators.”[9]  Although this 
may have been true at the time of his writing and publishing, the 
UAS industry has been moving towards BVLOS flights as being 
absolutely necessary for UAS delivery and other commercial uses. 
(Seeking Alpha, 2019)  Within these viewpoints and assumptions, 
the author examines and makes a convincing argument that UASs 
outfitted only with visual light spectrum cameras do not 
significantly challenge the jurisprudence[10] of privacy law in the 
U.S.  However, the author does concur that UASs are significantly 
able to exploit traditional assumptions about privacy and trespass as 
defined in our legal system. (Sella-Villa, Drones and Data: A Limited 
Impact on Privacy, 2020) 
 
The most significant contribution of Mr. Sella-Villa’s paper to this 
chapter’s study is his break-down of why UASs outfitted with visual 
light spectrum data collection devices alone, will not challenge our 
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Fourth Amendment rights, as the laws are currently written.  Much 
of his legal reasoning for this has to do with the precedence of 
“Third Party Doctrine”.  The basis of this concept has been 
established through several cases heard and decided by the 
SCOTUS, and “maintains that one cannot assert a privacy interest 
over something that has been knowingly shared with a third 
party.”[11]  The two primary ideas behind this premise according to 
the author’s listed assumptions, are; the UAS is operated legally, 
without trespass and the UAS’ image capture software stores images 
remotely.  This is almost always true because of the how UASs share 
what they are ‘seeing’ in near real time with their operators. (Sella-
Villa, Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy, 2020) 
 
Additional examples of how UAS and their technologies 
potentially impact privacy concerns can be found in products of the 
Congressional Research Service, which prepares and drafts reports 
for Congress[12].  One particular we will examine is titled, Drones in 
Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment Implications 
and Legislative Responses, by Richard M. Thompson II, a Legislative 
Attorney.  His report specifically looks at and addresses the use 
of UAS by law enforcement to conduct surveillance both with a 
warrant and without one.  Key points highlighted in this report are 
how a UAS is essentially a data collection device, and that without 
its high technology payloads, should not be considered a threat 
to Fourth Amendment rights or privacy laws.  The author suggests 
that many of the known high-tech payload capabilities of UAS (keep 
in mind this article was written in 2013) have been addressed 
sufficiently in federal or state laws.  In the conclusion however, the 
author concedes that where the capabilities of a UAS and its payload 
is headed, could be a place that will stretch our current privacy 
and Fourth Amendment protections to their limits. (Thompson II, 
Drones in Domestic Surveillance Operations: Fourth Amendment 
Implications and Legislative Responses, 2013) 
 
A second report from the Congressional Research Service, also 
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written by Thompson, but slightly later in 2015, is titled Domestic 
Drones and Privacy: A Primer.  This report, its cited sources, and the 
author’s legal perspective provide a comprehensive understanding 
of the complexities surrounding UAS and our current legal 
framework’s ability to contain the privacy invasion concerns and 
unlawful search threat posed by the potential of UAS payloads.  
(Thompson II, Domestic Drones and Privacy: A Primer, 2015) 
 
Technologies of the Digital Age and the Fourth Amendment 
 
Further study of the existing legal and regulatory landscape and 
the dangers of its lack of specific privacy protections, can be found 
in The Sky Police: Drones and the Fourth Amendment, by Jessica 
Dwyer-Moss.  Her work is a fairly comprehensive examination of the 
wide array of technologies UASs can bring to domestic authorities’ 
surveillance methods.  Applicable legal cases, pertaining to the 
individual technologies and their impact on the Fourth Amendment 
are also reviewed.  This work uses many of the case studies we 
have discussed previously to show how dated these references are 
compared to the twenty first century technologies UASs will 
present to test them.  An important case she brings to the 
discussion is Carpenter v. United States[13].  This case was not 
decided by the time of her publishing, but she correctly included 
it due to its topic being cell phone location records being used 
without a warrant, in the conviction of a robbery suspect.  Shortly 
after she published her article, SCOTUS decided the case.  In their 
decision it was determined that cell phone location data is constant 
and should be considered from the legal standpoint like GPS data, as 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, requiring law enforcement to 
obtain a warrant for its sharing and use as evidence.  This is seen as 
a win for privacy advocates and a blow to the Third-Party Doctrine’s 
coverage of modern electronic data.  (Dwyer-Moss, The Sky Police: 
Drones and the Fourth Amendment, 2018) 
 
Another case highlighted by this work is Riley v. California[14].  In 
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this case SCOTUS had to decide if law enforcement could search 
an individual’s cell phone upon arrest.  The court in its decision 
made particular note that the main reason an officer is allowed to 
search an individual under arrest is to preserve evidence and ensure 
safety of the officer and person under arrest.  SCOTUS concluded 
digital data could not harm an officer or help the individual escape, 
a warrant was required in order to search a cell phone. (Dwyer-
Moss, The Sky Police: Drones and the Fourth Amendment, 2018) 
This ruling could be immensely important to UAS operators and 
companies, since the primary thing UASs will “deliver” in the near 
future is data. 
 
Dwyer-Moss also examines the rulings in cases where aerial 
observation was a key component, although Brossart v. North 
Dakota was not among them.  Dwyer-Moss is an Assistant General 
Counsel at the Department of Defense whose extensive areas of 
practice include but are not limited to, Privacy Act, Privacy and Civil 
Liberties, and Intelligence Oversight. (Dwyer-Moss, Jessica Dwyer-
Moss’ Profile, 2020)  Her knowledge, opinions, and expertise in 
subjects discussed in this chapter has been immensely helpful in 
establishing the current environment and upon where it can be 
improved. 
 
An important legal construct to understand when we look at how 
UASs and the data they can collect effect privacy and the Fourth 
Amendment is known as the Miller Doctrine or Third-Party 
Doctrine.  This extremely important concept in Fourth Amendment 
law came from two decisions, Smith v. Maryland[15] and United 
States v. Miller[16], by SCOTUS in the 1970s.  These two decisions 
both referenced SCOTUS’s decision in Katz v. United States[17]. 
In the Katz decision SCOTUS ruled that Fourth Amendment 
protections not only applied to an individual’s tangible things but 
also to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  United 
State v. Miller’s decision helped to frame and contain this 
expectation by establishing that no reasonable expectation of 
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privacy can be expected when one uses the services of a third 
party, in this case the phone company, to contact (dial numbers) 
another party.  The conversation between yourself and the party 
you contact is protected and would require a warrant for authorities 
to access[18], but the number you dialed, the time you dialed it, and 
the connection made, were ruled to be business records of the third 
party, and therefore could be subpoenaed[19].  In Smith v. Maryland, 
a similar decision was handed down stating that records such as 
deposit slips, and checks used by an individual to perform business 
with the bank were not protected by the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy”[20] outlined in Katz because the customer was voluntarily 
sharing and disclosing their business with a third party[21].  All these 
decisions taken together have come to be known as the Third-Party 
Doctrine.  This doctrine and its application to twenty-first century 
technology is highly applicable to the subject matter of this chapter. 
(Thompson II, The Fourth Amendment Third-Party Doctrine, 2014) 
 
Examinations of Technologies on UASs due to CoViD-19 
 
An examination of all the individual technologies UASs are capable 
of carrying and collecting data with, is beyond the scope of this 
chapter.  In an effort to discuss these technologies in a relevant 
perspective, we will discuss one cutting edge technology and how 
it is being used in the CoViD-19 pandemic.  This technology was 
selected to be the example of how new technologies can raise 
privacy and Fourth Amendment concerns.  The technology is a new 
form of bio-identification.  A recent study of this new technology 
demonstrates just how capable UASs have become at being private 
data collection devices.  The recent research study proved how 
UASs can pick-up and monitor the cardiorespiratory signals from 
multiple individuals while flying at 200 feet AGL. (Al-Naji, 2017) 
This type of progress and advancement in a potential payload’s 
abilities are the kinds of advancements, once unleashed on society 
‘for its own good’, are very difficult to discontinue or legislate after 
the fact.  Although, as we will discuss in a later section, efforts to 
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legislate this type of UAS data collections have been proposed and 
argued in state capitals. 
 
Another work to study modern technology and its impact on 
the Fourth Amendment, is a short but important contributor to 
this chapter.  The article is Drones and the Fourth Amendment by 
Robert E. Smith and published in the May 2017 edition of Privacy 
Journal.  In his work, Smith concentrates on the implications of the 
government’s use of UAS equipped with surveillance technologies. 
His first point is how there is an established precedence for the 
government to use visual camera-based surveillance both with and 
without warrants.  These instances without a warrant require 
certain circumstances to exist such as “possible destruction of 
evidence, escape of a suspect, danger to the police or public.” 
However, any video surveillance that includes audio recordings 
must have a warrant.  This is due to established requirements in 
the federal electronic surveillance laws.  Smith boils down the two 
most important cases, in his opinion, for UAS surveillance by the 
government.  These are Kyllo v. U. S., due to the use of thermal 
imaging equipment; and Jones v. U.S. and its use of GPS tracking 
data.  The final point to stress from this article is the one Smith 
makes by including words from the late Associate Justice Anton 
Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in both cases.  In the 
majority opinion of Jones v. U.S., Justice Scalia wrote; 
“This court has to date not deviated from the understanding 
that mere visual observation does not constitute a search…It may 
be that achieving the same result through electronic means, 
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional 
invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us to 
answer that question.  We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing 
problems’ in some future case where a classic [physical trespass] 
is not involved.” 
Associate Justice Anton Scalia, (2012) 
In another fairly prophetic portion of the major opinion, Justice 
Scalia also noted, “the transmission of electronic signals without 
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trespass” falls under Fourth Amendment restrictions. (United States 
v. Jones, 2012) (Smith R. E., 2017)  To date, from the author’s research, 
no further decision by the Supreme Court has addressed the 
potential of electronic signals to be included in or excluded from 
Fourth Amendment protections. 
 
Federalism or Federal Regulation of UASs 
 
            To better understand the role of Federalism in UAS and 
privacy legislation and regulation, we will look at both the pro-
Federalism view, and the con-Federalism (or continued FAA 
regulation) view.  Available academic materials were heavily sided 
toward the pro Federalism argument of UASs and their abilities 
being regulated at a local level.  The con arguments cited are 
predominately articles from economic advocacy groups. 
Pro Arguments 
To begin the look at the “Pro” side of the argument, an essay by 
Margot E. Kaminski titled Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and 
the Things they Carry, was reviewed.  Her essay is rooted in the 
belief that there are two basic areas of UAS privacy legislation, UAS 
use by law enforcement, and UAS use by civilians.  She notes the 
FAA’s regulations have specifically allowed law enforcement to use 
UAS technology since the Congress’s original UAS legislation[22].  A 
common theme throughout this essay is the regulation and control 
of UASs and their payloads is best legislated by local authorities 
because of their “experience regulating other forms of civilian-on-
civilian surveillance.”  Perhaps the most notable argument for local 
authorities to regulate the privacy concerns around UASs, is one 
where she points out that an overarching and preemptive bill by 
Congress or omnibus privacy regulation by the FAA would, to be 
effective, be too restrictive in nature and run the real risk of 
infringing on UAS operators First Amendment rights.  The essay 
also points out the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 
(112 Congress, 2012) does not mandate the FAA take up the issue 
of privacy, and suggests the reason for this is likely the tradition 
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of states and local governments enacting privacy controls at their 
levels.  Her conclusion has a focused warning against Congress 
getting in too big of a hurry to control the budding UAS threat, and 
to allow the state and local authorities address the issue in their 
own jurisdictions. (Kaminski, 2013) 
 
The next work doesn’t so much argue for the states to regulate 
UASs as it assumes their control by local authorities is what is 
best for the growth potential of the UAS industry as a whole.  In 
their report, Which States Are Prepared For the Drone Industry, 
Brent Skorup and Connor Haaland from George Mason University 
study which states have prepared themselves to take advantage of 
the economic benefits the UAS industry can bring.  The basis of 
their work is the assumption that states can best be ready to reap 
these benefits by creating “drone highways-aerial corridors directly 
above public roads.”  The authors research which states have the 
appropriate legislative conditions to enact UAS highways.  They do 
this documenting and grading all 50 states on their preparedness in 
5 factors for UASs and enacting UAS highways.  The factors are: an 
airspace lease law on the books, an avigation easement law, a law 
vesting air rights with landowners, some sort of aviation advisory 
committee at the state level, and a look at the number of UAS jobs 
(per 100,000 residents) in each state.  Of note, North Dakota was 
ranked #1, Arkansas #2, Vermont #3, Kansas #32, and S. Carolina 
#50.  The ‘air’ highways described by Skorup & Haaland are one 
of the concepts proposed that would make the UAS industry more 
palatable to property owners concerned about their privacy and 
is a novel way for states to enact similar legislation to maintain 
an economically even playing field.  Whether this legal construct 
for UASs catches on and is enacted or not remains to be seen. (B. 
Skorup & Haaland, 2020) 
 
The final piece of pro-Federalism research comes from a guest 
article published by Dronelife.com, but written by Jonathan Hayden, 
Esq.  It is titled Why the Drone Community Should Not Embrace 
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Exclusive FAA Control of Drone Regulations.  In this article, Mr. 
Hayden begins by setting the scene twenty years into the future. 
He assumes that many of the FAA’s UAS regulatory arm members 
and experts are former employees from the larger of the companies 
within the UAS industry.  This is not an uncommon or unlikely 
occurrence since other federal regulatory bodies are currently 
made up of such professionals.  The problem Mr. Hayden foresees 
with this is if the FAA has complete regulatory control, this can 
create an environment where the large corporations, who are 
primarily concerned about profit, will have too large of a voice in 
the regulatory process.  An idea which has been demonstrated in 
other industries on multiple occasions.  This could even create a 
reality where landowners are prevented from flying UASs over their 
own property because they may interfere or endanger commercial 
UAS activity in some scenarios.  The best possible answer to this 
is for the states and local governments to have control over their 
jurisdictions.  (Hayden, 2020) 
Con Arguments 
The first argument against a federalism approach to UASs, privacy 
and the Fourth Amendment is a revisiting of The Sky Police: Drones 
and the Fourth Amendment, by Jessica Dwyer-Moss.  As a backdrop 
to the overall concerns from UASs on privacy in her paper, Ms. 
Dwyer-Moss opens her work with the following quote, “In the far 
distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for 
an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving 
flight.  It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s windows.” 
(Orwell, 1949)  The majority of her paper examines a collection of 
case law which can and will be used as precedence to decide UAS 
and high technology legal disputes in the near future.  The problem, 
as the Dwyer-Moss sees it, is that precedence can be overturned by 
a new subjective definition of societies “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” and regulations can be changed by an agency submitting 
a proposed change and allowing it to be committed on before 
changing it.  The only sure way for Fourth Amendment protections 
to be guaranteed is for Congress to take up the matter and legislate 
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visual and electronic surveillance norms.  She sums up her 
argument by stating that “A national approach is ideal, but in the 
absence of federal legislation, some states have begun to regulate 
drones for themselves.” (Dwyer-Moss, The Sky Police: Drones and 
the Fourth Amendment, 2018) 
 
An additional argument against the state and local governments 
controlling UASs is presented in States Rush to Regulate Drones 
Ahead of Federal Guidelines, by Sarah Breitenbach.  This article uses 
what the states have already tried to do in their legislation to make 
the argument that Congressional law and Federal regulation will 
be the best way to protect privacy without stifling the natural 
innovation of this disruptive technology.  In 2015 California’s 
Governor vetoed a law that would have made it illegal for any 
commercial or private UAS to fly less than 350 feet AGL over private 
property without consent.  Had this legislation been enacted, UAS 
delivery in California would have been severely set back.  An 
interesting point in this article is when the author notes the ACLU 
has not requested tighter regulation of UASs due to their belief that 
most privacy concerns posed by UASs are covered by laws already 
on the books.  In a further comment, the ACLU attorney, Chad 
Marlow suggested state laws limiting UAS activity can actually harm 
society by preventing the filming of illegal activity. (Breitenbach, 
2015) 
 
A Look at UAS Federalism in Action 
 
            In order to understand what state legislative responses 
have been to disruptive UAS and the technologies they carry; we 
will review state legislation whose primary purpose was to address 
UAS or their technologies specifically.  A comprehensive review of 
all the state legislation pertaining to our topic is beyond the scope 
of this textbook.  To ensure a more accurate accounting of state 
UAS laws, two web sites were used to create the collection of laws 
represented in this chapter.  The first was the site of the National 
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State Legislative Council. (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2020)  This site was extremely thorough with its list 
of UAS impacting legislation and resolutions, up to and through 
2019.  This sight included laws that addressed newer technology 
privacy laws in its list, knowing that UAS could or would be outfitted 
with increasingly sophisticated payloads.  The second site was a 
site dedicated to monitoring state and local governments, called 
Governing.com, and their adaptation to current events and national 
cultural trends.  One article on this site in particular looked at how 
state and local governments were using UAS technology as an 
answer to the CoViD-19 pandemic. (Smith C. , 2020)  This article and 
its included database have been kept current through the writing of 
this chapter. 
 
State Laws Pertaining to Privacy and UASs Before CoViD-19 
 
In the effort to understand the different approaches state 
legislatures took to regulating UAS and their potential to impact 
privacy, the author first went to the website for the National 
Conference of State Legislatures[23] (NCSL).  This site lists and 
tracks by each year (from 2013-2019), all state legislatures who 
introduce UAS law, and each of them that end up enacting UAS 
laws.  A review of all state level UAS laws introduced that pertain 
to privacy is beyond the scope of this Chapter.  Particular attention 
will be paid to those laws that address privacy concerns in all 50 
states.  The following is a list of state laws concerning UAS and 
their impact on privacy or the Fourth Amendment, and their 
summaries. (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020) 
Table 1. State Laws and Resolutions pertaining to UASs, their 
administration and Wildlife (National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2020) 
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Table Footnote 1-Virginia was the first state to pass a piece of UAS 




The Table 1 above contains a list of all the state UAS laws and 
resolutions which pertain to the administration of UASs, with a 
final column showing the states with laws concerning the use, or 
prohibition of use, of hunting and fishing with UASs.  The inclusion 
of the laws pertaining to UAS affecting the privacy of hunters/
fishers or the rules pertaining to using UAS while hunting and 
fishing demonstrates a unique look at the priorities of state 
legislatures as the introduction of UAS technology is growing.  The 
table listed below is a look at which states addressed UAS and their 
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impacts on personal privacy, either through their physical presence 
or the data they collect. 
 
Table 2. State Laws and Resolutions pertaining to UAS, their 
impacts on law enforcement, personal privacy, and 








Due to the ever-changing landscape of laws and resolutions at the 
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state level, a second source listing these laws was used.  Automated 
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) maintains a site of 
state and local laws that affect UASs, autonomous ground vehicles 
and unmanned maritime vehicles. (AUVSI Advocacy, 2020)  The 
information on the AUVSI website was reviewed and found to be 
more comprehensive, as in there were UAS and robotic bills found 
on this site, but all bills found on the NCSL were verified on the 
AUVSI site. 
Federal and State Laws Pertaining to Privacy and UAS After 
CoViD-19 
Since the CoViD-19 pandemic’s dominance of societies attention, 
the methods and instruments used by society to deal with and 
attempt to contain the disease have not only been addressed by 
each citizen, but our federal legislative and regulatory bodies as 
well.  The FAA was quick to realize the constraints their regulations 
were placing on the UAS industry in the name of safety, were 
needlessly preventing the potential of UASs to be a key tool in the 
fight against the virus.  With this realization, the FAA was quick[24] 
to put out extensions on any knowledge requirements with the 
SFAR.  The biggest changes made by the FAA to help get UASs into 
the fight against CoViD-19 has been an effort to quickly return 
approved waiver requests for BVLOS flight, night flight, and other 
requests by UAS operators and pilots. 
 
There have been 58 State Law concerning UASs proposed so far 
this year with only one of them being directly contributed to the 
CoViD-19 pandemic. (National Conference of State Legislatures, 
2020)  The number of UAS laws to actually be enacted by states so 
far this year is only 6.  Below is a chart to show the status and topics 
of state UAS laws pertaining to privacy.  For consistency of method, 
the author made note of how many states continue to address UASs 
being used in hunting or fishing. 
 
Table 3. Status of 2020 State UAS Legislation (Governing.com, 
2020) 
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Table Footnote 1-New York was the first state to draft UAS & 





UASs are becoming more prevalent in American society and the 
industry is expected to grow exponentially once BVLOS commercial 
flights become a reality.  In July 2020, it was reported the use of 
the Low Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability (LAANC) 
has significantly increased in so far in 2020.  In the first 6 months 
of 2020, a third of the 320,000 LAANC authorizations (it’s been 
operating since Oct 2017) were submitted by UAS operators and 
granted by the FAA. (McNabb, LAANC Use Accelerates: Kittyhawk 
Reports All-Time Record Levels of Activity, 2020)  Further evidence 
of increased UAS activity during the pandemic, the numbers of FAA 
registered UASs and certified pilots continues to grow.  On 10 March 
2020 we checked the numbers on the FAA’s “UAS By the Numbers” 
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website.  We checked the site again on 28 July 2020.  Only 138 days 
have passed. 
Table 4. Registered UAS & Certified Pilot growth during the 2nd 
quarter of 2020 Invalid source specified.Invalid source specified. 
With healthy growth of the UAS industry even during the 
CoViD-19 pandemic, the importance of understanding how UASs 
will affect the Fourth Amendment and the privacy rights attached 
to it are even more important.  Since the beginning of the pandemic 
there have been multiple nations around the world using UASs in 
their fight against the CoViD-19 virus. (Chen, 2020)  Some appear 
to be using the pandemic to push forward their own desires to 
increase their surveillance state. (Maynes, 2020)  Americans see 
these situations and naturally fear UASs and their capabilities will 
facilitate a similar environment here. (Tuccille, 2020)  During the 
chapter, we have reviewed an immense amount of material to study 
concerns about UAS and their effects on our privacy laws.  Many of 
these references have shared deep concerns UASs will impact our 
privacy and Fourth Amendment protections.  Dissenting views were 
more difficult to come by but made strong focused arguments our 
current laws are sufficient for the current level of technology used 
by UAS. (Sella-Villa, Drones and Data: A Limited Impact on Privacy, 
2020) 
 
As pointed out previously, the changes to UAS laws so far during 
the pandemic have largely been administrative.  Without the blanket 
approval of BVLOS flights, night flights, or commercial freight 
licenses, there hasn’t been an overwhelming number of UAS taking 
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to the sky and therefore there has been no need for knee-jerk 
reactions by the Congress or the state legislatures. 
 
The slow and fairly methodical spread and management of UAS 
delivery introduction appears to be exactly what is necessary for the 
current environment.  The FAA’s focus on safety and free efficient 
economic mobility in the U.S. NAS, while leaving the issues of law 
enforcement use, zoning, and privacy to be governed by that state 
and local authorities (FAA, 2018) appears to be the best mix of 
Federal oversight and Federalist control for the UAS industry, at 
the moment.  This patchwork approach has been proven for other 
transportation focused industries such as the automobile industry 




1. What has been the impact, if any at all, of the CoViD-19 
pandemic related regulatory changes to increase UAS use 
during the U.S.’s pandemic response? 
2. Do these changes create an environment where UAS and their 
payloads can further infringe upon or hamper individuals 
Fourth Amendment rights? 
3. Can you name benchmarked and precedence establishing 
court cases concerning UAS and the technologies used in their 
payloads? 
4. What situations can you see where privacy and Fourth 
Amendment rights can be endangered or negated by UAS and 
their payloads? 
5. When it pertains to privacy and UAS, do you think a national 
approach to regulation, or a Federalist approach is better for 
the UAS industry? For public privacy protections?  For 
advancing and protecting both? 
6. Were your answers to the previous question different? Why? 
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Much of this book is devoted to technology and its application 
within specific domains.  This chapter will explore the use of 
unmanned vehicles as conduits of information and the varying 
purposes to which those conduits can be put. 
Student learning objectives 
After reading this chapter, students should be able to do the 
following: 
1. Describe the components of communications 
2. Define misinformation and disinformation 
3. Describe the types of problems that can result from deceptive 
information in automated systems. 
 
The Ruses of War 
The concepts of misinformation and disinformation come from 
the practices of adversarial competition.  In fact, they are only 
useful in adversarial competition.  In collaborative endeavors, 
misinformation and disinformation can be not only problematic but 
downright dangerous.  Think about a team of medical professionals 
working together to perform a surgery, or a team of operators 
working with remote unmanned systems to execute a mission.  Any 
problems with the clarity and common understanding of 
information could be disastrous. When working with another party 
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towards a common goal, it is paramount that all parties understand 
the goal, the steps, and the strategies clearly.  Any mistakes in 
information, whether originating from the sender or by faults in the 
transmission or misinterpretation by the receiver, causes friction in 
relationships.  That friction slows down the effectiveness and speed 
of collaboration, because clarification must be sought, sometimes 
multiple times.  A savvy competitor uses such friction to gain an 
advantage.  An aggressive competitor creates and promulgates such 
friction to undermine and damage abilities to interpret, analyze, and 
strategize. 
In competition, it is sometimes useful to increase the friction 
rather than decrease it.  As the Earl of Chesterfield observed in 
1749, “without some dissimulation, no business can be carried on 
at all.” (Breuer, 2001, p. viii)  In warfare, the practice falls under a 
category known variously as stratagem, deception, diversion, ruse, 
or camouflage (Whaley, 2007).  Disinformation can be considered 
as “the most important single broad category of ruses … fed into 
another’s information system in order to deceive him” (Whaley, 
2007, p. 8).  The practice of disinformation has spanned all of 
history (Breuer, 2001) (Whaley, 2007) and has been observed in the 
animal kingdom as well (King, 2019).  As noted by Breuer (2001), 
“force and fraud have been the two cardinal principles of warfare 
since Sun Tzu, the Chinese warlord who conquered huge expanses 
of Asia, recorded his military theories in 550 BCE: ‘undermine the 
enemy, bewilder and confuse him, strike at his morale, then his army 
will fall to you.’” (Breuer, p. 1)  As such, it is prudent to understand 
both effective communication and how that process can be 
subverted or perverted. 
 
Understanding Effective Communication 
In order to understand the subversion of communication, it is 
necessary to understand what communication is and what 
distinguishes effective communication.  There have been many, 
many, many tomes written on effective communication, but for 
the purposes of this discussion, we will focus on the complexities 
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of communicating from person to person through the lenses of 
effective listening techniques and a model of communicative 
elements. 
The Elements of Communications 
There are several different elements of communication that are 
important to understand.  The most common way of referring to 
these elements is as ‘signal’ and ‘noise’.  However, that type of 
nomenclature obscures the subtleties associated with deception. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the ‘signal’ is described in four 
categories while ‘noise’ is treated through two categories. 
First, there is information that is both relevant and truthful.  An 
example of this could be a fire alarm that correctly alerts a home 
owner to a fire in the home while he is home.  It would be less 
relevant if the homeowner were away and unable to respond to the 
matter. 
Next, there is information that is truthful but irrelevant.  For 
example, if a person interrupted a business meeting to inform 
everyone present that two people in the grocery store were seen 
arguing, that would be truthful but highly irrelevant to the business 
meeting.  It is a distraction. 
Following that, there is information that is relevant but false or 
misleading.  An example of this could be a lie about a situation or 
manipulated media that presents a situation differently than what 
really happened. 
Finally, there is information that is irrelevant and false or 
misleading.  An example of this might be casual gossip that spreads 
an untrue rumor. 
Technical problems in the communications channel, such as static 
or blurred focus, are distinguishable from the previous categories 
and deserve a separate discussion.  While technical problems are 
neither true nor false, they do impede the effectiveness of 
communications.  Further, they may be caused by either 
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circumstances (weather, faulty equipment, or user error) or by 
malicious activity (jamming, sabotages, or computer exploit). 
Note that there are 4 components that are undesirable.  We can 
simplify by referring to them as misinformation and disinformation, 
thusly: 
• Misinformation is the general term for information that is one 
of the following types: 
◦ o Truthful but irrelevant information 
◦ o Irrelevant and false or misleading 
◦ o Technical problems in the communications channel, 
such as static or blurred focus, are distinguishable from 
the previous categories and deserve a separate discussion. 
• Disinformation is the general term for information that is 
relevant but false or misleading. 
The challenge to the consumer of information is, therefore, 
threefold: 
• Figure out what is truthful information; 
• Judge the relevancy of the information; and 
• Minimize the occurrence of technical problems. 
Figuring out either truthfulness or relevance of communications is 
not always as easy as it should be.  There are charlatans who publish 
fraudulent data, there are idea thieves who publish plagiarized 
material, and there are simpletons who publish what they think 
is good but which suffers from inherent flaws in logic or 
methodology.  Some publishers exert little control over the quality 
of material.  As a result, there is a span of quality in the published 
literature that ranges from extremely reliable to extremely 
questionable.[i] 
The increasing automation of information collection, 
interpretation, and fusion makes the challenge even greater: 
As dependence on information increases due to the automation 
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of more and more elements in the surrounding environment, the 
ability of the warfighter to judge the reliability and accuracy of 
information content becomes more important. There are two 
aspects to this challenge: 
• Judging relative truth: being able to comprehend the inherent 
inaccuracies in data that exist due to model uncertainty, 
source inaccuracies, and so on; and 
• Judging continued truth: being able to determine whether the 
information being considered has been tampered with, 
replaced, or otherwise interfered with. 
The significant technical challenges in both of these aspects range 
from human interface issues to confidentiality measures. In 
responding to these challenges, complex information display 
techniques, such as virtual reality applications, will clearly have 
some level of payoff. As capabilities for injecting falsehoods into 
otherwise truthful data continue to be developed, the challenge of 
determining continued truthfulness will be exponentially greater, 
particularly in light of the automated fusion capabilities that are 
being relied on to assist humans in handling the huge amounts of 
available data in a timely manner. 
(Panel on Information in Warfare, 1997, pp. 81-82) 
A Simple Model of Communications 
For information to be communicated from one entity to another, 
there is a surprisingly complex set of requirements.  Think about 
communications between a person and a pet, or between two dogs 
meeting for the first time in the park, or between two people who 
speak different languages.  The goal of communications is to 
transfer information from one entity to another.  Let’s look at what 
this entails. 
First, the entity originating the message must have some way 
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of encapsulating the information into the message.  This can be 
done with facial expressions, body language, words, music, and even 
pheromones. 
Next, the originator must have some way of transferring the 
message to the recipient.  This can be done by various ways, 
depending on how the information is encapsulated.  One simple way 
of transferring the message would be to simply place oneself in the 
visual range of the recipient and make sure that the recipient is 
looking and paying attention.  Another way would be to speak within 
auditory range of the recipient.  Crucially, the actual transmission 
a message requires some level of cooperation by the recipient.  In 
other words, the actions of the originator are necessary but not 
sufficient. 
The cooperation of the originator and the recipient are also not 
sufficient.  For communication to occur, the information must be 
in a form that is understandable by both parties.  The pet must 
understand what the person means by a specific hand gesture or 
a specific command.  Two people talking must have a common 
language interpretation.  Simply speaking the same language is not 
enough: the dialects and common usage patterns matter as well. 
To illustrate this point, consider this anecdote of a person from 
Australia visiting some American colleagues.  Obviously, they shared 
English as a common language and communication was seemingly 
problem-free.  The Americans, as part of their hospitality, took the 
Australian to a baseball game.  As is customary in the United States, 
the song “Take Me Out to the Ballgame” was sung with great gusto 
by the fans in the stadium.  The Australian was taking this all-in 
stride until the song got to the part about “Let me root, root, root 
for the home team…”, at which point in time a shocked look took 
over his face.  The Americans, noticing this, asked him if he was 
feeling okay.  He then explained how the word “root” was used in 
Australia, which is as an offensive and vulgar reference to sexual 
intercourse (O’Shea, 2016).  So when the Australian heard an entire 
stadium of people singing happily about rooting for the home team, 
he was somewhat taken aback. 
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The simple model of communications is, therefore, this: an 
originator forms and encapsulates information into a message 
medium, which is received and interpreted by a recipient.  The 
effectiveness of the communication is dependent upon the shared 
knowledge of the originator and the recipient.  It is also dependent 
on several elements that the originator and the recipient may have 
little to no control over: interference in the environment, in the 
signal formation, in the signal reception, or in the context.  The 
originator might sneeze while talking, a car backfire might drown 
out a few words, or the context of the conversation may lead the 
recipient to misinterpret the intended meaning.  In order to reduce 
the probability of misinterpretation or misunderstanding, active 
strategies can be adopted, including repeating messages through 
multiple channels or saying the same thing in many different ways. 
Crucially, these active measures to reduce misunderstandings are 
generally dependent upon cooperation between the originator and 
the recipient. 
Effective Listening 
There is an entire philosophy about how to reduce 
misunderstandings in human communication that illustrates this 
process.  The philosophy is called Active Listening (Rogers & Farson, 
1957) and it’s actually interesting to consider through the lens of 
“what can go wrong” in communications.  Since the entire point 
of disinformation and misinformation is to cause problems in 
communication, it’s worth taking a moment to reflect on how life 
coaches teach active listening as a way to make things go right. 
To practice active listening, six skills are emphasized.  These skills 
are used to enable a “listener to thoroughly absorb, understand, 
respond, and retain what is being said.” (Center for Creative 
Leadership, 2019)  Each of the skills identifies some element of 
communication that can improve the effectiveness of 
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communication but also identify targets for a disinformation 
campaign.  These six skills are: 
• Paying attention 




• Sharing (Center for Creative Leadership, 2019) 
Paying attention is exactly what it sounds like: actually listening to 
what a speaker is saying.  But it is also paying attention to what the 
speaker is conveying through other aspects: tone of voice, volume, 
pauses, emphasis, word choices, body language, and other elements 
of the conversation. 
Withholding judgment is meant to imply keeping an open mind 
but a more sophisticated interpretation of this skill is developing 
an understanding of what the person speaking is actually trying to 
communicate, taking into account that person’s culture, language 
skill, opinions, and purpose.  By integrating the spoken message 
into an appreciation of where the person is coming from, a listener 
develops a better platform for productive conversation. 
Reflecting is the process of repeating what you think you have 
heard in other words, with the purpose being to confirm that you 
have received the correct message.  If your paraphrase of what you 
think you have heard is rejected, then you know that there has been 
some breakdown in the communication effort. 
Clarifying the message is done through asking questions, either 
to ensure you have interpreted the context of the conversation 
correctly or to request amplifying information.  By asking questions, 
you give the speaker a chance to expand a topic to contextualize 
it better or to explain something that may be slightly ambiguous. 
Using reflection and clarification iteratively can be a powerful 
method for getting the speaker to be more descriptive and precise. 
Similarly, summarizing the message briefly back to the speaker 
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can test your comprehension of the conversation, particularly the 
sensitive elements.  Once you have established that your 
understanding is correct, then you have the ability to share some of 
your own thoughts and insights. 
The purpose of describing the processes associated with active 
listening is to underscore how very complex the act of 
communication is.  Communication consists not just of the 
information contained in the transmitted message; it also includes 
all the noise and extraneous information in the communication 
channel, including the brains of the communicators. 
Deception As A Strategy 
When one has perfect knowledge, one can choose the timing of 
actions and go fast or slow as appropriate to the situation and to the 
goals of action.  Perfect knowledge of any situation is the product 
of communication: collecting, analyzing, and interpreting messages 
that are both deliberately and inadvertently sent by an adversary. 
In the real world, achieving perfect knowledge is both desired and 
impossible: there is too much information, variation and change, 
and deception. 
Deception is used to deny perfect knowledge, to seed confusion 
into intelligence, and to mislead adversaries, which ultimately slows 
them down, from an effectiveness perspective.  Effective deception 
can result from hiding information, changing information, and 
seeding information.  Some examples of the use of deception 
include the following: 
• In the early 1960s, the Walt Disney Productions company used 
a series of companies to buy the land around Orlando that 
became the site for Disney World. These companies were 
created specifically for the purpose of shielding the true 
identity of the purchaser in order to keep land prices from 
rising, which surely would have happened if people had known 
the truth about who was buying the land and for what purpose. 
 In fact, when the news broke, “land prices skyrocketed in 
Orlando, where in some cases the land went up to $80,000 an 
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acre” (Ganninger, 2020). 
• In 1944, as the planning for the Allied invasion of Normandy 
was increasing in intensity, an actor playing the part of Field 
Marshall Montgomery was taken to alternative locations in 
order to deceive the Germans as to where the invasion would 
take place. This was only one of the many deceptions 
associated with Operation Overlord, but an effective one as it 
distracted the Axis powers with information that 
“Montgomery” had been observed in Gibraltar and North 
Africa, leading them to speculate that the invasion would be in 
the Mediterranean region.  (Breuer, 2001, pp. 198-202) (Whaley, 
2007, p. 376) (Howard, 1995, p. 125) 
• During the Cold War, agents of the Soviet Union used the 
tactic of injecting false news reports into media. One example 
of this type of activity was included in a 1981 US Department of 
State advisory: 
“In 1980, Pierre-Charles Pathe, a French Journalist, was 
convicted for acting as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959. 
His articles – all subtly pushing the Soviet line on a wide range 
of international issues – were published in a number of 
important newspapers and journals, sometimes under the 
pseudonym of Charles Morand.  The journalist also published a 
private newsletter which was regularly sent to many 
newspapers, members of parliament, and a number of foreign 
embassies.  The Soviets used Pathe over a number of years to 
try to influence the attitudes of the prominent subscribers to 
his newsletter and to exploit his broad personal contacts.” (U.S. 
Department of State, 1981) 
Deception is a technique that can be reasonably low cost as well 
as effective.  Deception includes many ruses, such as camouflage, 
diversions, and disinformation (Whaley, 2007, p. 7).  Barton Whaley, 
a scholar of deception and military successes over the century, 
noted in his seminal book Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in 
War (2007): 
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The most important single broad category of ruses includes all 
false information fed into another’s information system in order 
to deceive him. The standard technical term is “disinformation”.  It 
is conventionally meant to cover only the verbal or written forms 
of information, leaving “camouflage” and “diversion” to cover the 
nonverbal or visual forms. (pp. 8-9) 
He made this assessment of the importance of disinformation 
from his painstaking analysis of the effects of surprise in warfare 
over history.  A key analytical finding from his scholarship: 
Of the 61 cases of strategic military surprise that occurred 
between 1914 and 1968, no more than 4 can be exclusively or even 
mainly attributed to the initiator’s passive security.  More or less 
specific warning signals almost inevitably filter through the security 
screen and reach the intended victim. Moreover, these warning 
usually increase in frequency and specificity as the attacker’s 
preparations unfold, drawing more and more indiscrete persons 
into the planning and making ever more visible the necessary 
adjustments in mobilizations, deployment, logistics, and perhaps 
diplomacy. … There is only one type of activity still available that 
will multiply [the commander’s] chances of gaining surprise.  That is 
stratagem. (Whaley, 2007, pp. 1-2) 
In this quotation, the word stratagem in its classic meaning, which 
is as a reference to strategic deception. 
The world that he studied is not the world of today.  The growth 
and integration of information technologies is a dramatic change 
that has affected all aspects of life.  Further, the types and 
representations of information has increased exponentially, to the 
point where it makes less sense to separate non-verbal and visual 
information from written or spoken information.  The growth of 
augmented and virtual reality (AR and VR) applications, the 
widespread adoption of artificial intelligence implementations, and 
the integration of video, photography, data, and sound has changed 
the environment of deception activities.  As such, the discussion 
in this chapter includes manipulation of non-verbal and visual 
information in the definition of deception. 
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Implications for Unmanned Systems 
Unmanned systems rely on information technology.  As noted in 
Chapter 1 of this book: 
The separation of human labor, cognition, and equipment into 
disparate pieces means that a concomitant need for collaborative 
technologies becomes important.  The most obvious collaborative 
technologies are communications – exchanging data, commands, 
and responses.  Other types of collaborative technologies that need 
to be considered are those that prevent adverse interactions 
between system components, environmental sensing and reaction 
technologies, and control guidance technologies.  All of these 
enable the remote operation of an unmanned system. 
In other words, communication between the various components 
are a critical part of unmanned system operations.  It is therefore 
necessary for operators to plan for identifying and mitigating 
deception.  A solid information security regime provides a platform 
to build upon.  Having the people, processes, and technologies in 
place that protect the integrity of data in storage as well as in 
transactions is a critical first step. 
That first step is, obviously, only a first step.  It provides a way 
of adjudicating information already in the system and that being 
shared with trusted edge systems.  The next steps need to address 
the deception challenges that come from external data of all types: 
sensor collected data, aggregated data from a data market, and 
deliberately introduced deceptive data.  Problems to consider 
include the following: 
• Sensors that correctly work as engineered but which are 
triggered to misread a sensed situation because the target 
environment has been manipulated. For example, an 
unmanned car could be tricked into “reading” a road marking 
because the marking had been augmented with material 
designed to trick the car’s sensor. 
• Aggregated data from a data market that is used to create 
highly detailed virtual reality depictions of a target 
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environment, in which the data has been seeded with 
deliberately misleading information, such as multiple altitude 
power lines in a place where none exist. UAS operations would 
use that deceptive information to avoid flying in the vicinity of 
the powerlines, which could reduce the effectiveness of their 
mission operations. 
• Deliberately introduced deceptive data could come from an 
insider or from a modified infrastructure component. For 
example, an AI application that quickly processes data inputs 
to a system could follow a set of rules that leads it to an 
incorrect decision.  That incorrect decision then becomes 
deceptive data: relevant but misleading or untruthful. 
Any approach to addressing the problem of deceptive data will be 
unique to the operations and mission of the unmanned systems, so a 
one-size-fits-all solution is not possible.  As with every engineering 
problem, the solution lies in understanding what the threats are, 
what the potential impacts might be, and what countermeasures 
can effectively be used. 
 
Sensing and Interpreting Challenges 
Because there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the challenge of 
deceptive data, it is helpful to review some examples of historical 
events. 
“Hidden” Information Embeds 
In 2018, researchers experimented with overlaying what they called 
“adversarial examples” on actual stop signs to see if autonomous 
vehicle detection systems could be fooled.  The overlays used did 
not change a human’s ability to identify the sign as a stop sign: the 
overlays were smaller than many of the graffiti stickers commonly 
seen on stop signs in cities.  The researchers were able to make the 
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sensors miss the stop sign.  Further, they were able to make the 
sensor detect things that were not present: 
… we create perturbed physical objects that are either ignored 
or mislabeled by object detection models. We implement a 
Disappearance Attack, in which we cause a Stop sign to “disappear” 
according to the detector—either by covering the sign with an 
adversarial Stop sign poster, or by adding adversarial stickers onto 
the sign. In a video recorded in a controlled lab environment, the 
state-of-the-art YOLO v2 detector failed to recognize these 
adversarial Stop signs in over 85% of the video frames. In an outdoor 
experiment, YOLO was fooled by the poster and sticker attacks 
in 72.5% and 63.5% of the video frames respectively. We also use 
Faster R-CNN, a different object detection model, to demonstrate 
the transferability of our adversarial perturbations. The created 
poster perturbation is able to fool Faster R-CNN in 85.9% of the 
video frames in a controlled lab environment, and 40.2% of the video 
frames in an outdoor environment. Finally, we present preliminary 
results with a new Creation Attack, wherein innocuous physical 
stickers fool a model into detecting nonexistent objects. (Eykholt, et 
al., 2018) 
One can easily understand the potential impact of an unmanned 
system missing or inventing information: the problems could 
cascade to the entire system as well as cause harm to external 
elements, such as people or property. 
In another set of experiments, researchers developed a set of 
eyeglass frames that foiled a facial recognition system.  The choice 
of glasses frames was to minimize the perturbation components 
while using something that was easy to modify and widely available: 
One advantage of facial accessories is that they can be easily 
implemented. In particular, we use a commodity inkjet printer 
(Epson XP-830) to print the front plane of the eyeglass frames on 
glossy paper, which we then affix to actual eyeglass frames when 
physically realizing attacks. Moreover, facial accessories, such as 
eyeglasses, help make attacks plausibly deniable, as it is natural for 
people to wear them. (Sharif, Bhagavatula, Bauer, & Reiter, 2016) 
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The results were impressive.  In all but one experiment, the device 
worked perfectly.  In the one in which it didn’t, the device worked 
91% of the time.  They were able to successfully show that their 
“eyeglass frames enabled subjects to both dodge recognition and to 
impersonate others.” (Sharif, Bhagavatula, Bauer, & Reiter, 2016) 
These two examples represent a rich and growing field of 
research.  As the rush towards full automation for unmanned 
systems continues, this type of work is both useful for improving the 
sensing systems and for identifying the types of threats that need to 
be considered during operations. 
Distinguishing Signals in Noisy Environments 
In 2013, a group of students conducted an experiment on a 213-foot 
ship to see if they could successfully change the course of the yacht 
without the crew noticing.  From the top deck of the yacht, they: 
broadcasted a faint ensemble of civil GPS signals from their 
spoofing device a blue box about the size of a briefcase toward 
the ship’s two GPS antennas. The team’s counterfeit signals slowly 
overpowered the authentic GPS signals until they ultimately 
obtained control of the ship’s navigation system. 
Unlike GPS signal blocking or jamming, spoofing triggers no 
alarms on the ship’s navigation equipment. To the ship’s GPS 
devices, the team’s false signals were indistinguishable from 
authentic signals, allowing the spoofing attack to happen covertly. 
Once control of the ship’s navigation system was gained, the 
team’s strategy was to coerce the ship onto a new course using 
subtle maneuvers that positioned the yacht a few degrees off its 
original course. Once a location discrepancy was reported by the 
ship’s navigation system, the crew initiated a course correction. In 
reality, each course correction was setting the ship slightly off its 
course line. Inside the yacht’s command room, an electronic chart 
showed its progress along a fixed line, but in its wake there was a 
pronounced curve showing that the ship had turned. 
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“The ship actually turned and we could all feel it, but the chart 
display and the crew saw only a straight line,” Humphreys said. 
After several such maneuvers, the yacht had been tricked into a 
parallel track hundreds of meters from its intended one the team 
had successfully spoofed the ship. (Animation by Erik Zumalt, 2013) 
This type of attack is not just in the lab.  Around the world, there 
have been increasing reports of navigation problems of varying 
sorts, all related to the electronic navigation aids in use to make 
navigation possible through storms, night, and disputed waters. 
The misuse of the technology has led to some very interesting 
situations: 
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) are causing problems for 
mariners transiting waters where there are high concentrations of 
fishing vessels, particularly in the East China Sea. … Local fisherman 
discovered that by putting AIS transponders on their fishing nets, 
large ships would change course for the nets, thinking they were 
vessels. … If we are to see more unmanned ships in the future, this 
needs to be rectified. What would an unmanned ship approaching 
a literal “sea” of AIS targets do without a professional mariner in 
charge to properly assess the situation? Ships would be changing 
course to avoid fishing nets, only to be “faced” with a whole new 
set of AIS targets on the new course. Shipowners may find their 
unmanned vessels turning circles in order to avoid what the 
automated equipment deems to be dangerous, but may only be crab 
pots or fishing buoys.  (Kovary, 2018) 
Conclusions 
These two examples underscore the challenge of sensing and 
interpreting, particularly in noisy environments where competing 
interests collide. 
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12. Chapter 12 Chinese UAS 
Proliferation along New Silk 
Road Sea / Land Routes 
[Carter] 
Student Learning Objectives 
Upon completion of this chapter, students should be able to: 
 
1. Explain the sectors of the Belt and Road Initiative that impact 
unmanned technology 
2. Understand the importance and impact of the relationship 
between China and the Middle East 
3. Explain the Blue Ocean Information Network 
4. Identify factors of the Digital Silk Road that impact them 
directly 
 
Progression of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Partnerships 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launch as part of the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 2013. Partnerships 
among China and other countries continue increase by engaging 
through economic and diplomatic means. The target completion 
date for BRI is 2049, the anniversary of the founding of People’s 
Republic of China. For lower income countries, the enticement of 
low-interest loans and support to build infrastructure is part of the 
attraction to a relationship with China. Current events of Brexit 
and a spilt United States political infrastructure have played into 
China’s goal of becoming a global superpower. As the U.K. and the 
Chapter 12 Chinese UAS Proliferation
along New Silk Road Sea / Land
U.S. appear to be in consistent conflict with itself and other nations, 
China’s façade to help countries through loans, technology, 
infrastructure without personal gain grows. Partnerships with the 
European Union, Middle East, Africa, Russia, Latin America and Asia 
fall into the different BRI initiative categories of Economic, 
Maritime, or Digital. The relationships formed by China have put the 
country as the world’s largest shipping nation. China is second in 
the world for economy and ranks and third in the world’s military 
powers (Tybring-Gjedde, 2020). 
 
As of March 2020, 138 countries and 30 international 
organizations are part of BRI, covering the following regions: (Figure 
12.1) 
 
• 38 countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
• 34 BRI countries are in Europe & Central Asia (including 18 
countries of the European Union (EU) that are part of the BRI). 
• 25 BRI countries are in East Asia & pacific. 
• 17 BRI countries in Middle East & North Africa. 
• 18 BRI countries are in Latin America & Caribbean. 
• 6 countries are in South East Asia. 
A complete country listing, region, and income status can be found in 
Appendix A. 
( International Institute for Green Finance II Central University for 
Finance and Economics, 2020) 
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Figure 12.1 Countries of Belt and Road Initiative as of March 2020 
Source: (International Institute for Green Finance II Central 
University for Finance and Economics, 2020) 
 
The BRI has the remained strong with the following five goals: 
 
• policy coordination 
• facilities connectivity 
• unimpeded trade 
• financial integration 
• people-to-people bonds 
 
The BRI “people to people bonds” has created a network of think 
tanks, media agreements, and establishment in communities and 
universities (Hamilton & Ohlberg, 2020). The spread of propaganda 
using these bonds, delivers a powerful message of international 
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trust within a global community, making the BRI appear attractive 
and peaceful. With the addition of Italy and Switzerland in 2020, 
reinforces BRI commitment and credibility. Along with BRI, China 
has evolved to modernize their military defense and establish 
themselves as an international arms dealer. 
 
Figure 12.2 China’s Inward Investment 
Source: (Harding, 2020) 
 
Middle East 
The BRI is critical for China in the Middle East; the gulf region is 
a global player for trade and finance. The Middle East’s partnership 
will give China advantages in trade, military operations, and 
infrastructure. Drones in this region have grown from surveillance 
to Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs). The U.S. has strict 
polices against the export of these deadly attack weapons.  In a 
ten-year period, China has sold 163 UCAVs verses the sale of 15 
Reaper drones during the same time period (Roblin, 2020). The 
largest producer of UCAVs, China Aerospace Science and 
Technology Corporation (CASC), has plans to open a factory in Saudi 
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Arabia. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are given priority by China for 
UCAVs, which are 75% cheaper than MQ-9 Reaper (Alden, Fiala, Krol, 
& Whittle, 2020). 
 
Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group has taken advantage of China’s 
freedom to sell to anyone, not restricted by export policies. Wing 
Loong I and Wing Loong II are popular UAV models sold to the 
United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.  The Wing Loong series of 
UAV are similar to the GA-ASI Predator. Saudi Arabia has acquired 
an estimated 300 UAV’s from China (Stevenson, 2019). China is in 
close competition with Turkey for supplying UAV’s to the Middle 
East. December 2019, Rainbow (CH-5) drones were exported to 
Pakistan, Egypt, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. (Figure 12.3) 
 
In the Middle East, China invests in the energy, infrastructure, 
nuclear power, agriculture and finance to strengthen the ties to 
the Middle East (Chaziza, 2020). China would bring to Iran 
telecommunications (5G), banking, ports and railways to the region. 
China’s partnership with Iran could pose detrimental to the U.S. 
Military. China and Iran would agree to joint military operations, 
training, weapons development and intelligence sharing.  This 
would give China a military advantage over the U.S. and Iran global 
ally. 
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Figure 12.3 Sale of Chinese UCAVs Along BRI 
Source: (Alden, Fiala, Krol, & Whittle, 2020) 
 
European Union 
The build out of China – EU partnerships began in 2013 with 
the recruitment of the former Swedish ambassador to an advisor 
position with Huawei. Eventually, other members of the EU were 
recruited to be advisors for Huawei. With the growth of the Huawei 
relationships enabled China to build trust and obtained signatures 
of support for the BRI from EU member states. The governing body 
of the EU does not have a formal agreement with China regarding 
BRI. However, about half EU member states signed on to the BRI 
(Hamilton & Ohlberg, 2020). China has not sealed commitments for 
BRI from the top European economies (France, U.K. and Germany). 
Other EU member states have begun participating in the BRI 
through financial, corporate, and educational sectors. In July 2020, 
Serbia received their first order of Six Chinese-built CH-92A 
combat drones. This marks the beginning of China supplying drones 
to Europe, another step-in building ties in the region. 
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Figure 12.4 CH – 92A Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) 
 Source: (Roblin, 2020) 
 
As part of the Made in China 2025 plan, Aviation and Aerospace 
Equipment is considered a priority sector. In some reports referred 
to as the “Air Silk Road”. 
  Maritime Silk Road 
 
Tracing back to 12th century BC, the East China Sea Routes 
connect mainland China to Northeast Asia. The Liaodong Peninsula 
located in this region of Asia holds critical military value, dating back 
the Sino-Japanese War (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, 
2020). The peninsula’s trade route value, natural resources, and 
military positioning makes it a cornerstone for this route of 
Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The South China Sea route is critical 
for MSR, opening China to the continent of Africa, following the 
maritime routes through the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, and Red 
Sea. China has 32,000 kilometers of coastline and more than 3 
million square kilometers of maritime land, making the country 
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a real maritime power, according to the China Engineering 
Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 
 
 
UAE is a leader in supporting China with the Maritime Silk Road 
(MSR). The creation of Khalifa Port’s CSP Abu Dhabi Terminal, by 
UAE and China shipping giants has attracted twenty additional 
Chinese companies to the area (Calabrese, 2020). This is the first 
phase of MSR for Abu Dubai. Turkey is the only country in the region 
not favorable to MSR. 
 
Blue Ocean Information Network 
In addition to the support of countries along the MSR, China 
is building an underground network for military communication 
and expanding sensors to create a “World Ocean” (Asia Maritime 
Transparency Initiative, 2020). The Blue Ocean Information Network, 
is part of MSR, will accomplish the following for China: 
 
• Information perception (internationally) 
• Target recognition 
• Active sonar 
• High-resolution marine satellites 
 
The Blue Ocean Information Network is based on Skynet and 
Submarine Net according to the PLA. China will have the ability to 
detect mineral, biological resources. With the information network 
China will have advanced unmanned cyber methods to control and 
protect the BRI. The Blue Ocean Information network combined 
with the increase of partnerships / locations along BRI will 
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Figure 12.5 Schematic Diagram of Underwater Information 
Network 
 
(Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2019) 
 
Floating Integrated Information Platforms (FIIP) (also called 
Ocean E-Stations are the most visible piece of the Blue Ocean 
Information Network. The network is currently deployed between 
the Hainan Island and Paracel Islands, and the Bombay Reef. It is 
believed a previously identified one of the was deployed to Bombay 
Reef in the Paracel Island sometime in 2018. Communications 
capabilities of the FIPP include a Ku-band satellite antenna, an L-
band satellite antenna, radio antenna, and cellular communications 
antenna. Sensing systems include an Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) antenna and an Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) antenna as well as a small air- and 
surface-search radar (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2020). 
 
Figure 12.6 Ocean E-Stations 
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Left FIIP Between the Hainan Island and Paracel Islands 
(February 7, 2019) 
Right FIIP Bombay Reef (April 28, 2020) 
Source: (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2020) 
 
Other components such as ocean buoys, fixed and relocatable 
underwater sensors to include sonar and hydrophones, unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and 
unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) could be part of the Blue Ocean 
Information Network (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2020). 
Revisiting the first edition of this textbook, Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air 
Assets, Chapter 16 Chinese Drones in Spratly Islands and Chinese 
Threats to USA forces in the Pacific, the case for cyber weapon 
spoofing of legacy GPS signals affecting the US Navy and 
commercial vessels in Pacific Ocean are relevant to the Ocean E-
Station that was placed in 2018 Bombay Reef in the Paracel Island. 
The FIIP communications functionality includes AIS, which could 
be allow for spoofing of AIS sending a fake collision alert by Closet 
Point of Approach (CPA) spoofing and negating the true alert 
transmitting to the vessel. 
 
China’s goal to complete the development of the “Belt and Road” 
sea network cooperation to meet the military and civilian 
management by 2025. China’s researchers state there is an urgent 
306  |  Chapter 12 Chinese UAS Proliferation along New Silk Road Sea /
Land Routes [Carter]
need for information acquisition in the jurisdictional sea area 
(Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2019). China 
Telcom will use the maritime information nodes, network and 
submarine network to construct ideas and continue to strengthen 
the Blue Ocean Information Network. 
 
Digital Silk Road 
 
Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative was introduced by China in 2015. 
DSR has more of a government push using Chinese commercial 
company channels. The idea to grow DSR through several vectors 
such as social media, telecom, fintech, etc. Ideally, China wants 
the homegrown companies to fit in with their specific industry, to 
become a trusted member and contributor to their specific sector. 
This would give China the ability to intertwine DSR within the 
different tech vectors. China uses to their advantage of taking lead 
in specific technology to gain members for DSR, for example next 
generation (5G). They have used mobile technologies and fiber optic 
infrastructure to entice countries to the DSR with internet/telecom 
advantages (Greene & Triolo, 2020). China also promotes their 
payment system technology, digital wallets, two-way QR codes, 
paying via social media. 
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Figure 12.7 China E-Commerce Europe 
Source: (Shi-Kupfer & Ohlberg, 2019) 
 
The fiber-optic members of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), Frankfurt 
to Mumbai via Azerbaijan added a new member November 2020. 
Turkmenistan agreed to link with Azerbaijan through cables in the 
Caspian Sea. It is suspected Iran is part of the DSR with cables 
running down the Persian Gulf. 
The drone industry plays a critical part of DSR. SZ DJI Technology 
is a leader in the global consumer drone marketplace, therefore a 
large part of the technology vector. DJI has been accused of sharing 
user information and having week cybersecurity practices. Banned 
by the U.S. Military, DJI is attempting to create a DoD version of 
their product. If DJI is successful reaching DoD level of security, it 
could allow DJI access to a broader marketplace. 
 
Conclusions 
China’s Brick and Road Initiative has covered several sectors. In 
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the context of unmanned, China has a significant role in the Middle 
East, Asia, and Africa military drone marketplace. They are 
beginning to capture the attention buyers from the Europe Union. 
China’s strong relationships across all vectors in the Middle East 
has led to a maritime advantage for trade and military operations. 
Extensive ties between China and Iran has created an unlikely 
partnership for the U.S. and allies. China has expanded technology 
under water that will lead to control of several regions if maritime 
partnerships continue to grow. The Digital Silk Road is an immediate 
cause for concern for Europe and the U.S., as consumers and 
industry become dependent on products produced by Chinese 
companies. The BRI continues to grow at an accelerated rate as 





1. Discuss the key areas of expansion of Belt and Road Initiative 
that impact the military drone marketplace. 
2. Which Silk Road initiative is a greater threat, Maritime or 
Digital? 
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13. Chapter 13 Automaton, 
AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the 
Machine – Human Barrier 
[Lonstein] 
“The development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end 
of the human race….It would take off on its own, and re-design 
itself at an ever-increasing rate. Humans, who are limited by slow 
biological evolution, couldn’t compete, and would be superseded.” 
Stephen Hawking (Cellan-Jones, 2014) 
Student Learning Objectives 
            Professor Stephen Hawking gave the cautionary warning 
above almost six years ago. While no human can predict what the 
future will hold with specific accuracy, we can examine new 
technology, blend it with the social sciences and history to develop 
generalized ideas of the societal risks and rewards of new 
technology. Students should use their imagination, experience, and 
learning to enhance their understanding of how best to implement 
technology, predict intended and unintended consequences, and 
engage in their risk-benefit analysis. This process is an essential 
precursor for the introduction of Artificial Intelligence into 
everyday life. This analysis will challenge the student to think 
critically, not merely accept statements of “experts” or 
manufacturers of even celebrity or other endorses of a particular 
technology at face value. Someone once said: “Any intelligent fool 
can make things bigger and more complex… It takes a touch of 
genius — and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction.” – 
Attributed to Albert Einstein, E.F Schumacher, and Woody Guthrie 
in various publications, for our purposes, the source of the quote 
is less important than the message. Students should be bold and 
Chapter 13 Automaton, AI, Law,
Ethics, Crossing the Machine –
brave, speak truth based on their experience, and education and 
not shy away from being unpopular or different. Conformity, for 
the sake of conformity, does not honor students’ effort in acquiring 
knowledge. It makes them more lemming and less human. Students 
should strive to be the best human one can be. 
 
Once Completed Students Should 
• Understand that they all possess unique thinking and analysis 
tools based upon their imagination, learning, experience, and 
uniqueness. Those attributes are critical to better not only 
themselves but to better mankind both by embracing new 
technology or rejecting it based upon risk. 
 
• Consider the risk of ubiquitously using automation and AI 
throughout many aspects of everyday life. Students must be 
aware of potential risks from connected technology, such as 
social media where information is simple to acquire and digest 
in seconds carry risk of abuse, manipulation or even 
degradation of human thought processes? 
 
• Be aware that there are no simple answers to the widespread 
implementation of AI and Automation and beyond the changes 
to how we, as humans do things but also consider how we 
might be changed as a result of this process. From mental and 
physical health to its impact upon future generations, the 




Humans, Humanity and Humanoids 
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            According the Merriam-Webster Dictionary a “Human” is 
defined as “a bipedal primate mammal (Homo sapiens), a 
person” (Merriam-Webster, 2020); “Humanity” is defined as “the 
quality or state of being human.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020); And 
“Humanoids” are defined as “a humanoid being: a nonhuman 
creature or being with characteristics (such as the ability to walk 
upright) resembling those of a human.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020). 
Finally, Merriam-Webster Defines Artificial Intelligence as: “1. a 
branch of computer science dealing with the simulation of 
intelligent behavior in computers and 2: the capability of a machine 
to imitate intelligent human behavior.” (Merriam-Webster, 2020) 
[See Figure 13.1] 
The question which will confront all of us in the very near future 
is what will differentiate the human and humanity, one organic the 
other more ethereal in terms of their ability to make subjective 
judgments, from the Humanoid which is not organic, nor is it 
capable of subjective thought, only objective decision making based 
upon its programming. 
Figure 13.1 The Humanoid 
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Source: Courtesy Forbes & Adobe Stock) 
 
Are We Losing Our Minds? 
Today there is no shortage of conflicting viewpoints on the law, 
ethics, and morality relating to autonomous technology and 
Artificial Intelligence. Moving beyond what is their current nascent 
state, these technologies will undoubtedly continue to become 
staples of everyday life. To focus our discussion on technology 
familiar to most if not all of us, we will examine the issues of AI and 
Autonomous operation in social media. In 2017 Liz Stillwaggon Swan 
wrote an article in the IEEE publication “Technology and Society” 
entitled “Are Social Media Making Us Stupid?” Swan asks whether 
addiction to social media amongst our youth results in a rapid loss 
in writing skills proficiency. Swan writes: 
“Social media platforms force users to think and write in bit-
like form, with acronyms substituting for sentences and emoticons 
substituting for the expression of feelings. We are learning–some of 
us more quickly than others–to adapt to a computer-dictated form 
of communication. Sherry Turkle (M.I.T.) has noted that a fluency 
with texting and tweeting is commonly correlated with a dearth of 
skills in face-to-face interactions. We’re noting, in addition, what 
social media addiction is doing to written communication: 
specifically, it’s eroding the traditional divide between speaking and 
writing.” (Stillwaggon Swan, 2017) 
 
Our focus will be on the rapidly decreasing face-to-face 
interactions associated with increased social media usage. Social 
media is a simple technology, but Swan writes it also has “broken 
time and space barriers” by allowing users to communicate with 
followers and vice-versa 24/7 around the globe instantly.[1] How do 
AI and autonomous technology result in the need for consideration 
of laws and ethics relating to their implementation in social media? 
According to Courtney Seiter, the Neurotransmitter Dopamine, 
(“the Pleasure Chemical”) and the Hormone Oxytocin (the “Cuddle 
Chemical”) play a significant role in the addictive use and near-
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blind acceptance of content on social media. According to Seiter, 
there is a strong relationship between these two behaviors affecting 
biological compounds and the online and increasingly offline 
actions of its users. Seiter writes that the roles of Dopamine and 
Oxytocin play significant roles in the psychology of social media. 
Dopamine 
Dopamine is stimulated by unpredictability, by small bits of 
information, and by reward cues—pretty much the exact conditions 
of social media. The pull of dopamine is so strong that studies have 
shown tweeting is harder for people to resist than cigarettes and 
alcohol. 
Oxytocin 
Then there’s oxytocin, sometimes referred to as “the cuddle 
chemical” because it’s released when you kiss or hug. Or … tweet. In 
10 minutes of social media time, oxytocin levels can rise as much as 
13%—a hormonal spike equivalent to some people on their wedding 
day. And all the goodwill that comes with oxytocin—lowered stress 
levels, feelings of love, trust, empathy, generosity—comes with social 
media, too. As a result, social media users have shown to be more 
trusting than the average Internet user. The typical Facebook user 
is 43% more likely than other Internet users to feel that most people 
can be trusted. So, between dopamine and oxytocin, social 
networking not only comes with a lot of great feelings, it’s also really 
hard to stop wanting more of it.” (Seiter, 2016) 
 
Slot Machines in Your Hand & Head 
            Creators of social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, 
amongst many others, did not need to look far to learn how to 
drive maximum adoption and daily dependence upon social media. 
I always enjoy the bells and whistles and lights when walking into 
a casino. Yet, after playing a bit, the usual sensation experienced 
is regret, foolishness, and quite frankly dirtiness. Much like a 
smartphone, noises, visuals, and other sensory stimulation 24 hours 
a day can lead to dependence and mistakes.  B.F Skinner, the famed 
Harvard psychologist, once said “A pigeon can become a 
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Figure 13.2 Gambling Pigeons 
Source: (Courtesy Bettmann Archive / Getty) 
So, what do pigeons and gambling have to do with social media? 
“Just as substance addicts require increasingly strong hits to get 
high, compulsive gamblers pursue ever riskier ventures. Likewise, 
both drug addicts and problem gamblers endure symptoms of 
withdrawal when separated from the chemical or thrill they desire. 
And a few studies suggest that some people are especially 
vulnerable to both drug addiction and compulsive gambling because 
their reward circuitry is inherently underactive—which may partially 
explain why they seek big thrills in the first place.” (Scientific 
American, 2013) 
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The Psychology of Social Media 
            In 2004 Dr. John Suler wrote the groundbreaking paper 
entitled the “Online Disinhibition Effect. In the paper Dr. Suler 
examined the psychology behind our behavior on line and how it 
varies from the brick and mortar world. Dr. Suler wrote in 2004: 
“Everyday users – on the Internet—as well as clinicians and 
researchers have noted how people say and do things in cyberspace 
that they wouldn’t ordinarily say and do in the face-to-face world. 
They loosen up, feel less restrained, and express themselves more 
openly. So pervasive is the phenomenon that a term has surfaced for 
it: the online disinhibition effect.” (Suler, 2004) 
What the psychological components of the Online Disinhibition 
Effect and how do they drive our online behavior? [See Table 13.1] 
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ONLINE BEHAVIOR –IS IT DIFFERENT? 
SIMPLE, VIRTUAL, ANONYMOUS 
•You Don’t Know Me (Dissociative anonymity) -As you move around the internet, most of the pe
you are. When people have the opportunity to separate their actions from their real world and iden
don’t have to own their behavior by acknowledging it within the full context of who they “r
•You Can’t See Me (Invisibility) -Even with everyone’s identity visible, the opportunity to be ph
effect. You don’t have to worry about how you look or sound when you say (type) something. Y
look or sound when you say something. 
•See You Later (Asynchronicity) -People don’t interact with each other in real time. Others ma
to reply to something you say. Asynchronous communication is like “running away” after doing some
•It’s Just a Game (Dissociative imagination) –People feel their online personae exist in a dif
demands and responsibilities of the real world. Once they turn off the computer and return to their dail
leave their online identity behind. Why should they be held responsible for what happens in an online w
reality? 
•It’s All In My Head (Solipsistic Introjection) -Absent cues combined with text communic
Sometimes they feel that their mind has merged with the mind of the online companion. R
experienced as a voice within one’s head, as if that person magically has been inserted or “in
may not know what the other person’s voice actually sounds like, so in our head we assign a v
or unconsciously, we may even assign a visual image to what we think that person looks lik
companion now becomes a character within our intrapsychic world, a character that is shape
him or herself via text communication, but also by our expectations, wishes, and needs. Be
people we know, we fill in the image of that character with memories of those other acquain
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•We’re Equals (Minimizing authority) -While online a person’s status in the face-to-face w
have as much impact as it does in the face-to-face world. If people can’t see you or your surr
president of a major corporation sitting in your expensive office, or some “ordinary” person loung
computer. 
Table 13.1 Online Disinhibition Effect 
Source: (Courtesy John Suler) 
When Facebook was conjured up one of its founders, Sean Parker, 
its President at the time said: 
“The thought process that went into building these applications, 
Facebook being the first of them… was all about: ‘How do we 
consume as much of your time and conscious attention as 
possible?'” “And that means that we need to sort of give you a 
little dopamine hit every once in a while, because someone liked or 
commented on a photo or a post or whatever. And that’s going to 
get you to contribute more content, and that’s going to get you … 
more likes and comments.” “It’s a social-validation feedback loop … 
exactly the kind of thing that a hacker like myself would come up 
with because you’re exploiting a vulnerability in human psychology. 
“The inventors, creators — it’s me, it’s Mark [Zuckerberg], it’s Kevin 
Systrom on Instagram, it’s all of these people — understood this 
consciously. And we did it anyway.” (Allen, 2017) 
 
 
Now that we have enough understanding of how social media was 
designed to psychologically effects humans, the question becomes 
how it can be used or misused.  By leveraging the known 
psychological intended effects social media can be used to cross 
the virtual / actual barrier to cause humans to take or not take 
actions or behave in a particular way. This can fulfill the objective 
of the social media platforms or actors as a tool of disinformation, 
confusion, political unrest, or even armed conflict. 
Noted internet and virtual reality Jaron Lanier recently wrote 
about these and many other concerns in his 2018 book, “Ten 
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Arguments for Deleting your Social Media Accounts Right Now.” 
In an April 2018 interview with the Intelligencer he spelled out 
his concerns about the damage social media may be doing across 
society. 
Weaponizing AI and Automation Using Social Media as the 
Delivery Method            
Lanier in a prescient and articulable fashion express his very real 
concern with the potential of social media and its digital automation 
to have profoundly dangerous affects upon the world: 
“One of the things that I’ve been concerned about is this illusion 
where you think that you’re in this super-democratic open thing, 
but actually it’s exactly the opposite; it’s actually creating a super 
concentration of wealth and power and disempowering you. This 
has been particularly cruel politically. 
Every time there’s some movement, like the Black Lives Matter 
movement, or maybe now the March for Our Lives movement, or 
#MeToo, or very classically the Arab Spring, you have this initial 
period where people feel like they’re on this magic-carpet ride and 
that social media is letting them broadcast their opinions for very 
low cost, and that they’re able to reach people and organize faster 
than ever before. And they’re thinking, Wow, Facebook and Twitter 
are these wonderful tools of democracy. But then the algorithms 
have to maximize value from all the data that’s coming in. So, they 
test use that data. And it just turns out as a matter of course, 
that the same data that is a positive, constructive process for the 
people who generated it — Black Lives Matter, or the Arab Spring— 
can be used to irritate other groups. And unfortunately, there’s this 
asymmetry in human emotions where the negative emotions of 
fear and hatred and paranoia and resentment come up faster, more 
cheaply, and they’re harder to dispel than the positive emotions. 
So, what happens is, every time there’s some positive motion in 
these networks, the negative reaction is actually more powerful. 
So, when you have a Black Lives Matter, the result of that is the 
empowerment of the worst racists and neo-Nazis in a way that 
hasn’t been seen in generations. When you have an Arab Spring, 
322  |  Chapter 13 Automaton, AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the Machine –
Human Barrier [Lonstein]
the result ultimately is the network empowerment of ISIS and other 
extremists — bloodthirsty, horrible things, the likes of which haven’t 
been seen in the Arab world or in Islam for years, if ever.” (Lanier, 
2018) 
 
            A mere two years later we have seen protests and riots 
across the United States and globe started in late May when a 
citizen in Minneapolis, George Floyd was seen dying during a police 
restraint where an officer kneeled on his neck for over eight 
minutes. Spontaneous and understandable protests and cries for 
justice ensured and social media became a tool employed to 
coordinate some of these demonstrations. Unfortunately, almost 
immediately social media’s emotional and Dopamine intensive 
qualities were manipulated to turn peaceful protests into riots, 
violence, property damage and even death across America. [See 
Figure 13.3] 
Figure 13.3 Protest Tweet 
Source: (Twitter Post @sugaaab_retweeted by 
@rave_mom_breezy) 
Large sections of the population have recently become more 
reliant upon social media, especially during the global Coviid-19 
Pandemic, which has turned to social media and away from 
broadcast media in droves. According to the Business Insider, a 
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“Harris Poll conducted between late March and early May, between 
46% and 51% of US adults were using social media more since the 
outbreak began. In the most recent May 1–3 survey, 51% of total 
respondents — 60% of those ages 18 to 34, 64% of those ages 35 to 
49, and 34% of those ages 65 and up – reported increased usage on 
certain social media platforms.” (Samet, 2020) 
Couple a significant uptrend in the global usage of social media 
with a populace that has increasingly become addictively and 
compulsively tethered to social media, and the result is an army 
of potential human assets which, to a certain degree, can be 
transformed to near humanoids. 
The ability to deploy a humanoid army, nearly instantly, anywhere 
in the world, is a potent delivery system. The ordinance must be 
programmed into the delivery vehicle.  Bots, fake accounts, fake 
news, disinformation, real-fake videos, and memes are all tools of 
social media information warfare. They have increasingly leveraged 
as a weapon of information warfare globally. 
Recently Jeff Elder of Business Insider reported: 
Media and citizen journalists are posting video, images, and 
accounts of scattered and chaotic protest events in response to the 
killing of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer, and the posts 
are being re-shared broadly. The result is an often-overwhelming 
stream of media from multiple sites and sources, and experts say 
audiences must be aware that the situation is being manipulated. 
“People need to be aware that these events on the ground are 
being spun for political reasons,” says Angie Drobnic Holan, editor-
in-chief of PolitiFact, the Pulitzer Prize-winning fact-checking news 
service of the Poynter Institute journalism think tank. Much of that 
spin likely comes from forces outside of America, the experts warn. 
“Were there foreign-backed disinformation accounts targeting 
Americans this weekend? Absolutely. I am positive that was 
happening,” says Molly McKew, a writer and lecturer on Russian 
influence who advises the non-profit political group Stand Up 
America.” (Elder, 2020) 
Information warfare is nothing new as a tool of conflict. Between 
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the 1920’s and 1940’s Germany under Hitler’s Minister of Propaganda 
Dr. Joseph Goebbels. According to Dr. Yaniv Livyatan, “Goebbels 
needed a staff of 1,000 to generate propaganda. Today all it takes is 
the click of a button.” (Livyatan, 2019) [See Figure 13.4] 
 
Figure 13.4 Dr. Joseph Goebbels 
Source: (Courtesy AP) 
Dr. Levyatan belies that social media, its ubiquitous nature, ease 
of automation and ability to instantly “push” notifications to 
subscribers instead of them searching for content makes it a 
propaganda game changer. He continues: 
So, it’s vital to understand who your audience is and what moves 
it. At the same time, the world is becoming a place where you can 
accumulate more and more knowledge of that kind. You can target 
your messages accurately. Scientifically. Think what Goebbels could 
have done with Facebook. 
“Facebook is excellent for psychological warfare because they’re 
constantly collecting information about us. An analysis of that 
information is very illuminating with respect to our personalities, 
our aspirations, our opinions. We saw that vividly in the story of 
Cambridge Analytica [which acquired data from profiles of some 
50 million Facebook users] in the 2016 U.S. election. Our behavior 
in the social networks, which we perceived as something innocent 
Chapter 13 Automaton, AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the Machine – Human
Barrier [Lonstein]  |  325
and mundane, has become an instrument through which we can 
be influenced via manipulative techniques. The information we 
volunteer, such as Likes, make it possible for those who want to, to 
understand how to communicate with us in a precise way. 
Goebbels had a ministry of 1,000 personnel whose primary task 
was not to compose messages but to go into the field and examine 
how the messages work on people. Today you can do that by 
pressing a small button. If the Nazis had come to power today, they 
would have ruled the world. 
Indeed, we see which rulers are rising to power today and what 
their messages look and sound like. We can take it that there’s a 
connection.” (Livyatan, 2019) 
 
Conclusions 
            While many consider the implementation of Artificial 
Intelligence and Autonomous Technology concepts most closely 
associated with Drones, Driverless Vehicles, Autonomous Surface 
and sub-surface and sea technology, students must keep a keen eye 
on their personal technology as well. According to Rescuetime.com 
the average American checks their cell phone 58 times each day so 
if you wanted to get a message in front of a target’s eyes, the phone 
and Social media apps are the way to do it. (McKay, 2019) When 
combined with addictive behavior and a growing reliance on short 
form messaging and content, critical thinking is under attack and 
those who seek to do harm are well aware of this troubling reality. 
 
Questions for students to consider 
1. How would you respond to the mass dissemination of false 
information on social media video designed to mislead the 
public that a terror attack was occurring in New York City 
using film from the 9/11 attacks in 2001? 
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2. Should social media technology be controlled or be subject to 
oversight and regulation from the federal government due to 
the risk it can easily be used to destabilize or even overthrow 
the nation? 
 
3. Should Social Media companies be allowed to employ 
algorithms and use encryption technology without allowing 
access to the information to the federal government or military 
in a time of national crisis? 
 
4. How would you slow the progress of the pernicious addictive 
allure of social media upon today’s youth or do you believe that 
is something best left to the social media companies 
themselves? 
 
5. Have you ever asked another who informed you that they saw 
that a particularly disturbing event occurred where they saw 
the information and their reply was Facebook, Twitter, or 
another social media platform? 
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[1] Nations such as North Korea, Iran and a few others have been 
referred to as hermit nations because to the extent technologically 
possible, they restrict the use of social media. 
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14. Chapter 14 Maritime 
Cybersecurity [Nichols] 
Student Objectives 
Students will revisit the South China Sea and Chinese Threats to 
USN and Commercial vessels in the area. 
Students will grasp the size and cybersecurity issues for the 
Maritime Transportation Sector (MTS) 
Students will understand the nuances of Cyber-Physical systems, 
Operational technology, and the Internet of Things (IoT). 
Introduction 
I would like to dedicate this bonus chapter to Dr Gary C Kessler 
and Steven D. Shepard on their 2020 release of a fascinating book 
on Maritime Cybersecurity: A Guide for Leaders and 
Managers. (Kessler, 2020). I respect and agree with everything their 
many years of experience have witnessed and put into writing on 
the subject except strategies for maritime cyberdefense in which 
the authors mistake the priorities of Vulnerabilities over real 
Threats.  The author has liberally cited this excellent work. We can 
do something about Threats  – applying appropriate countermeasures 
to reduce risk. Vulnerabilities are a constant and represent an 
existing weakness in the information system that will always be 
present, will generally increase even after a computer security 
audit, or patch(es), and may or may not be a conduit for a real Threat 
to attack an information system. The security goal is to identify 
Vulnerabilities and to reduce Threats. 
Our views are different. The author is a captain of a cruising yacht 
with 40 plus years as previous owner / master of five different 
medium – size sail and power boats. Every effort was made to 
maximize / duplicate the security of electronics, navigation 
systems, powertrain, fire suppression, pumping, SOLAS, anchoring, 
weather, piloting, RADAR, AIS, SONAR, seamanship, and passenger 
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safety on my marine craft. My charges were USCGA approved / 
inspected every two years. It took nearly 20 years to become a 
decent captain. The author made every mistake that was on some 
novice list of “don’ts” on the water. But that is called experience. My 
career has been in cybersecurity and INFOSEC. Multiple systems 
on my craft were computer aided including AIS, RADAR plots, 
navigation, USCG soundings / charts, ATN, buoys, weight 
distribution / loading, emergency systems, power, bilge, satellite 
phone, EPIRB, entertainment, three VHS radios, previously LORAN-
C, and remote communications. Threats to these coordinating 
computer – information systems were serious and might have 
denied me port entry if they were not adequately protected. [1] 
The author’s point is that qualitative information system Risk is 
~ f(Threats / Countermeasures). This is true because Vulnerabilities 
and Impact are essentially constants that drop out of the strategic 
consideration for planning for cyberdefense. Increase the Threat 
vector and we directly increase the risk. Increase applied 
Countermeasures and Risk is reduced. These can be calculated as 
qualitative levels of risk or translated into worst, best and normal 
case scenarios for comparison of incremental changes to either 
dependent variable. 
 
This chapter will not debate the (Kessler, 2020) notions of Risk 
Vs Vulnerabilities Vs Threats. There are some valid points, charts, 
procedures presented in his final chapters. (Kessler, 2020)  Instead, 
Chapter 14 will  revisit the authors research on the spoofing of 
navigation systems on vessels in the South China Seas. This will 
be followed by a section on the MTS and potential cybersecurity 
vectors and end with a section focused on the holy grail of IoT as 
related to the maritime sector. 
 
The Case for Cyber Weapon Spoofing of Legacy GPS Signals 
Affecting US Navy and Commercial Vessels in Pacific 
 In (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019), the author presented a detailed 
case for GPS spoofing by Chinese assets of  US Navy and Commercial 
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Vessels in South China Seas. It is summarized here as a starting point 
for a condensed discussion on maritime security.[2] 
U.S Navy Vessel Collisions in the Pacific 
In 2017 there was a chain of incidents/collisions involving four 
U.S. Navy warships and one U.S. Navy submarine. On 17 June, the 
destroyer USS Fitzgerald collided with the ACX, a 30,000-ton 
container ship resulting in seven dead. Records show that the ACX 
turned sharply starboard (right) at the time of collision. The captain 
of the Philippine-flagged container ship accused the Navy destroyer of 
failing to heed warning signs before the crash. Those warning signs 
came from the commercial vessels Automated Collision Systems 
(AIS) on the bridge. On 9 May, the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake 
Champlain collided with a South Korean fishing boat off the Korean 
Peninsula. There were no injuries (Department of the US Navy, 
Office of Chief of Naval Operations, 2017).  On 31 January, the 
guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam ran aground dumping more 
than 1000 gallons of oil into Tokyo Bay.  On 18 August, the ballistic-
missile submarine USS Louisiana collided with the Navy Offshore 
Support Vessel in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. There were no injuries. 
“On 20 August, the guided-missile destroyer USS John S McCain 
collided with the 600-foot oil and chemical tanker Alnic MC at 0624 
JST resulting in ten dead (Navy Information Office , 2017)”. (Weise, 
2017) 
Navy Response 
In all five incidents, the U.S. Navy blames their field leadership 
for not responding in an appropriate manner. This response means 
that the Skipper / XO / COB and at least five (5) watch sailors on 
each Naval vessel (roughly 40 – 50 personnel including bridge staff 
plus 130 lookouts on the USS McCain because of ordered watch 
conditions) have been judged incompetent (Navy Information Office 
, 2017).  Their careers are over, and some will face courts martial 
and possible brig time. This response also implies that all five Navy 
vessels’ radar, emergency positioning alert systems, AIS, sonar, and 
long-range collision avoidance equipment must have been 
functioning perfectly, without a catastrophic failure or interference 
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of any kind. This conclusion assumes that none of the ships were in 
difficult maneuverable waters or serious traffic.  The Navy blames 
funding, readiness, and training.  However, their response may not 
fully account for the commercial vessel accident data, actions 
required, o GPS positional data received (Olson, August 30, 2017). 
(Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in Cyber Domain: 
Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 2019) 
 
The Navy Official Reaction regarding the possibility of Cyber-
Weapon or Cyber-Attack 
The Navy has downplayed the possibility of a Cyber Weapon or 
Cyber Attack. Prior Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral John 
Richardson said in a tweet on Monday 23 August, referring to the 
USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald collisions, “there was no indication 
of the possibility of cyber intrusion or sabotage was involved or 
that the Navy ships were hacked, but the review will consider all 
possibilities.” (Weise, 2017) The Navy investigators after inspecting 
the physical damage to the USS McCain and USS Fitzgerald agree 
with the CNO’s conclusions (Olson, August 30,2017). 
“Navy experts in the technology and researchers at University of 
Texas at Austin say there are certainly scenarios they can imagine 
in which GPS hacks could have been used to foil ships’ navigations 
systems but emphasize there’s no evidence such attacks took place 
in the case of the Navy collisions.” (Weise, 2017) “The technology to 
jam or misdirect navigational software is readily available, though 
the Navy uses a much more robust encrypted version of GPS that 
would be very difficult to disrupt.” (Weise, 2017) 
The only way to spoof such a system is a record and replay attack, 
“where a recording is made of the encrypted location data being 
sent from GPS satellites to the naval ship.  Replaying the recording 
at a slightly later time could fool a ship into thinking it is someplace 
else. This is a very sophisticated and difficult hack that requires 
multiple recordings of the navigation data stream from multiple 
angles, and then sending the recorded signal from two or more 
locations.” (Weise, 2017) “To ensure that nearby ships do not also 
Chapter 14 Maritime Cybersecurity [Nichols]  |  333
get the false data, it would have to be transmitted from close to the 
Navy ship being targeted, perhaps using multiple drones.” (Weise, 
2017) 
However, according to “ Professor David Lust, former president of 
the Royal Institute for Navigation in the United Kingdom, “it takes 
two to Tango…. I” think you just have to attack the weakest of the 
pair, which is the commercial vessel.” Commandeering the GPS of 
the cargo ship to get it to veer off course could cause collision, and 
it is a much easier hack.” (Humphreys, 2009) 
 
The Case for a Cyber Weapon 
There appears to be valid evidence to support the theory that 
at least two of the U.S. Navy Warships, USS John McCain, and the 
USS Fitzgerald AND/OR the commercial vessels involved were the 
on the wrong end of a Cyber-Weapon and were receiving incorrect 
GPS generated positional information. In agreement with Dr. Lust’s 
conclusions, the Cyber Weapon may have been deployed by an 
adversary’s [China PLAN]  UAS off a small nearby vessel. The author 
believes that the subject Cyber-Weapon is an advanced modular 
entity that can spoof the GPS signals received by all vessels in its 
range. J.S. Warner & R.G. Johnson established in 2013 that the cyber-
security of many common automated navigational systems today 
lacks basic cyber-attack protection; vessels using incorrect data 
will make wrong decisions in terms of navigation and emergency 
responses, leading to potential collisions and deaths (Warner & 
Johnson, 2013). 
Surfacing Questions 
Spoofing is generation of false transmissions masquerading as 
P(Y) [the encrypted] Precise Signal that makes up the military vessel 
positioning basis, or unencrypted C/A [Civilian Acquisition] code 
from GPS satellites. In a virtual world tracking invalid data streams 
or non-integrity-based data is difficult, especially on three 
dimensional vessels moving in time. However, there may be more 
than one method to spoof a signal no matter how well it is 
encrypted. The cargo ships involved could have received 
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unencrypted GPS ranging; a much less complex method than is 
required for military vessels. 
 
Both ships do not need to be disabled or spoofed. All ships 
(military, commercial, recreational, specialized service) in 
international waters require detailed positional information. GPS 
systems accurately supply a 3-D position, velocity, and time fix in all 
types of weather, 24 hours a day. 
GPS satellite signals are ranging devices that deliver two signals 
made up of a civilian carrier, C/A code, NAV message, P-Code, and 
a military carrier. (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
in Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets, 2nd Edition, 
2019) 
 
Because of cost, most systems on commercial vessels have legacy 
GPS systems. In the author’s view, even if the GPS signals of the 
military vessels were not hacked the unencrypted C/A – L1 Civilian 
signal may have been.   It is also provable that this spoof is 
technically feasible on the legacy systems. Experiments by Warner 
and Johnston out of Los Alamos, and surveys by Schmidt, et al out of 
Queensland University clearly support the GPS/GNSS Cyberattack 
threat vector. (Warner, 2013)  In 2013, Humphreys and his students 
successfully spoofed an $80MM Yacht’s GPS system. (Humphreys, 
2009) 
 
What the physical damage indicates for the USS McCain and USS 
Fitzgerald is that both naval vessels appear to have collided on the 
starboard side. This leads to the theory that the Civilian vessels 
involved in crossing or approaching the US Naval vessels were 
relying on faulty information for their position.  Further, the cyber 
weapon may have been delivered by small UAS from a nearby fishing 
or recreational vessel. It would be a perfect delivery vehicle: stealth, 
quiet, low radar signature, requiring only 1- 25 watts signal spoofing 
power. Since the true GPS signal strength reaching the surface of 
the Earth is about -160dBw (1x 10**-16 Watts), a 1-Watt GPS jamming 
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spoof signal can override C/A code acquisition for more than 620 
miles (Line of Sight (LOS) to horizon.) (Warner, 2013) 
The starboard side collisions suggest that one of the vessels may 
have turned port or that the commercial ship tried to avoid a fake 
collision target received by turning starboard at the wrong time. 
The USS Fitzgerald report confirms this observation.  These are 
huge vessels. Turning, stopping, or reversing course on a dime are 
not possible – especially by a large freighter. Decisions must be 
made well in advance of potential collision alerts. This is also why 
delivery of a cyber-weapon by UAS is so attractive. It would be a 
small bird in the glasses while attention was directed to the huge 
targets closing in on each other. In the chaos, the adversary wins. 
 
How could GPS chaos be achieved against US Vessels? 
The author believes, that for the spoofing GPS signal theory 
[targeting a commercial vessel by cyber weapon to give it a false 
position and potentially cause collision to itself or another vessel], 
to be possible. It would require an enemy Unmanned Aircraft 
System (UAS) to be launched from either a sea-based vessel or land-
based intelligence station in the Spratly Islands.  The methodology 
contemplated consists of three cyber-attack activities: 
1) Breaking the existing AIS GPS commercial vessel receiver signal 
locks, 
2) Locking the AIS GPS tracking device onto the GPS Simulator 
counterfeit signal, 
3) Maintaining access by continued broadcasting of the fake GPS 
signal. 
 
The problem is interesting because there are two three-
dimensional maritime targets moving in time based on inaccurate or 
false ranging (GPS position) signals. The clocks used in GPS satellite 
systems are extremely accurate and present synchronization 
difficulties with the target naval / commercial vessel receivers. If it 
is possible to simulate and spoof the GPS signals to the commercial 
vessel using AIS collision avoidance systems (Cyber-weapon 
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CONOP), then it is also possible that the US Navy may not have given 
proper attention to the non – personnel issues in their accident 
investigations. 
 
Further, the possible delivery of such a Cyber-Weapon by close 
range UAS means that adversaries may have increased their 
knowledge management and understanding of U.S. Navy defensive 
systems. Using asymmetric warfare tactics and attacking the 
commercial traffic, which deploys legacy and cheaper GPS 
receivers, forces dependence on faulty information. Unfortunately, 
it is an effective tactic that bypasses much of the military 
modernization of GPS signals and satellites.  This same possibility 
could affect military and commercial aircraft also, especially at 
airports where traffic speeds are reduced, and aircraft are closer 
to each other.  (Nichols, et al., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in 




Think of Chinese use of swarming drones on the seas, in the air, 
floating nuclear power plants, underwater mining, robot freighters 
and anti-submarine UUVs. In the author’s view, they are 
leapfrogging US technology and antiquating defenses (Lehman, 
2017). 
 
It should be clear that the Chinese (PLAN) are heavily invested 
in military operations using unmanned aircraft and naval vessels 
in the Spratly Islands. This researcher has been tracking Chinese 
UAS and Intelligence assets /facilities / naval vessels since 2014. 
Figure 14.1 shows a glimpse of the deployment in the Spratly Area 
of Operations (AO). The black pin is the Spratly Islands group. Blue 
pins represent US Navy capital ships involved in either collisions or 
groundings in the AO. Red pins represent center of known Chinese 
UAS Intelligence elliptical paths. Green pins represent Chinese 
Intelligence facilities or seaborn assets.  An exploded map view 
Chapter 14 Maritime Cybersecurity [Nichols]  |  337
would show many more Chinese assets in the AO (Nichols R. &., 4 
May 2018). 
Given the capabilities that Chinese (and US) UAS systems can 
deploy in almost any conditions and any location, it seems 
reasonable to this researcher, that the Chinese military might test 
their cyber weapons from their UAS in the Spratly AO coverage 
to harass US vessels and potentially disrupt US Navy capital ships 
navigation systems. [This would be a natural priority for the 
Wanshan Marine Test Facility.] As a lesser alternative, the Chinese 
might take the 911 approach [ i.e. turning planes into missiles loaded 
full of fuel and ramming them straight into fixed buildings] by 
disrupting (signal spoofing) the GPS /AIS unencrypted signals of 
huge commercial vessels and forcing them to act as Greek trireme 
vessels, colliding into the US Naval vessels in restricted 
maneuverable waters. [4] 
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Figure 14.1 Chinese UAS Chinese Intelligence Assets Deployment 
in Spratlys 
 Source: (Nichols R. &., 4 May 2018) 
 
Marine Transportation System / Sector (MTS) Scope 
To their credit, Kessler and Shepard have a wonderful description 
of the MTS. (Kessler, 2020) Its size /scope and value to the economy 
as well as the enormity and complexity of its cyber structure cannot 
be overestimated. The MTS represents a very large cyberthreat 
surface, given every system with it represents a potential attack 
vector. (Kessler, 2020) 
The MTS comprises ships, shipping lines, ports, passenger 
terminals, manufacturers, cargo facilities, intermodal partners, and 
all users of these facilities globally. Every element represents a 
potential vulnerability to cyber attack – a potential weak point to 
cyberthreats – and a vector for infection of other elements in the 
MTS. (Kessler, 2020)  By 2023 there are expected to be more than 
70,000 merchant vessels on the water operating in / out of 
approximately 4,800 ports in 200 countries. Merchant ships don’t 
make money if they sit idle, they are in constant motion. (Kessler, 
2020) All modes of transportation interact with each other as cargo 
and passengers move be to disposal, tween ships, inland waterways, 
railroad cars, trucks, and airplanes. Intermodal connections are 
additional vectors for cybersecurity threats. 
(Kessler, 2020) describe the MTS as a system of systems 
comprising of six interconnected systems: ships, ports, people, 
shipping lanes, inland waters, and intermodal transfers. 
 
MTS Systems / Sector 
The Ships subsystem includes all aspects of in the lifecycle of 
a vessel, from manufacturing, to maintenance, to operations, 
communications, networks, security, and navigation systems. 
The Ports subsystem includes construction, maintenance, 
logistics, vessel traffic management, and daily port operations. 
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The People subsystem includes the entire supply chain, trading 
partners, vendors, and customers. 
The Shipping Lanes subsystem comprises the operation and 
management of companies that own ships, passengers and cargo, 
reservation and scheduling, finances, operations, and 
communications. 
The Inland Waters subsystem includes the inland waterway 
systems, Aids to navigation (ATN), Notice to Mariners (NTM) and 
dredging and maintenance. 
The intermodal Transfer subsystem describes the MTS interfaces 
with other transportation modalities, including barge, railroads, 
trucking and to lesser extent aviation. (Kessler, 2020) 
 
MTS Scope 
The MTS is a significant economic driver for the nation. It 
contributes about $5 trillion annually to the GDP, supports 30 MM 
jobs, representing 20% of the workforce. It includes 25,000 miles of 
navigable channels, 95,000 miles of shoreline, 361 commercial ports, 
50,000 federal and millions of private aids to navigation (ATNs) 
/ (ATONs), 20,000 bridges over water, greater than 3700 marine 
terminals, 200 ferry operations, 238 locks at 192 locations.  The MTS 
user community includes hundreds of thousands of small fishing , 
sightseeing, liveaboard, dive boats, and 12 million recreational boats. 
MTS waterways are shared by military, public safety, LEO vessels; 
work boats, dredge boats, buoy tenders; commercial fishing vessels; 
personal power boats and sailing vessels; and drilling platforms , 
wind turbines, moorings, and fixed location offshore facilities. 
(Kessler, 2020) 
It should be clear that the MTS environment comprises countless 
moving parts, each playing a critical role in maritime transportation 
safety and operations. Each represents a potential attack vector 
through their associated computer networks. 
 
MTS Cyber Attack Vectors / Targets 
Most maritime cyber-attacks are via operational computer 
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networks. In general, they are not designed for robust security 
nor are they modern.[5] (Kessler, 2020) identifies eight critical 
cyberattack vectors in the MTS: vessel operation, shipping line 
operations, port operations, cargo and transit, manufacturing, 
vessel traffic control (VTC), remote control and autonomous 
operations and partners. 
Vessel operations: Ships are floating networks. They include 
operational networks controlling ships systems, security and cargo 
management, bridge controls for navigation, weapons control, and 
lad / ship to ship / satellite communications. 
Shipping line operations: cargo and passenger shipping lines have 
complex outward facing networks and internal networks. They use 
the public internet for public relations, e-commerce, reservations, 
partner portals, reservations, cargo tracking and sales / marketing 
information. Internal networks handle all the vessel operations 
above plus payroll, taxes, logistics, legal compliance, route 
management and partner relations. 
Port operations: networks handle all the shipping line functions, 
vessel tracking, USCG operations, vessel traffic management 
(VTM),immigration, drug enforcement, cargo security, and links to 
intermodal carriers. 
Cargo and shipping: cargo-related operations include SCADA 
systems to move cargo, onloading / offloading, port cranes, 
security at several stages, inspections, and autonomous systems. 
Manufacturing: All the functions of the port are seen through 
the eyes of its supporting manufacturers and vendors. Critical to 
the security is supply chain management, intellectual property 
protection, and ID theft resolution. 
VTC: Managing the flow of vessels, especially in a busy port or 
narrow body of water requires reliable communications; 
positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems. Automatic 
Identification Systems (AIS), NTM,  are critical to safe operations. 
Each of these systems provides a fertile line of cyber-attack in 
geographic areas than can tolerate a low margin of error. VTC does 
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not control the recreational or commercial fishing vessels.   (Kessler, 
2020) 
Remote control and autonomy: Unmanned and autonomous 
vehicles and vessels, are emerging as 
shortage of qualified personnel becomes more acute. Remote 
control ships, tugs, docking facilities, drones, trucks, and cranes are 
sprouting up like weeds. Each can be manipulated independent of 
the owner /operator. The author did a simulation of taking over an 
oil company’s storage facilities and SCADA systems to pour 12 MM 
gallons of oil into the Chesapeake Bay. The environmental damage 
was in the billions and loss of services, crab industry, effects on the 
recreational boating industry took a decade to recover. (Nichols R. 
K., Nov 28-30 2006) 
Partners: Vulnerable computer network systems can be exploited 
as a jumping point on to a more fertile target. Attackers do not want 
your computers or your networks; they want your information. That 
is the very definition of partner in the context of cybersecurity. 
A partner is any entity that affects, the chain of custody of your 
data. Last point, the IT structure in many organizations are shared 
ownership. In terms of security, this is akin to sharing a hypo needle 
for cocaine. Organizations use the cloud as a host. Reservations, 
ticketing, are managed by an e-commerce host. It is linked to a 
financial system. This is nuts of course. So many ID frauds and 
compromised credit cards in huge numbers ought to tell us this. 
Corporate networks general use VPNs to provide access to their 
internal network via a public internet. 
Civilian ships have multiple onboard networks to handle ballast, 
propulsion, power, status monitoring and provides a pathway to 
communicate with their land-based counterparts. GPS, AIS, VHF, 
and VTS communicate over public radio channels. (Kessler, 2020) 
The MTS represents a huge cyber threat surface, given that every 
system within it represents a potential attack vector. (Kessler, 2020) 
 
Cyber-Physical Systems, Operational Technology, and the 
Internet of Things (IoT) 
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Cyber-physical systems(CPS) is the global term encompasses 
people, computers, and physical devices into an operational system. 
CPS takes advantage of sophisticated sensors, instruments, 
networks, embedded computers, SCADA brains, and combines them 
into smart infrastructures and industrial applications. CPS 
applications run the whole gamut from the smart grid; medical 
monitoring; autonomous vehicles, vessels, aircraft; process control 
systems; robotics systems; and automatic aviation and maritime 
navigation systems. (Kessler, 2020). 
Figure 14.2 Cyberwar: Chokepoints 
Source: (Nichols R.K, 2002) 
 
There are lots of views / models of CPS systems. Figure 14.2 
shows a differentiation of computer “choke points” (vulnerable to 
cyberattacks in cyberwar scenario) based on network parameters, 
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transmission media, applications, and services. Figure 14.3 shows 
the interaction between physical and cyber systems and how they 
leverage each other. 
Figure 14.3 Shared Cyber Threats in CPS System 
Source: (Nichols R. K., Nov 28-30 2006) 
Figure 14.4 shows the complex interdependencies between 
Infrastructure and the SCADA controls that dictate the inter-flows 
in a CPS system. 
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Figure 14.4 shows SCADA and Infrastructure interdependencies 
in a CPS System 
Source: (Peerenboom, 2001) 
Operational Technology (OT) comprises the technologies and 
methods that enable the cyber and physical worlds to interact. In 
OT systems, computers directly provide real-time monitoring, and 
control of physical devices such as valves, pumps, dams, power 
grids, robots and transportation systems.  Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) make up the largest OT devices. SCADA is the control 
brains of these systems and represents the preferential vector for 
cyberattacks. (Randall K. Nichols, 2000) (Nichols R. K., Nov 28-30 
2006) (Kessler, 2020) 
 
Internet of Things (IoT) 
The Holy Grail of CPS is the Internet of Things (IoT)! IoT combines 
data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI), wide available broadband 
networks (WABN), advanced sensor technology, miniaturized 
processors, embedded ASICS,[6] and advanced software to allow 
independent devices to share all kinds of information and engage 
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in network-wide decision making. This transforms traditional 
physically limited devices into smart equivalents. (Kessler, 2020) IoT 
devices number in the multi-billions. IoT applications are found in 
every business and infrastructure and home. They are single reason 
that privacy is a thing of the past. {I have taught my students the 
theory behind hacking the house smart electrical meter (installed 
in about 80% of homes without their permission or realization how 
much privacy and control of their lives was lost ). The meter-hack 
can tell the Bad Actor how many times you flush your toilet, use 
the microwave, the frequencies behind your security systems, or 
turn lights off /on or even charge your phone. All without the user 
knowledge or permission. IoT!} 
 
Computers within CPS and IoT networks are prone to the same 
threats and vulnerabilities with any other architecture BUT the span 
of control has a much larger purview. Unsecured IoT devices are a 
very real threat to the global internet and attached devices. They 
are the favorite target for criminals. Websites like censys.io and 
shodan.io allow people to search the internet for IoT devices where 
one can find passwords to hacked IoT devices. Many of them crack 
security monitoring / credit monitoring services. 
 
Maritime CPS Applications and Cybersecurity 
The trend is to increase automation systems on vessels. The 
trends is also miniaturization and to some extent replace people. 
The USN is doing this at David Taylor Research Center in Annapolis 
, MD. There goal is to automate vessels and reduce the crew size. 
The author has been on some of these experimental ships. 
There is no doubt that automation has safety and economic 
benefits and achieve precise solutions to navigation scenarios.  But 
more systems also means increasing interdependencies and more 
risky cyber vulnerabilities. New ICS and IoT technologies have 
enabled innovations inside the ship envelope and outside. From 
bridge to the engine room, system designers have endeavored to 
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build more integrated shipboard control systems (ISCS) and make 
the supply chain operations and fuel systems more efficient. 
New IoT technologies have enabled innovative systems outside of 
the ship: 
• ü Intelligent mooring systems with embedded sensors in 
mooring lines. From the bridge, these monitor tension, time, 
temperature, and predict early failure or wear. (Kessler, 2020) 
• ü Supplement Interactive Electronic Maintenance Manuals ( 
IETM) and optimize outcomes. 
• ü Act as building blocks for a Cooperative Cognitive Maritime 
Cyber Physical System (CCMCPS) to provide high-speed, low-
cost communications between ships, ports, buoys,offshore 
platforms, and shore stations. This includes automation of the 
cranes and transport vehicles. Ports are the bottleneck for 
movement of cargo. CCMCPS optimizes communication 
between vessels, ports, maritime terminals and cargo handling 
systems. (Kessler, 2020) 
Autonomous maritime systems are starting to incorporate drones, 
UAVs to provide surveillance, situational awareness in a port area, 
for both manned and unmanned ships. UAVs supplement ship 
inspections by their ability to safely enter locations too dangerous 
for people. They are used for a detailed analysis of hull or cargo 
bay in real-time. They supplement autonomous tugs and mooring 




IoT, ICS and autonomous maritime systems are technologies 
bringing the maritime industry into the future. While the individual 
devices are small the systems they interact with are large, complex, 
and complete with cybersecurity issues because fundamentally, 
they are merely computer hardware, software, SCADA, and 
communications technologies. 
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Student Questions 
1. Make a taxonomy of the top cybersecurity attacks on the MTS 
and needed cyber defenses to reduce risk in the chosen 
targets. 
2. Where do you see the IoT landscape in terms of cyber attack 
payloads on MTS. 
3. There is no silver bullet to protect the MTS “elephant.” So 
develop an initial plan to protect the “part of the elephant” 
subsystem in the MTS that offers the biggest return on 
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[1] (Kessler, 2020) discuss exactly this kind of scenario in their 





[2] The full case with equations of closest point of approach  (CPA) 
are given in www.newprairiepress.org/ebooks/27/ 
[3] The South China Seas GPS scenario is the sole speculation of 
the author based on his research and proposals during 2017-2018. It 
is not the opinion of KSU, NPP, CADS or any official in the line of 
publication. The USN has admitted that cybersecurity of its systems 
and commercial vessels has vulnerabilities. They have devoted 
significant resources to the cybersecurity threats /  subject under 
command of an Admiral. There is significant work to mitigate these 
navigational threats. 
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[4] Triremes were used in the Peloponnesian Wars to ram at about 4 
knots at a 60-degree angle of attack. The greater the angle of attack 
the lesser the speed requirement for ramming. What is interesting is 
that the Athenians used a multi-trireme attack, an early predecessor 
to Swarm tactics. They also used grappling hooks to engage the 
enemy ships directly up close. This was the predecessor to piracy 
tactics in the 1500’s – 1830’s. Wikipedia. 
[5] Authors evaluation based on his research at KSU. 
[6] ASICs= Application specific integrated Circuits & circuit boards 
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Chapter 10: UAS, the Fourth Amendment and Privacy [Shay] 
 
Appendix A – Summary of UAS Provisions in H.R. 302
(Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, 2018) 
SEC. 343. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT TEST RANGES. 
The Administrator is directed to carry out and update a program 
for the use of six test ranges to facilitate the safe integration of 
unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace. The program 
will coordinate with the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
and test range operators to develop standards for UAS that support 
UAS capabilities specific to beyond visual line of sight operations, 
nighttime operations, operations over people, operation of multiple 
UAS, and unmanned aircraft system traffic management. The 
Administrator is directed to collaborate with the Center of 
Excellence for Unmanned Aircraft Systems to carry out research 
supporting the above operations. Waivers for operations at test sites 
to support the above research will be streamlined. 
SEC. 344. SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT IN THE ARCTIC. 
The Secretary of Transportation shall develop a plan to designate 
permanent areas in the Arctic where small unmanned aircraft may 
operate 24 hours per day, for research and commercial purposes. 
These operations include UAS operations beyond visual line of sight 
and below 2,000 feet in altitude. 
SEC. 345. SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SAFETY STANDARDS. 
The Administrator shall establish risk-based safety standards 
related to design, production, and modification of small UAS. The 
geographic location, altitude, and sense and avoid capabilities shall 
be taken into consideration when establishing such standards using 
a set of performance-based requirements.  Manufacturers will be 
required to provide the FAA: aircraft operating instructions, 
maintenance procedures, be subject to inspections by FAA to 
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ensure compliance of aircraft and be required to provide a 
statement of compliance to the FAA for UAS platforms. The Center 
of Excellence for Unmanned Aircraft will establish an UAS research 
facility to study appropriate safety standards. 
SEC. 346. PUBLIC UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS. 
The Administrator shall create a streamlined process for issuance 
of a certificate of authorization to facilitate the capability of public 
agencies to develop and use test ranges. Government public safety 
agencies may operate an UAS under 4.4 pounds within visual line of 
sight, less than 400 feet above the ground, during daylight and at 
least 5 miles from an airport. 
SEC. 347. SPECIAL AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS. 
The Secretary shall use a risk-based approach to determine if 
certain UAS may operate safely in the national airspace prior to 
the completion of certain rulemakings if operations do not create a 
hazard to users of the national airspace system or the public. 
SEC. 348. CARRIAGE OF PROPERTY BY SMALL UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FOR COMPENSATION FOR HIRE. 
Within one year of bill passage, the FAA shall update existing 
regulations to authorize the carriage of property by operators of 
small UAS for compensation or hire, considering performance-
based requirements and varying levels of risk to other aircraft and 
people or property on the ground. The FAA shall create a 
certification process pending a rulemaking for persons seeking the 
carriage of property for hire. 
 
SEC. 349. EXCEPTION FOR LIMITED RECREATIONAL 
OPERATIONS OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT. 
This section states that a person may operate a small UAS without 
certification or operating authority from the FAA if: the aircraft 
is flown for recreational purposes, the aircraft is operated in 
accordance with a community- based organization’s safety 
guidelines developed in coordination with the FAA, is flown within 
visual line of sight, does not interfere with manned aircraft, is flown 
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below 400 feet above the ground, the operator passes an online 
aeronautical knowledge and safety test, and the aircraft is 
registered with the FAA. The FAA may periodically update the 
required community-based organization standards including the 
marking and remote identification requirements flying under these 
recreational parameters. 
SEC. 350. USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS AT 
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION. 
The Administrator shall update standards and procedures for the 
use of UAS at institutions of higher education for education and 
research purposes. 
SEC. 351. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS INTEGRATION 
PILOT PROGRAM (IPP). 
The Administrator shall improve the acceptance of applications 
from state, local, or tribal jurisdictions for the IPP to accelerate the 
safe integration of UAS in the national air space with the focus of 
testing and validating new concepts, including beyond visual line 
of sight operations, detect and avoid technologies, command and 
control links, navigation, weather, and human factors. IPP 
operations are limited to operation during daylight hours, and 
limited operations over public roads and sporting events. The data 
from IPP operations will be made available to the FAA to inform 
future rulemaking and standards. 
SEC. 352. PART 107 TRANSPARENCY AND TECHNOLOGY 
IMPROVEMENTS. 
No later than 30 days after bill passage, the Administrator shall 
publish a sample of the safety justifications offered by applicants 
for small UAS waivers and airspace authorizations that have been 
approved by the Administrator. The Administrator shall review the 
authorization process to provide real time confirmation and review 
of application status capabilities. 
SEC. 353. EMERGENCY EXEMPTION PROCESS. 
The Administrator shall update the Special Government Interest 
process for local law enforcement agencies and first responders to 
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use UAS in response to catastrophe, disaster, or other emergency 
situations in addition to developing best practices for such uses. 
SEC. 354. TREATMENT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OPERATING 
UNDERGROUND. 
An unmanned aircraft system that is operated underground for 
mining purposes shall not be subject to regulation or enforcement 
by the FAA under relevant law. 
SEC. 355. PUBLIC UAS OPERATIONS BY TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENTS. 
This section amends a section of the U.S. Code relating to public 
UAS operations by tribal governments. 
SEC. 356. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR KNOW 
BEFORE YOU FLY CAMPAIGN. 
The FAA is appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 2019-2023 
for the Know Before You Fly educational campaign to broaden UAS 
safety awareness. 
 
SEC. 357. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS PRIVACY POLICY. 
UAS operations shall be carried out in a manner that respects 
and protects personal privacy consistent with the United States 
Constitution and federal, state, and local law. 
SEC. 358. UAS PRIVACY REVIEW. 
The Comptroller General of the United States National 
Telecommunication and Information Administration shall review 
privacy issues and concerns associated with UAS operations. Such 
a review will include analysis of the response to the Presidential 
memorandum titled “Promoting Economic Competitiveness While 
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic 
Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” dated February 15, 2015, as well 
as examine existing federal law related to personal privacy, identify 
specific issues and concerns that may limit the civil or criminal 
remedies regarding inappropriate operation of UAS, and identify 
deficiencies in federal, state, and local privacy protections. Such 
findings will be submitted in a report to Congress 180 days after 
passage of this bill.[1] 
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SEC. 359. STUDY ON FIRE DEPARTMENT AND EMERGENCY 
SERVICE AGENCY USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS. 
The Administrator shall conduct a study on the use of UAS by 
fire departments and emergency service agencies regarding how 
such entities currently use UAS, obstacles to greater use of UAS 
by these entities, ways to provide greater support of UAS use by 
these entities, analysis of laws or regulations that present a barrier 
to career, combination, and volunteer fire department use of UAS, 
airspace limitations of emergency use of UAS, roles of UAS in fire/
emergency services, and technical challenges to greater adoption of 
UAS by fire departments and emergency agencies. 
SEC. 360. STUDY ON FINANCING OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SERVICES. 
The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct a 
study within 60 days of passage of the bill that studies appropriate 
fee mechanisms to recover costs of regulation and safety oversight 
of UAS and air navigation services for UAS. The study shall consider 
any recommendations of the Drone Advisory Committee, the costs 
incurred by the FAA for regulation and safety oversight of UAS, 
general classes of UAS activity, the number of FAA employees 
dedicated to UAS programs, the use of privately-operated 
unmanned traffic management (UTM) systems, and the projected 
growth of UAS, among other factors. A report of appropriate fee 
mechanisms will be provided to Congress 180 days after the passage 
of the bill. 
SEC. 361. REPORT ON UAS AND CHEMICAL AERIAL 
APPLICATION. 
No later than one year after passage of the bill the FAA shall 
submit to Congress a report evaluating which aviation safety 
requirements under Part 137 of title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations should apply to UAS engaged in aerial spraying of 
chemicals for agriculture purposes. 
SEC. 362. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SAFETY. 
It is the sense of Congress that UAS operations near airports 
Appendices Chapters 10 & 12  |  361
pose a significant safety concern. The Administrator should pursue 
remedies available, including referrals to other government 
agencies for criminal investigations with respect to persons who 
operate unmanned aircraft in an unsafe manner. The Administrator 
should prioritize measures to educate the public about operating 
UAS over areas that have temporary flight restrictions in place due 
to the risk of wildfires, as well as partner with state and local law 
enforcement to enforce laws so that UAS do not interfere with 
efforts of emergency responders.  Manufacturers should take steps 
to educate consumers about safe and lawful UAS operations. 
SEC. 363. PROHIBITION REGARDING WEAPONS. 
Unless authorized by the Administrator, a person may not operate 
a UAS that is equipped or armed with a dangerous weapon. Persons 
in violation are liable for a civil penalty not more than $25,000 for 
each violation. 
SEC. 364. U.S. COUNTER-UAS SYSTEM REVIEW OF 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION PROCESSES. 
No later than 60 days after passage of this bill the Administrator 
shall review agencies currently authorized to operate Counter-
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-UAS). The review should include the 
process of interagency coordination of C-UAS activity, standards 
for operation of C-UAS, safety of the NAS, protecting individuals’ 
property on the ground, non-interference with avionics of manned 
aircraft and traffic control systems, operational procedures and 
protocols during C-UAS operations, adequate training for persons 
using C-UAS systems, best practices of C-UAS systems, and current 
airspace authorization information from LAANC. The Administrator 
shall report to congress on the above described review 180 days 
after passage of the bill. 
SEC. 365. COOPERATION RELATED TO CERTAIN COUNTER UAS 
TECHNOLOGY. 
The Secretary of Transportation shall consult with the Secretary 
of Defense to streamline deployment of C-UAS in the national 
airspace. 
SEC. 366. STRATEGY FOR RESPONDING TO PUBLIC SAFETY 
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THREATS AND ENFORCEMENT UTILITY OF UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS. 
Within one year of passage of the bill, the FAA shall develop 
a comprehensive strategy to provide outreach to state and local 
governments, local law enforcement agencies, and first responders 
on how to identify and respond to public safety threats posed by 
UAS, in addition to opportunities to use UAS to enhance 
effectiveness of local law enforcement and emergency responders. 
The FAA shall establish a website for the above entities that provides 
guidance on these topics. 
SEC. 367. INCORPORATION OF FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION OCCUPATIONS RELATING TO UNMANNED 
AIRCRAFT INTO VETERANS EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION. 
The FAA will work with the Veterans Affairs Department to 
determine whether occupations in the Administration relating to 
UAS can be incorporated into the Veterans’ Employment Program. 
SEC. 368. PUBLIC UAS ACCESS TO SPECIAL USE AIRSPACE. 
The Secretary of Transportation shall issue guidance for the 
expedited and timely access to special use airspace for public UAS 
to assist federal, state, local, or tribal law enforcement organizations 
in conducting law enforcement, emergency response, or other 
activities. 
SEC. 369. APPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNATION. 
This section makes corrections to now consider railroad facilities 
as critical infrastructure that could potentially restrict the nearby 
operation of UAS. It also mandates that by 31 March the 
Administrator will publish an NPRM regarding how to carry out the 
requirements outlined in this section. 
 
SEC. 370. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ADDITIONAL RULE-
MAKING AUTHORITY. 
It is the sense of Congress that UAS beyond visual line of sight 
operations, operations at night, and operations over people have 
tremendous potential to enhance commercial and academic use, 
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spur economic growth, improve emergency response as it relates to 
critical infrastructure like roads, bridges, utilities, water and power, 
ultimately speeding response times. Integrating UAS safely into the 
national air space including the above operations should be a top 
priority of the FAA as it pursues additional rulemakings. 
SEC. 371. ASSESSMENT OF AIRCRAFT REGISTRATION FOR 
SMALL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT. 
The Secretary of Transportation and the National Academy of 
Public Administration will estimate and assess compliance of small 
UAS registrations pursuant to the FAA rule “Registration and 
Marking Requirements for Small Unmanned Aircraft.” The Secretary 
shall report to Congress the findings of the assessment one year 
after passage of this bill. 
SEC. 372. ENFORCEMENT. 
The Administrator shall establish a pilot program to take 
advantage of available remote identification technologies for 
purposes of safety and enforcement of UAS operators not in 
compliance with applicable federal laws and regulations. The pilot 
program will establish a mechanism for the public and law 
enforcement to report UAS operations that violate federal laws and 
regulations. The data from that reporting shall be reported to 
Congress one year after passage of the bill. 
SEC. 373. FEDERAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. 
A study will be conducted on the roles of federal, state, local, and 
tribal governments in regulating low-altitude operations of UAS. 
The study shall include the state of law federally and locally as it 
pertains to UAS, potential gaps in authority, analysis of regulatory 
consistency, and infrastructure requirements necessary to monitor 
low-altitude UAS operations[2]. 
SEC. 374. SPECTRUM. 
The FAA shall provide the relevant Congressional Committees 
of Jurisdiction a report on UAS allocation of Aeronautical Mobile 
R Service (AM(R)S) and control links for UAS by the World Radio 
Conferences in 2007 (L-band, 960-1164 MHz) and 2012 (C-band, 
5030-5091 MHz) for operations within the UTM system or outside 
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of such system. The report will address operation barriers to using 
the spectrum and determine if some spectrum frequencies are not 
suitable for UAS use. 
SEC. 375. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AUTHORITY. 
A violation of privacy policy by a person that uses an UAS for 
compensation or hire in the national airspace shall be an unfair and 
deceptive practice in violation of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act (15U.S.C. 45(a)). 
 
SEC. 376. PLAN FOR FULL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
(UTM) 
FAA and NASA shall develop a plan to allow the implementation 
of UTM services that expand operations beyond visual line of sight 
and ensure the safety and security of all aircraft as established 
in the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016. The UTM 
system pilot program will work with industry stakeholders to allow 
testing of UAS operations in airspace above test ranges including 
IPP sites. Testing of remote identification and tracking technologies 
is permitted and will be evaluated by the Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking 
Committee. Under this pilot program, blanket waiver authority will 
be granted to UAS operators by a UTM pilot program selectee that 
otherwise would fall under a case-by-case approval basis. The UTM 
pilot program will develop safety standards and outline roles and 
responsibilities of industry and government in establishing UTM 
services that allows commercial and noncommercial operations. 
This section outlines a number of additional logistical details to be 
considered in the implementation of the UTM pilot program that are 
more appropriate to be described in a separate forum. 
SEC. 377. EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTAIN UTM 
SERVICES. 
No later than 120 days from passage of this bill the FAA will 
determine if certain UTM services may operate safely in the national 
airspace system. If the FAA determines that certain UTM services 
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may operate safely in the national airspace, then requirements for 
safe operations will be established. The Administrator will provide 
expedited procedures for making the assessment and 
determinations where the UTM services will be provided primarily 
or exclusively in airspace above areas in which UAS operations pose 
low risk, such as croplands and areas that are not congested. 
SEC. 378. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that any person that uses UAS for 
compensation or hire should have a written privacy policy 
consistent with section 357 that is appropriate in nature and scope 
of the activities regarding collection, use, retention, dissemination, 
and deletion of any data collected during operation of UAS. Such 
privacy policy should be publicly available.[3] 
SEC. 379. COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL OPERATORS. 
The FAA should make available by website any certification of 
waiver or authorization, a spreadsheet of UAS registrations with 
relevant details, description of UAS operations in general locations 
and expirations of those operations, links to any applicable privacy 
laws associated with those operations, a list of any operations that 
collect personably identifiable information and relevant details of 
the collection of data, and details of the operations of the UAS 
including location, date, time, etc. 
SEC. 380. TRANSITION LANGUAGE. 
This section ensures that certain orders, determinations, rules, 
and other actions based on authority from the FAA Modernization 
and Reform Act of 2012 continue to have legal effect after their 
appeal or recodification. 
SEC. 381. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS IN RESTRICTED 
BUILDINGS OR GROUNDS. 
This section amends the United States Code to make it a crime to 
knowingly operate UAS with the intent to enter or operate within or 
above restricted areas. 
SEC. 382. PROHIBITION. § 40A. OPERATION OF UNATHORIZED 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OVER WILDFIRES 
Any person who operates an UAS and knowingly or recklessly 
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interferes with a wildfire suppression or emergency response 
efforts related to wildfire suppression shall be fined or imprisoned 
for not more than two years. 
SEC. 383. AIRPORT SAFETY AND AIRSPACE HAZARD 
MITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT. 
The FAA shall work with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
to ensure that technologies that are used for UAS mitigation do 
not adversely impact or interfere with safe airport operations, 
navigation, air traffic services, or the national air space. The FAA 
shall develop a plan to authorize, permit, and certify UAS mitigation 
systems and charter an Aviation Rulemaking Committee to provide 
recommendations on the matter. The FAA shall test UAS mitigation 
technology at five airports through year 2023. These activities are 
exempt from laws that previously restrict such activity like the 
Aircraft Sabotage Act, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 
and the Wiretap Act. 
SEC. 384. UNSAFE OPERATION OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT. 
Any person that operate an UAS and knowingly interferes with a 
manned aircraft or an airport, including the runway exclusion zone, 
shall be fined or face up to one year in jail. If serious bodily harm 
occurs, then UAS operators face a fine and up to 10 years of jail time. 
 
 
Appendix B – Summary of CFR 14 Part 107 (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2016) 
Part 107. OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS. 
• Unmanned aircraft must weigh less than 55 lbs. (25 kg). 
• Visual line-of-sight (VLOS) only; the unmanned aircraft must 
remain within VLOS of the remote pilot in command and the 
 person manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS. 
Alternatively, the unmanned aircraft must remain within VLOS 
of the visual observer. 
• At all times the small unmanned aircraft must remain close 
enough to the remote pilot in command and the person 
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manipulating the flight controls of the small UAS for those 
people to be capable of seeing the aircraft with vision unaided 
by any device other than corrective lenses. 
• Small unmanned aircraft may not operate over any persons not 
directly participating in the operation, not under a covered 
structure, and not inside a covered stationary vehicle. 
• Daylight-only operations, or civil twilight (30 minutes before 
official sunrise to 30 minutes after official sunset, local time) 
with appropriate anti-collision lighting. 
• Must yield right of way to other aircraft. 
• May use visual observer (VO) but not required. 
• First-person view camera cannot satisfy “see-and-avoid” 
requirement but can be used as long as requirement is satisfied 
in other ways. 
• Maximum groundspeed of 100 mph (87 knots). 
• Maximum altitude of 400 feet AGL or, if higher than 400 feet 
AGL, remain within 400 feet of a  structure. 
• Minimum weather visibility of 3 miles from control station. 
• Operations in Class B, C, D and E airspace are allowed with the 
required ATC permission. 
• Operations in Class G airspace are allowed without ATC 
permission. 
• No person may act as a remote pilot in command or VO for 
more than one unmanned aircraft operation at one time. 
• No operations from a moving aircraft. 
• No operations from a moving vehicle unless the operation is 
over a sparsely populated area. 
• No careless or reckless operations. 
• No carriage of hazardous materials. 
• Requires preflight inspection by the remote pilot in command. 
• A person may not operate a small unmanned aircraft if he or 
she knows or has reason to know of any physical or mental 
condition that would interfere with the safe operation of a 
small UAS. 
• Foreign-registered small unmanned aircraft are allowed to 
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operate under part 107 if they satisfy the requirements of part 
375. 
• External load operations are allowed if the object being carried 
by the unmanned aircraft is securely attached and does not 
adversely affect the flight characteristics or controllability of 
the aircraft. 
• Transportation of property for compensation or hire allowed 
provided that- 
◦ o The aircraft, including its attached systems, payload, and 
cargo weigh less than 55 pounds total. 
◦ o The flight is conducted within visual line of sight and not 
from a moving vehicle or aircraft; and 
◦ o The flight occurs wholly within the bounds of a state and 
does not involve transport between (1) Hawaii and another 
place in Hawaii through airspace outside Hawaii; (2) the 
District of Columbia and another place in the District of 
Columbia; or (3) a territory or possession of the United 
States and another place in the same territory or 
possession. 
• Most of the restrictions discussed above are waivable if the 
applicant demonstrates that his or her operation can safely be 
conducted under the terms of a certificate of waiver. 
Part 107. REMOTE PILOT IN COMMAND CERTIFICATION AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES. 
• Establishes a remote pilot in command position. 
• A person operating a small UAS must either hold a remote pilot 
airman certificate with a small UAS rating or be under the 
direct supervision of a person who does hold a remote pilot 
certificate (remote pilot in command). 
• To qualify for a remote pilot certificate, a person must: 
◦ o Demonstrate aeronautical knowledge by either: 
Passing an initial aeronautical knowledge test at an FAA-
approved knowledge testing center; or 
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§ Hold a part 61 pilot certificate other than student pilot, 
complete a flight review within the previous 24 months, 
and complete a small UAS online training course provided 
by the FAA. 
◦ o Be vetted by the Transportation Security Administration. 
◦ o Be at least 16 years old. 
• Part 61 pilot certificate holders may obtain a temporary remote 
pilot certificate immediately upon submission of their 
application for a permanent certificate. Other applicants will 
obtain a temporary remote pilot certificate upon successful 
completion of TSA security vetting. The FAA anticipates that it 
will be able to issue a temporary remote pilot certificate within 
10 business days after receiving a completed remote pilot 
certificate application. 
• Until international standards are developed, foreign- 
certificated UAS pilots will be required to obtain an FAA- 
issued remote pilot certificate with a small UAS rating. 
A remote pilot in command must: 
• Make available to the FAA, upon request, the small UAS for 
inspection or testing, and any associated documents/records 
required to be kept under the rule. 
• Report to the FAA within 10 days of any operation that results 
in serious injury, loss of consciousness, or property damage of 
at least $500. 
• Conduct a preflight inspection, to include specific aircraft and 
control station systems checks, to ensure the small UAS is in a 
condition for safe operation. 
• Ensure that the small unmanned aircraft complies with the 
existing registration requirements specified in § 91.203(a)(2). 
A remote pilot in command may deviate from the requirements of 
this rule in response to an in-flight emergency. 
Part 107. AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS. 
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• FAA airworthiness certification is not required. However, the 
remote pilot in command must conduct a preflight check of 
the small UAS to ensure that it is in a condition for safe 
operation. 
Part 107. MODEL AIRCRAFT. 
• Part 107 does not apply to model aircraft that satisfy all of the 
criteria specified in section 336 of Public Law 112-95. 
• The rule codifies the FAA’s enforcement authority in part 101 
by prohibiting model aircraft operators from endangering the 
safety of the NAS. 
 
 
Appendix C – Summary of changes due to CoViD-19 pandemic in 
UAS CFR 14 Part 107 & Part 135 (“Coronavirus guidance & resources 
from FAA,” 2020) 
 
Drone Use for Response Efforts 
 
The FAA is enabling drone use for COVID-19 response efforts 
within our existing regulations and emergency procedures. Our 
small unmanned aircraft rule (Part 107) and Certificate of 
Authorization process allow operators to transport goods and 
certain medical supplies – including test kits, most prescription 
drugs and, under certain circumstances, blood – provided the flight 
complies with all provisions of the rule or authorization. The FAA 
also issues special approvals, some in less than an hour, for flights 
that support emergency activities and appropriate government, 
health, or community initiatives. The agency’s Systems Operations 
Support Center is available 24/7 to process emergency requests. 
Safety is the top consideration as we review each request. 
 
Expanded Drone Operations 
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The FAA has received inquiries about expanded drone operations 
to respond to COVID-19. We are addressing the inquiries using 
our existing Part 135 on-demand certification process. Follow us 
on Twitter @FAADroneZone and Facebook @FAADroneZone for the 
latest drone news. 
 
Relief for Certain Persons and Operations during the COVID-19 
Outbreak 
The FAA has published a Special Federal Aviation Regulation 
(SFAR) that provides regulatory relief to a wide range of people 
and operations affected by the COVID-19 public health emergency. 
The relief applies to pilots, crew members and other FAA certificate 
holders including some drone pilots who have been unable to 
comply with certain training, recency-of-experience, testing, and 
checking requirements due to the outbreak. It also provides relief 
to certain people and pilot schools who are unable to meet duration 
and renewal requirements, including extending the validity period 
of FAA medical certificates. FAA has developed FAQs (PDF) to help 
explain the regulatory relief. 
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[1] After a search for this report, the authors were unable to confirm 
whether or not the Office of the Comptroller General of the United 
States National Telecommunication and Information Administration 
produced a report or ever requested an extension on its delivery.  It 
would have been due to congress by late March of 2019. 
[2] After a search for this study, the authors were unable to confirm 
whether or not the study was produced.  The assumption is the FAA 
would deliver this study.  It is unclear who or when this study would 
be expected to be delivered and to whom. 
[3] An important omission from this summary is the exemption from 
this section for “the media”. 
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( International Institute for Green Finance II Central University for 
Finance and Economics, 2020) 
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Country Region Income Group 
“Afghanistan South Asia Low income 
Albania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Algeria Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
Angola Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
Latin America & 
Caribbean High income 
Armenia Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Austria Europe & Central Asia High income 
Azerbaijan Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Bahrain Middle East & North Africa High income 
Bangladesh South Asia Lower middle income 
Barbados Latin America & Caribbean High income 
Belarus Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Benin Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Bolivia Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Brunei Darussalam East Asia & Pacific High income 
Bulgaria Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Cabo Verde Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Cambodia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Chad Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Chile Latin America & Caribbean High income 
China East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
Cook Islands East Asia & Pacific 
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Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Congo, Rep. Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Costa Rica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Côte d’Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Croatia Europe & Central Asia High income 
Cuba Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Cyprus Europe & Central Asia High income 
Czech Republic Europe & Central Asia High income 
Djibouti Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
Dominica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Ecuador Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
El Salvador Latin America & Caribbean Lower middle income 
Equatorial Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
Estonia Europe & Central Asia High income 
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Fiji East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
Gambia, The Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Georgia Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Greece Europe & Central Asia High income 
Grenada Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Guyana Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
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Hungary Europe & Central Asia High income 
Indonesia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Iran, Islamic Rep. Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
Iraq Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
Italy Europe & Central Asia High income 
Jamaica Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Kazakhstan Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Kiribati East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Korea, Rep. East Asia & Pacific High income 
Kuwait Middle East & North Africa High income 
Kyrgyz Republic Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
Lao PDR East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Latvia Europe & Central Asia High income 
Lebanon Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Libya Middle East & North Africa Upper middle income 
Lithuania Europe & Central Asia High income 
Luxembourg Europe & Central Asia High income 
Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Malaysia East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
Maldives South Asia Upper middle income 
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Malta Middle East & North Africa High income 
Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
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Micronesia, Fed. 
Sts. East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Moldova Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
Mongolia East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Montenegro Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Morocco Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Myanmar East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Namibia Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
Nepal South Asia Low income 
New Zealand East Asia & Pacific High income 
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Niue East Asia & Pacific 
North Macedonia Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Oman Middle East & North Africa High income 
Pakistan South Asia Lower middle income 
Panama Latin America & Caribbean High income 
Papua New Guinea East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Peru Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Philippines East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Poland Europe & Central Asia High income 
Portugal Europe & Central Asia High income 
Qatar Middle East & North Africa High income 
Romania Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Russian Federation Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Samoa East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
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Saudi Arabia Middle East & North Africa High income 
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Serbia Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Seychelles Sub-Saharan Africa High income 
Sierra Leone Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Singapore East Asia & Pacific High income 
Slovak Republic Europe & Central Asia High income 
Slovenia Europe & Central Asia High income 
Solomon Islands East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Somalia Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Upper middle income 
South Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Sri Lanka South Asia Lower middle income 
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
Suriname Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Tajikistan Europe & Central Asia Low income 
Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Thailand East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
Timor-Leste East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Togo Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Tonga East Asia & Pacific Upper middle income 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Latin America & 
Caribbean High income 
Tunisia Middle East & North Africa Lower middle income 
Turkey Europe & Central Asia Upper middle income 
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa Low income 
Ukraine Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Middle East & North 
Africa High income 
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Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean High income 
Uzbekistan Europe & Central Asia Lower middle income 
Vanuatu East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Venezuela, RB Latin America & Caribbean Upper middle income 
Vietnam East Asia & Pacific Lower middle income 
Yemen, Rep. Middle East & North Africa Low income 
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa Lower middle income 
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